Introduction & Details
Logistics is the backbone of any military operation from invasion, to occupation, to reconsolidation. Without a consistent and reliable supply of equipment, munitions, rations, and reinforcements, operations begin to hollow out from within and allow even the strongest militaries to be whittled away. Insurgents and other actors conducting asymmetric warfare throughout history have sought to reduce the effectiveness of their enemies not only on the battlefield, but before the battle has begun.
One of the most crucial ways this has been achieved has been to strike valuable logistics convoys supporting conventional militaries that are orders of magnitude stronger than often-ragtag insurgent groups. The Vietnam War, The Chechen Wars, the Russian and American occupations of Afghanistan, and the Iraq War, are all contemporary examples of conflicts where significantly better resourced military superpowers have been bogged down and even repulsed by insurgent groups who understood the value of targeting logistical infrastructure. Understanding how these attacks are executed, what tactics and patterns these attacks follow, and what countermeasures have been employed by counterinsurgent forces to mitigate the danger posed to supply lines will help to illuminate the war being fought to enable operations from the tactical level to the strategic level.
Past Uses & Renowned Cases
The idea of ambushing supply convoys before they reach their destinations has been employed since the first insurgencies, thousands of years ago. In more contemporary conflicts, the advent of modern weaponry has significantly increased the amount of destruction an insurgent force can inflict upon their opponents. The following examples illustrate three different contemporary scenarios between the years of 1965-2024 that demonstrate how insurgent forces were able to target their opponent’s logistical infrastructure to their own advantage and how those counterinsurgent forces were forced to adapt in response.
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During the Vietnam War, on September 2nd, 1967, a supply convoy of 90 trucks from the 54th Transportation Battalion and the 666th Light Truck Battalion moving supplies supporting the American mission in Vietnam was struck by a North Vietnamese Army (NVA) company of approximately 60 men. The convoy was moving through the narrow An Khe Pass and was only being protected by two Jeep gun trucks, one leading the convoy and one at the rear. The NVA company launched a primary ambush from an entrenched position on a hill above the road, firing down into the trucks. The lead jeep was struck by a recoilless rifle round in the initial ambush and became disabled. A secondary ambush initiated on the other half of the convoy targeted a 5,000-gallon tanker, further blocking the road and trapping the convoy in the kill zone. Ambush response standard operating procedure (SOP) had not been established and the drivers disembarked to return fire. This proved to be a tactical error as the American truck drivers were under equipped due to their support role status and quickly ran out of ammunition. In a span of ten minutes, the NVA had destroyed or damaged 30 vehicles, killed seven American servicemen and wounded another 17. By the time air support responded to the scene, the NVA company had escaped under the cover of darkness. This ambush would mark the first of many conducted during the Vietnam War and would go on to become a recurring issue for supply convoys under the 8th Transportation Group.
Doctrinal shifts to enable rapid deployment of mechanized and air units, implementation of new standard operating procedures for drivers to escape enemy kill zones, and more widespread implementation of larger, more powerful gun trucks were all steps taken by the United States to mitigate the danger posed to supply convoys. Two months later in November of 1967, mining and sniper attacks against convoys would become a weekly occurrence, and by January of 1968 with the onset of the Tet Offensive, large scale ambushes like the one covered in this example also became near weekly occurrences, persisting until the end of the offensive. Tactics employed by the NVA would continue to evolve alongside American countermeasures and would continue to persist throughout the war. (1)
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During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the 1980’s, attacks against supply convoys by Afghan Mujahideen fighters were a chronic issue. One such attack was executed against a Soviet and Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) supply column of several hundred trucks moving from the Soviet Turkmenistan border town of Torghundi to the Soviet garrison in Kandahar in September of 1984. Many of the trucks were loaded with gasoline from the city of Shindand, but unbeknownst to the Soviet supply column, a detachment of 250 Mujahideen fighters set up a kill zone on a stretch of highway roughly seven kilometers long (calculated to be the length of the convoy from lead to rear) outside the suburbs of Kandahar. The available Mujahideen were split into individual groups and assigned to engage specific sectors of the halted convoy with rocket-propelled grenades and 82mm recoilless rifles. All groups were directed to open fire simultaneously as the head of the convoy reached the Ashoqa villages outside of Kandahar.
Planning for the ambush was both thorough and intensely secretive as fighters moved in the night to establish positions. Villagers along the route were either reluctant to join due to fear of retaliation from Soviet soldiers or were left completely unaware. On the morning of the attack, fighters temporarily detained villagers to ensure total secrecy. The Soviet convoy, devoid of proper reconnaissance or quick response air capabilities, was caught completely by surprise and quickly descended into panic, with tanks and APCs firing in random directions to little effect. Several gasoline trucks caught fire and the fire spread to other trucks, resulting in a chain reaction causing several secondary explosions. Within a span of 30 minutes, Mujahideen forces recounted direct hits on roughly 50 vehicles, with many more damaged from the explosions. Troops who did escape did so by fleeing out of range of Mujahideen weapons and did not pursue the fighters. This ambush was the start of a five-year long battle for control over Kandahar’s western road that only ended with the Soviet withdrawal from the country in 1989.
