Arakan Army

Insurgency Overview

The Arakan Army (AA), also known as the Arakha Army, is an ethnic armed organization (EAO) based in Rakhine State, Myanmar. Formed in 2009 and led by General Twan Mrat Naing, the Army is predominantly made up of ethnic Rakhine. As a member of the government-aligned Northern Alliance, it has played a major role in the ongoing Myanmar Civil War and is one of the country’s largest EAOs with over 15,000 troops. It controls the entirety of the Rakhine State along the country’s western coast and parts of Chin State to its north. Along with its political wing, the United League of Arakan (ULA), the Army seeks self-determination for the Rakhine people by increasing federal autonomy within Myanmar. It has been accused of atrocities and war crimes, particularly against Rohingya Muslims, who are a minority in Rakhine State (1).

AA troops capturing the Tatmadaw’s Western Regional Military Command in September 2024.

History & Foundations

Since gaining independence from British rule in 1948, Myanmar has been a hotbed for various insurgent groups and ethnic armed organizations, groups formed by the country’s numerous ethnic minorities to fight for increased sovereignty. In 1962, General Ne Win established an oppressive military dictatorship that would rule the country in various forms until 2011. Secessionist sentiment began to grow amongst the Rakhine people living in what was then known as Arakan State, one of the poorest regions in Myanmar, as they watched other EAOs wage low-level insurgencies during this period. They began to form their own EAOs, including the Arakan Liberation Party and the Arakan Independence Army. In 1989, the junta changed place names across the country to replace those created by the British. Burma was renamed Myanmar and Arakan State was renamed Rakhine (2).

On April 10, 2009, the Arakan Army was formed. Initially based out of the northern Kachin State, the Army created a headquarters and began to train its forces with the help of the Kachin Independence Army (KIA). It started out with a mere 27 soldiers (2). Its first combat engagement was in 2011 when fighting between the Tatmadaw, Myanmar’s military, and the KIA, a regional EAO, broke out over control of key territory where the government planned to build hydroelectric dams. The Arakan Army took up arms alongside the KIA. Earlier that year, the military junta was dissolved and a civilian government took its place. Led by former Tatmadaw general Thein Sein, the government began to gradually implement reforms and increase freedoms (3).

Eventually, the Army was able to relocate to Rakhine State in 2014 and began its own campaign against the Tatmadaw a year later. By this point, it had expanded to 1,500 troops (4). In 2016, it formed the Northern Alliance, along with the KIA and several other EAOs, as a coalition to fight against the Tatmadaw. From 2015 to 2018, the AA engaged the Tatmadaw in a series of intermittent clashes in northern Rakhine State and neighboring Chin State (5). In January 2019, the AA attacked several police posts near the Myanmar-Bangladesh border. During the raids, the Army killed 13 police officers and captured two border posts. The Tatmadaw responded with increased deployments and operations against the AA in the area (6).

What followed over the next two years was the most intense period of fighting between the Tatmadaw and the AA up until that point. While the AA continued to attack Tatmadaw and police outposts, the military carried out regular strikes on AA positions. The conflict resulted in the displacement of thousands of civilians (7). During the conflict, the AA and two other members of the Northern Alliance, the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army and the Ta'ang National Liberation Army, formed the Three Brotherhood Alliance. The alliance was formed because, at the time, the KIA was in peace talks with the government while the rest of the Northern Alliance continued their fight (5). In November 2020, the Tatmadaw and the AA brokered a ceasefire once the Army had managed to solidify control of most of northern Rakhine State and began to autonomously administer the area without the presence of the central government (8).

In February 2021, after a decade of democracy, the Tatmadaw deposed the civilian government led by then-leader Aung San Suu Kyi. Over the year, discontent began to rise. The junta brutally cracked down on protesters, empowering EAOs and the exiled civilian government to take up arms against the Tatmadaw. By the end of 2021, the country was embroiled in an all-out civil war. The existing ceasefire between the AA and the Tatmadaw soon fell apart and renewed fighting began in July 2022 after the Tatmadaw ordered an airstrike on an AA base in Karen State, killing six AA soldiers (9).

This time, however, things were different. The Tatmadaw was in a tough position, being under attack from numerous EAOs and the People’s Defence Force (PDF), the armed forces of the exiled civilian National Unity Government. Despite the AA’s hostile relationship with the previous government, it found itself in a de facto alliance with the PDF. After a few months of fighting in the familiar northern Rakhine State and southwestern Chin State, the AA and Tatmadaw came to yet another tedious and short-lived ceasefire in November 2022 (1).

