Insurgency Overview
Cossacks have a centuries-long history in Ukraine and have fought countless wars against invaders from all great powers surrounding the region. The cultural relevance of the Cossacks increased during the nineteenth century, when they became, on the one hand, a romantic model for Ukrainian intellectuals, and on the other deeply tied to the autocratic tsarist regime. Originally, Cossacks were organized communities with a mixed ethnic heritage that were subsequently coopted to fight for the tsar in the borderlands of the Russian Empire.
Following the Russian Civil War, Cossacks went through periods of repression and rehabilitation under Soviet rule. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Cossacks have played an intermittent role in many post-Soviet conflicts. Their military activities increased in relevance after the 2014 secession of Donetsk and Lugansk from Ukraine, culminating in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, with many Cossack communities indirectly supporting or joining Russian forces.
Video from the channel of the commander of the Dnepr Cossack Brigade, a Russian unit staffed by Cossacks:
History & Foundations
Cossack history is deeply connected to Ukraine, and vice versa. Originally a nomadic people, Cossacks eventually established ties with the Russian monarchy, which employed them as ad hoc military forces in the borderlands of the Russian Empire while also allowing them a degree of autonomy as communities. Through their history, Cossacks eventually became an ethnic group that identified more with a certain geographic area—roughly encompassing the lands between the Volga and Dnepr rivers and the Caucasus—and their militarized lifestyle more than a specific population. The earliest autonomous polities that emerged in modern Ukraine were the self-ruling Cossacks, broadly united under the authority of the Cossack Hetmanate, until Catherine the Great of Russia’s great centralizing and modernizing drive led to the Hetmanate’s abolishment during the eighteenth century.
As Imperial Russia imposed stricter control on what had once been a chaotic borderland of little interest to the tsars, the legacy of Cossack identity contributed to and contrasted with the self-understanding of the people inhabiting the region, which became known as Little Russia (1). The ethnonym Little Russian became a contested term in the nineteenth century, when a nascent movement of Ukrainian nationalism opposed the idea that Ukrainians had much in common with Russia proper. Throughout the era of romanticism nationalism, a Ukrainian mythology rooted in Cossack identity was developed by Ukrainian intellectuals (2).
Cossacks once again appeared as significant actors in Ukrainian history during the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, when the region became a battleground between various warring factions. One of the most notable was the short-lived pro-German and White-affiliated (i.e., opposing the Bolsheviks) Second Hetmanate, aptly named after Pavlo Skoropadskij, its leader and hetman, the highest rank in the Cossack military hierarchy. Remarkably, almost all sides fighting in Ukraine at the time used Cossack symbology to some extent, including the soviets, or revolutionary workers’ councils (3).
Another remarkable event in Cossack history was the formation of the Don Republic, also known as the Almighty Don Host, a self-proclaimed independent Cossack republic that controlled parts of the Donbas and other regions to the east of modern Ukraine’s borders between 1918 and 1920. This brief separatist state was the last time Cossacks mobilized to restore a form of political independence that had been lost by the end of the eighteenth century and that never again materialized.
While Cossacks fought on all sides of the Russian Civil War, and some did side with the Bolsheviks as recounted in Šolochov’s masterly tetralogy Quiet Flows the Don¸ the majority fought with separatist, nationalist, or White-affiliated factions, which led to the implementation of decossackization and collectivization measures after the war (4). State policy against Cossacks eased during the 1930s, and by the time of Germany’s invasion of the USSR in 1941, Cossacks had been reintegrated into Soviet society. While thousands of Cossacks did fight for the Third Reich in collaborationist units (5), the overwhelming majority remained loyal to the Soviet Union, where entire divisions were formed specifically out of Cossacks (6).
Amid the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, which was preceded by years of cultural and economic liberalization, Cossack identity re-emerged, most prominently in Ukraine and Russia. In Ukraine, the symbolism of the newly independent state drew much from Cossack heritage, drawing an ideal connection between Ukrainian identity and Cossack identity as a form of “national pedagogism” (7). This has also created a limited cultural mobilization, spurred more by Ukrainian secular authorities than genuine popular sentiment, that has sought to integrate Cossack identity into a wider Ukrainian identity (8).