The Soviets attempted to reestablish a presence in the valley through the implementation of security outposts and forward operating bases which resulted in Mujahideen forces responding with their own field fortifications. With consistent pressure being applied by Mujahideen fighters who were able to maintain the initiative, the Soviets relented and established a bypass route to the north of the area in 1985. Ambushes, raids, shelling and mining attacks, blocking lines of communication, and sieges were all persistent issues posed for Soviet forces stretched across the population dense regions of Afghanistan (particularly around the Kabul and Jalalabad area) throughout the entirety of the occupation. Similar ambushes at Qala-e Haidar, Sadre Azam Hill, Mazar Creek, Sisay, the Jalalabad-Asadabad Road, Kanday, and Mamur Hotel outside of Kabul are all valuable case studies that span across the war that highlight Soviet troubles in establishing and maintaining logistics across the country. (2)
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On April 9th, 2004, the 724th Transportation Company of the United States Army was ambushed while protecting a supply convoy moving 60 miles from Camp Anaconda to the north gate of Baghdad International Airport. The convoy consisted of 17 fuel trucks and two bobtail tractors operated by American defense contractor KBR, with supporting American forces comprising of five gun trucks (2 HMMVs, 2 5-ton tractors, and a 5-ton cargo truck, all outfitted with at least one crew-served weapon), with an additional HMMV provided by the 644th Transportation Company to bring the total number of vehicles to 26 with an escort vehicle to prime mover ratio of 1:4. Four days prior to the attack, Shia cleric Muqtada al-Sadr had called for a jihad against Western coalition forces and April 9th also happened to coincide with the one year anniversary of the fall of Baghdad. An hour into the route, the convoy was struck by a well-coordinated attack from various Salafist and Shia insurgents who had been pushed into the area by elements of the 1st Cavalry Division the day prior. An ambush initiated by IEDs and a barrage of small arms and rocket propelled fire left seven of the fuel trucks and one of the HMMVs, a third of the overall convoy, stranded in the kill zone. Six KBR drivers and an American soldier were killed, with eight soldiers and four other KBR drivers wounded. Insurgent forces also captured one KBR driver and two soldiers. (3)
This ambush was one of the first engagements between coalition forces and insurgent militias during the Iraq War, and the 2004 spring fighting season marked a major turning point in the war that caused massive territorial setbacks to the American-led coalition. This ambush was not the only one conducted that day but was by far the deadliest. A spike in attacks against coalition forces continued across Easter weekend and were maintained by insurgents into June. Convoy composition adapted, gun truck to prime mover ratio increased from requiring a 1:10 ratio to a 1:5 ratio, and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) evolved to meet the growing threats throughout the duration of the war to varying levels of success. (4)
Purpose of Use & Details
The purpose for insurgent groups in conducting these ambushes is straightforward: to deny state forces the logistical support needed for conducting operations. This is not unique to insurgencies and is frequently implemented in larger, conventional conflicts, with a prime example being the American submarine campaign in the Pacific and German submarine campaign in the Atlantic during the Second World War. Even in the current ongoing war in Ukraine, partisan groups like BOAK have been a constant thorn in the side of the Russian war effort by sabotaging logistics equipment and infrastructure within Russia proper. However, in an insurgency, these sorts of attacks can lead to significant hardship for any counterinsurgent with examples ranging from the partisan fighting groups of the Second World War to the American occupations of Afghanistan and Iraq during the Global War on Terror.
Insurgents need not only be non-state actors, with the example of North Vietnamese Army elements penetrating into South Vietnamese territory to harass American and ARVN resupply efforts and footage of Ukrainian squad and platoon sized elements attacking Russian logistics being increasingly common as the war continues to drag on. The wars of the late 20th and early 21st century have imparted invaluable wisdom to militants of all forms of organizational structures in waging war in an asymmetric capability. Large, set piece battles are not the only way wars are fought and won, and any attempt to hollow out an opponent’s operational capability before they can muster their full strength has turned the tide of conflict for scores of people and will continue to be implemented by the underdogs of the world.