This ceasefire was broken with the launch of Operation 1027 in October 2023, a joint operation carried out by the Northern Alliance along with several other EAOs and paramilitaries. The operation was the Alliance’s most coordinated offensive to date, starting with attacks on Tatmadaw positions in Kachin and Shan state along the Myanmar-China border, in which the AA participated. The AA started its own offensive in Rakhine State the next month, leaving the Tatmadaw overextended (10). Junta forces responded with indiscriminate strikes on rebel-controlled areas. In May 2024, the Tatmadaw and allied militias massacred 76 villagers alleged to have ties to the AA in the village of Byian Phyu. Before being killed, many were tortured and raped while Tatmadaw forces burnt down most of the village (11).

Throughout 2024, the Army launched its first major offensives in the southern portion of the state. The AA captured the Tatmadaw’s Western Command headquarters, its major military headquarters for the region, after four months of fighting. This was a major blow for the junta (12). By December 2024, the AA had consolidated control of the entirety of mainland Rakhine State, while its allies in Operation 1027 had also seen major territorial gains. In early 2025, the AA extended its operations into neighboring regions, capturing multiple junta bases along the borders of Rakhine, Magway, Bago, and Ayeyarwady. These actions have positioned the AA as a dominant force in western Myanmar, seriously threatening the Tatmadaw’s authority (14).

Meanwhile, the AA were fighting a very different enemy. The Rohingya are an ethnic group who are also predominantly from Rakhine State, where they are a majority in the northern region where the Army’s power is concentrated. The Rohingya have long been an extremely persecuted minority in Myanmar. They are not granted citizenship, thus making them a stateless people, and their rights are heavily restricted (14). Sectarian violence between the Muslim Rohingya and the Buddhist Rakhine exploded in 2016 after the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA) began its insurgency against the Tatmadaw. Following its attacks on border posts, the Tatmadaw began to indiscriminately attack Rohingya villages. Many human rights violations were committed by the military, such as the destruction of households, rapes, extrajudicial killings, and other acts of violence that have left hundreds of thousands of Rohingya displaced (15).

In recent years, the AA has committed numerous atrocities against Rohingya civilians under the justification of alleged ties to insurgent groups such as the ARSA, who the AA alleges have collaborated with the junta (16). The Army is alleged to have killed thousands of Rohingya and displaced many more. Dozens of Rohingya villages were burned down by the AA in 2024 (17). In one incident in August 2024, over 150 Rohingya were killed by AA drone and artillery strikes while fleeing the war near the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, which the AA denies (18).

March 2025 ARSA engagement against the AA.

Objectives & Ideology

Besides seeking Arakan sovereignty, the Arakan Army is not particularly ideologically motivated. The Army is not secessionist; it seeks to obtain more autonomy for Rakhine State within Myanmar. It calls this ideology “the Way of the Rakhita.” Similar to the United Wa State Army (UWSA), it has begun to set up its own administration and public works in Rakhine State. While the AA has been successful in capturing and controlling a large swath of territory, it is unclear whether it could maintain a semi-autonomous state in the absence of conflict (2).

Early in its existence, the AA espoused Rakhine nationalism, but it has changed its tune in recent years. While the Army is largely made of ethnic Rakhine and exists to further their interests, it uses the name Arakan instead of Rakhine to represent all of the people living in Rakhine State, formerly known as Arakan State, instead of just the Rakhine (19). This differentiates the AA from other EAOs, as many are explicitly nationalist and fight along ethnic lines. That being said, the AA’s complicated relationship with Rakhine’s Rohingya population calls their claims of tolerance into question. While the organization alleges to have begun a process of reconciliation with the Rohingya, many are skeptical of its intentions, given past atrocities (20).

Political & Military Capabilities

The Arakan Army controls tens of thousands of square kilometers in and around Rakhine State and has managed to administer its territory independently of the central government since 2020. This is done through the ULA. Before the conflict, Rakhine State had a population of over three million, most of whom are ethnically Rakhine with a significant Rohingya minority (8). Along with the KIA and the UWSA, the AA is one of the largest EAOs operating in Myanmar. While it claims to have over 30,000 troops, the real number is likely between 15,000 to 20,000 (21, 22). Many of its soldiers are young men in their 20s, though it has recruited many women as well (7). The Army is well-trained and heavily armed, receiving training and equipment from other more seasoned EAOs such as the KIA and the UWSA. It has acquired small arms such as various AK-pattern rifles from its allies and captured larger equipment, such as artillery and armoured vehicles, from the Tatmadaw (23).