Nevertheless, the great majority of registered and unregistered Cossacks live in the Russian Federation, where a more structured integration of Cossacks into public life began in the mid-1990s (9). In 1994, the Russian state established an official register of Cossack hosts, allowing Cossack communities to receive official recognition, in addition to financial and institutional support (10). Their status was further expanded under Putin’s rule and they are now legally able to perform non-military public security duties (11). In 2012, the Cossack Party of the Russian Federation was registered as a political party, remaining active today. Other organizations related to Cossack identity, such as the All-Russian Cossack Society, have since emerged (12).
With the most recent additions of the Black Sea Cossack Host (2021) and the North-West Cossack Host (2023), the total number of registered hosts in Russia has reached fourteen (13). However, the great majority of Russia’s Cossacks remain unregistered and under informal self-governing arrangements within their own communities. Population estimates range between two and seven million Cossacks in the Russian Federation, with at least 200,000–300,000 performing paramilitary duties or being otherwise employed in state service (14). Objectives & Ideology
The majority of Cossacks active in the Russo-Ukrainian War side with Russia, and therefore fully support the Russian state agenda regarding the annexation of significant parts of Ukraine.
Cossacks, as exemplified by their history of service to the Russian Empire, and notwithstanding their service under the Soviet Union, have long been regarded as culturally and politically ultraconservative; Cossacks fighting in the Donbas on the separatist side since 2014 have been known to hold beliefs that can be summarized in the motto: “For the Tsar, the Faith, and the Fatherland” (15).
Representatives of Russian Cossack organizations have expressed full support for Russian military and political objectives in the war, stating that the conflict is a “holy war,” as the areas where the majority of the fighting is currently taking place are regarded as ancestral Cossack homelands (16).
Military & Political Abilities
Some Cossack units were involved in operations in Ukraine as early as 2014, when several militias emerged in the Donbas region and elsewhere in eastern and southern Ukraine as “self-defense” groups, supposedly formed as neighborhood watches to prevent operations of the Maidan-aligned groups, such as Right Sector (17). Cossacks have a history of fierce independence, and those fighting on the separatist side in Donbas were often at odds with the leaders of the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (18). Some of these joined the loose grouping known as the Union of Donbass Volunteers, a paramilitary association that has served as a rallying point for all militiamen involved in the Donbas conflict since 2014.
Since then, the relationship of many Russian Cossacks with the Russian state has significantly intensified, with institutional cooperation and support increasing at all levels. When the Russo-Ukrainian War broke out in 2022, Cossack participation was initially negligible. In April 2022, sources reported a total combat strength of 4,000 Cossacks, up from 1,400 earlier that month and possibly bolstering up to 5,500 fighters divided into two paramilitary units, the Don and Tavrida detachments (19).
By late 2023, this number had grown to over 25,000, with Cossack troops mostly organized in the “Combat Reserves” detachments known as BARS (20). BARS units began the activation process in late 2021, creating a structure of military reservists previously absent from the Russian Armed Forces (21).
Appeals by politicians close to Russian Cossack organizations for heavier equipment to be provided to Cossack units in late 2023 indicated that many Cossack units had been operating as light infantry formations until then (22). The continued creation of new Cossack units has led to the effective replacement of PMC Wagner’s role on the Ukrainian front, including the formation of Cossack PMCs (23).
Relations & Alliances
Russian Cossacks have been undergoing an unprecedented historical phase of “re-Cossackisation” in partnership with the Russian state. However, this movement is not limited to the borders of the Russian Federation, involving a burgeoning network of ties within former Soviet countries, as well as independent Cossack communities abroad (24). The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad represents about 30,000 Cossacks living outside the borders of Russia proper and has established ties with Kazakh and Kyrgyz Cossacks, but also with individual Cossacks from Belgium, Germany, and Finland (25).