Technical Analysis
The United States Army defines an ambush as a “surprise attack from a concealed position on a moving or temporarily halted target.” Usage of small arms, explosive devices (improvised and conventional), and anti-vehicle weaponry has proven to be the most effective way for insurgents to attack convoys in contemporary insurgency settings. Many successful ambush sites factor in visibility of the kill zone, ability to conceal and cover the ambushing force, and further ability to egress the area after the attack from a concealed withdrawal route. Knowledge of local terrain and conditions are an indispensable aspect to waging asymmetric fighting, with American conflicts in Vietnam and the Global War on Terror, Russian campaigns in Chechnya, and Israeli thrusts into the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Lebanon all serving as useful case studies. All of these countries have dedicated vast resources in developing counterterrorism methods over recent decades and all of them have found themselves at the receiving end of vicious ambushes despite their focus on deterrence. Most successful ambushes typically succeed if the attacker successfully implements the elements of secrecy during all phases of the ambush prior to its initiation, simplicity in communication between ambush participants, surprise at the initiation, initiative during the ambush, and ultimately mobility in exfiltrating from the battlespace. (5)
Effective target prioritization is also an integral part of conducting any ambush, with the lead and rear of a convoy column being the first targets an attacking force may engage in order to restrict the target’s movement within the kill zone. While no two insurgencies are the same, neither are two ambushes. What might work in one location one day can be completely ineffective in another location at another point in time, especially if the force on the receiving end of a previous ambush has had time to make adequate preparations and arrangements to safeguard against further attacks. These attacks can be relatively inexpensive to execute and have massive logistical implications for counterinsurgent forces. For example, utilization of first-person view (FPV) drones to attack supply trucks and thinly armored personnel carriers can kill and maim troops, leading to costly casualty evacuations, and can delay resupply to areas in time sensitive situations, all for the price of a few hundred to a few thousand dollars. In calculating return on investment and forcing an occupying force to reconsider the cost of maintaining an occupation, the appeal is self-evident.
Countermeasures
The steps that counterinsurgent forces have taken to mitigate and respond to ambushes on logistical infrastructure have come in a variety of different ways with varying levels of success. Most actions taken typically fall into the reactive category. One of the most visible methods of combating these attacks has been through increasing the capacity for units to react to being caught in an ambush. This has come in many different forms from active engagement, like employing gun trucks in the Vietnam War, to more passive methods, like coalition forces deploying Mine-Resistant Ambush Protected, or MRAP, vehicles during the War on Terror. Simply dividing equipment and resources across the entirety of the convoy and avoiding over consolidation helps in the sense that if there is a successful ambush, large amounts of supplies are not lost in just a handful of vehicles. Coupling this with moving faster to minimize the chance of being hit can prove effective as well. More logistically intensive solutions can come in the form of the establishment of checkpoints to act as a quick response force in potentially problematic areas. Coordination with mechanized units and/or air units, whenever and wherever pragmatic, has also found its place in mitigating insurgent attacks against logistical support.
Employment of hybrid actions that can fall in the category of both reactive and proactive have the potential at reducing attacks committed against convoys. Targeting local insurgent logistical efforts and infrastructure has also been employed to mitigate the operational and tactical capacity of these groups, with Israeli Air Force and Defense Force strikes against Palestinian militant organizations illustrating this method. One of the most effective ways at reduction of attacks is the prioritization of community necessities of population centers along supply routes. If counterinsurgent forces can ensure local cooperation, insurgents become limited in their operational capacity as they are denied the information, shelter, and resupply required to conduct offensive operations against regime forces.
Denying insurgents the ability to mobilize popular support, capture state assets, and obtaining support from external sources serves to further the counterinsurgents goals by destroying the incentive for local populations to support insurgent activities. This endeavor, however, is a lot more complicated in reality than it is in theory. The “hearts and minds” campaign has proven to be a psychological and logistical uphill battle that is often failed, even by some of the most powerful military forces in history. All it takes is one miscommunication to completely undo months, if not years, of community integration for any counterinsurgent force.
Open-Source Intelligence & Field Examples
Afghanistan - Taliban ambush of American convoy in Afghanistan
Chechnya - Chechen ambush of a Russian vehicle column in Second Chechen War
Iraq - IEDs being used against American troops in Iraq
Works Cited (Chicago-style)
(1) - Killblane, Richard. 2006. “Convoy Ambush Case Studies.” https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA592921.pdf.
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(2) - Ali Ahmad Jalali, Lester W Grau, and Marine Corps. 1999. The Other Side of the Mountain: Mujahideen Tactics in the Soviet-Afghan War. Madison, Ala.: Mentor Enterprises.https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/tr/pdf/ADA376862.pdf
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(3) - “Transportation Corps in Operation Iraqi Freedom 2 April Uprising.” United States Army Transportation Corps, transportation.army.mil/history/april_uprising.html.
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(4) - Killblane, Richard. 2006. “Convoy Ambush Case Studies.” https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA592921.pdf.
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(5) - “Actions on the Objective - Ambush.” US Army Maneuver Center of Excellence , www.moore.army.mil/Infantry/DoctrineSupplement/ATP3-21.8/chapter_08/CombatPatrols/ActionsontheObjective_Ambush/index.html.