AA troops smoking in a muddy trench.

Approach to Resistance

The Army employs a mix of guerrilla warfare and conventional assaults against the Tatmadaw. Initially relying on hit-and-run tactics and ambushes in periodic skirmishes, it has transitioned to prolonged sieges and urban warfare, successfully capturing many towns and military bases. Over the course of the ongoing civil war, the AA has managed to take control of trade routes along the Myanmar-Bangladesh border, cutting off key supply lines for the Tatmadaw. It has leveraged strategic ceasefires and alliances to its advantage, allowing it to consolidate its power and coordinate large-scale offensives (1). Multi-front attacks like Operation 1027 have been effective because while the AA and its allies fight from their strongholds, the Tatmadaw is stretched far across the country (10). The AA has been accused of numerous war crimes against Rohingya civilians and Tatmadaw soldiers. In its defense, the group claims that these are the actions of individual soldiers and are not ordered by the Army’s leadership (4).

Relations & Alliances

The AA has received support from the neighbouring Indian and Chinese governments, with the intention of protecting these countries’ significant investments in Myanmar. Indian government officials allegedly met with AA leaders in late 2024, despite the past targeting of Indian infrastructure projects in Myanmar including roads and ports (24). Meanwhile, China has allegedly supplied the AA with arms, a claim that Chinese officials deny (23). Part of the stated goal of Operation 1027 has been to root out illegal gambling operations and scam centres along the China-Myanmar border. Typically, China has not allowed significant military action from EAOs along its border, but because of the benefit to Chinese security, it is alleged that the operation has received approval from Chinese officials (10). On the other hand, the AA’s relationship with Bangladesh, which its territory borders, is much more strained. While both parties have expressed their intentions to maintain positive diplomatic relations, AA troops have attacked Bangladesh border guards (25). The displacement of Rohingya who have largely fled to Bangladesh has also put stress on the relationship (21).

The AA has forged connections with other EAOs involved in the civil war, most notably as a part of the Three Brotherhood and Northern Alliances. While not formally aligned with the National Unity Government, the two organizations have found themselves in a de facto alliance against the Tatmadaw, and the portions of their territories that border each other have been peaceful. Recently, the NUG and AA have begun to normalize their relations (26). The AA has also received material support from the UWSA, which is not directly active in the civil war. The AA seeks to establish a similar arrangement to the self-administered zone controlled by the UWSA in Wa State (5). Meanwhile, the AA has intermittently clashed with Rohingya insurgent groups. It claims that Rohingya insurgent groups, including the ARSA, RSO, and Arakan Rohingya Army, fight alongside the Tatmadaw. The conflict between the groups has fueled the anti-Rohingya violence perpetuated by the AA (20).

Works Cited

(1) Hlaing, K. H. (2023, April 21). Understanding the Arakan Army. Stimson Center. https://www.stimson.org/2023/understanding-the-arakan-army/

(2) Linn, K. (2019, February 28). ‘Way of Rakhita’: dream or nightmare? Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2019/02/way-of-rakhita-dream-or-nightmare/#

(3) Human Rights Watch (2012, March 20). “Untold Miseries”: Wartime Abuses and Forced Displacement in Burma’s Kachin State. https://www.hrw.org/report/2012/03/20/untold-miseries/wartime-abuses-and-forced-displacement-burmas-kachin-state

(4) Mathieson, D. (2017, June 11). Shadowy rebels extend Myanmar’s wars. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2017/06/shadowy-rebels-extend-myanmars-wars/

(5) Bynum, E. (2020, February 12). Dueling Ceasefires: Myanmar’s Conflict Landscape in 2019. Armed Conflict Location & Event Data. https://acleddata.com/2020/02/12/dueling-ceasefires-myanmars-conflict-landscape-in-2019/

(6) The Irrawaddy (2019, January 8). President Convenes Top-Level Security Meeting in Wake of AA Attacks. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/president-convenes-top-level-security-meeting-wake-aa-attacks.html

(7) Anonymous (2020, November 18). Why more women are joining Myanmar’s Arakan Army insurgency. The New Humanitarian. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/news-feature/2020/11/18/myanmar-women-army-arakan-rakhine-female-soldiers-peace