Works Cited
(1) - Cfr. Sysin, F. E. The Cossack Chronicles and the Development of Modern Ukrainian Culture and National Identity. In: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 14, 3/3, 1990.
(2) - Sysyn, F. The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology. In: Social Research, 58, 4, 1991. pp. 850-851.
(3) - Ibidem.
(4) - Holquist, P. "Conduct Merciless Mass Terror": Decossackization on the Don, 1919. In: Cahiers du Monde russe, 38, 1/2, 1997. pp. 127-148.
(5) - Cfr. Ratushnyak, O. V. The Cossacks on the side of the Third Reich (1949-1945 ГГ.). In: Science and Society, 1, 2013. pp. 222-236.
(6) - Cfr. Trut, V. P. & Narezhny, A. I. On the Participation of Don Cossacks in World War II in 1941. In: Bylye God, 36, 2, 2015. pp. 428-433.
(7) - Cfr. Bureychak, T. & Petrenko, O. Heroic Masculinity in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Cossacks, UPA and “Svoboda”. In: East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies, 2, 2, 2015. pp. 6-9.
(8) - Ibidem.
(9) - Macievskiy, G. O. State and the Cossacks: On the Way to Public Service. In: Vestnik Volgogradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, 24, 4, Volgograd, 2019.
(10) - Ibidem.
(11) - Darczewska, J. Putin's Cossacks - Folklore, Business or Politics?. In: Point of View, 68, Warsaw, 2017. pp. 18-21.
(12) - http://kaprf.ru/
(13) - Arnold, R. Moscow Moves to Establish Cossack Hosts in Occupied Ukrainian Territories. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor – The Jamestown Foundation, 25.01.2024. Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-moves-to-establish-zaporizhzhian-cossack-host/ [Last consulted: 16.06.2024]
(14) - Darczewska, J. Putin's Cossacks - Folklore, Business or Politics?. Cit. pp. 15, 24-25.
(15) - Arnold, R. Geschichte der Beziehungen der Kosaken zum Kreml. In: Russland-Analysen, 415, 08.03.2022. DOI: 10.31205/RA.415.01
(16) - Arnold, R. Cossack Warriors From Russia and Abroad Meet in Moscow. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20, 181, 28.11.2023. https://jamestown.org/program/cossack-warriors-from-russia-and-abroad-meet-in-moscow/ [Last consulted: 16.06.2024]
(17) - Arnold, R. Russian Special Services Employ Cossacks, Ukrainian Religious Institutions Against Kyiv. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 17, 52, 16/04/2020 [Last consulted: 16.06.2024]
(18) - Ibidem.
(19) - Arnold, R. Cossacks and the Battle for Donbas. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 19, 59, 25/04/2022. https://jamestown.org/program/cossacks-and-the-battle-for-donbas/ [Last consulted: 16.06.2024]
(20) - Arnold, R. The Kremlin Uses Registered Cossacks as a Means of Stealth Mobilization. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20, 155, 10/10/2023 https://jamestown.org/program/the-kremlin-uses-registered-cossacks-as-a-means-of-stealth-mobilization/ [Last consulted: 16.06.2024]
(21) - https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/reserves-bars.htm
(22) - Kozyin, N. Казаки хотят получить танки и артиллерию. In: Parlamentskaya Gazeta, 22.11.2023 https://www.pnp.ru/social/kazaki-khotyat-poluchit-tanki-i-artilleriyu.html [Last consulted: 16.06.2024]
(23) - Arnold, R. Cossack Fighters Replace Wagner Forces in Ukraine. In: : Eurasia Daily Monitor, 21, 5, 16.01.2024 https://jamestown.org/program/cossack-fighters-replace-wagner-forces-in-ukraine/ [Last consulted: 16.06.2024]
(24) - Arnold, R. Cossack Warriors From Russia and Abroad Meet in Moscow. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20, 181. 28.11.2023 https://jamestown.org/program/cossack-warriors-from-russia-and-abroad-meet-in-moscow/ [Last consulted: 16.06.2024]
(25) - Ibidem.
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