(8) Bhattacharyya, R. (2024, December 28). 5 Factors That Catapulted Arakan Army to Unprecedented Success Against the Myanmar Military. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2024/12/5-factors-that-catapulted-arakan-army-to-unprecedented-success-against-the-myanmar-military/

(9) Hlaing, K. H. (2022, October 3). Insurgents in Myanmar’s Rakhine State Return to War on the Military. United States Institute for Peace. https://web.archive.org/web/20231129000026/https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/10/insurgents-myanmars-rakhine-state-return-war-military

(10) Head, J. and Luo, L. (2023, November 9). A turning point in Myanmar as army suffers big losses. BBC. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-67305690

(11) Wei, B. (2024, June 4). Arakan Army: Myanmar Junta Killed 76 in Village Massacre. The Irrawaddy. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/arakan-army-myanmar-junta-killed-76-in-village-massacre.html

(12) The Guardian (2024, December 21). Myanmar rebels claim control over major western military headquarters. https://www.theguardian.com/world/2024/dec/21/myanmar-rebels-claims-control-over-major-western-military-headquarters

(13) Martin, M. (2025, February 20). Arakan Army Posed to “Liberate” Myanmar’s Rakhine State. Center For Strategic & International Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/arakan-army-posed-liberate-myanmars-rakhine-state

(14) Wende, R. L. (2022, March 23). Young people in Myanmar's Rakhine State tackle ethnic divisions. UNHCR. https://www.unhcr.org/news/stories/young-people-myanmars-rakhine-state-tackle-ethnic-divisions

(15) Bhattacharya, S. (2025, April 1). Bangladesh: Change of Reign in Arakan Army. Sri Lankan Guardian. https://slguardian.org/bangladesh-change-of-reign-in-arakan-army/

(16) Mizzima (2024, February 10). RSO denounces Arakan Army and junta accusations, affirms Rohingya rights. https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/02/10/7035

(17) Human Rights Watch (2024, August 12). Myanmar: Armies Target Ethnic Rohingya, Rakhine. https://www.hrw.org/news/2024/08/12/myanmar-armies-target-ethnic-rohingya-rakhine

(18) Peck, G. (2024, August 10). Ethnic armed group suspected of deadly attack in Myanmar on Rohingya trying to flee fighting. Associated Press. https://apnews.com/article/rohingya-rakhine-maungdaw-bangladesh-refugees-edb7b9df01ae4c20795c9c149c9bbcc0?utm_source=copy&utm_medium=share

(19) Narinjara News (2024, April 12). Rebranding Arakan Army to represent all people in Rakhine State: AA spokesperson. https://www.narinjara.com/news/detail/66195139a777fb8405e3315b

(20) Bhattacharyta, R. (2024, October 30). Rohingya Community Is Divided Over Arakan Army’s Plan for ‘Inclusive Administration’. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2024/10/rohingya-community-is-divided-over-arakan-armys-plan-for-inclusive-administration/

(21) Davis, A. (2024, February 1). Myanmar junta in a make-or-break Rakhine fight. Asia Times. https://asiatimes.com/2024/02/myanmar-junta-in-a-make-or-break-rakhine-fight/#

(22) Naing, I. (2025, January 10). As Arakan Army gains ground in Myanmar, peace remains elusive. Voice of America. https://www.voanews.com/a/as-arakan-army-gains-ground-in-myanmar-peace-remains-elusive-/7931879.html

(23) Corr, A. (2020, May 28). China’s diplo-terrorism in Myanmar. LICAS News. https://spotlight.licas.news/china-s-diplo-terrorism-in-myanmar/index.html

(24) Lone, W. and Ghoshal, D. (2024, September 23). India extends unprecedented invite to Myanmar’s anti-junta forces, sources say. The Print. https://theprint.in/world/exclusive-india-extends-unprecedented-invite-to-myanmars-anti-junta-forces-sources-say/2280218/

(25) Mizzima (2015, August 27). Arakan Army attack Border Guard Bangladesh patrol. https://www.mizzima.com/news-domestic/arakan-army-attack-border-guard-bangladesh-patrol

(26) The Irrawaddy (2023, April 10). Myanmar’s Civilian Govt Seeks Closer Ties With Arakan Army on 14th Anniversary. https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmars-civilian-govt-seeks-closer-ties-with-arakan-army-on-14th-anniversary.html