Insurgency Overview
PEGIDA, short for "Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West," first emerged on October 20, 2014, in Dresden, Germany. This group of demonstrators quickly gained attention with slogans such as "Non-violent & united against religious wars on German soil," "Against religious fanaticism and every kind of radicalism. Together without violence," and "No Sharia in Europe." By late 2014 and early 2015, PEGIDA rallies attracted over 20,000 supporters, with similar movements springing up in other German cities (2,5).
Primarily, PEGIDA positions itself as an alliance opposed to the perceived spread of Islamism in Germany and Europe. Its demonstrations, which have remained largely peaceful, aim to protest what supporters see as the federal government’s misguided policies on immigration and integration. Beyond opposition to Islamism, many participants view PEGIDA’s protests as a way to express broader dissatisfaction with the political system and a growing distrust of institutions such as political parties, the media, churches, and associations. These concerns are often centered around fears of cultural change, particularly the perceived threat of foreign influence, with Islamism acting as a focal point for these anxieties. (2)
History & Foundations
Lutz Bachmann is regarded as the founder of the PEGIDA movement, having launched a Facebook group called “Peaceful Europeans Against the Islamization of the West” on October 11, 2014, focused on “rescuing the West”. This initiative was a response to violent clashes in early October between Kurds and Salafists in Hamburg and Celle amid the struggle over control of the Syrian city of Kobane. The group quickly gained thousands of followers and began holding Monday protests in Dresden with Bachmann, attracting participants that included members of right-wing extremist parties, after the first public gathering in front of Dresden’s Frauenkirche on October 20, 2014, which initially was attended by only 350 people (1,2).
This number of attendees grew to 500 by October 27 and doubled to 1,000 by November 3 and continued to climb, reaching over 3,000 by November 17. Around this time, PEGIDA began drawing attention from both regional and national media, which fueled further interest and increased turnout. On November 24, 5,500 people participated, and by December 1, this number rose to 7,500. In December, participation reached five-figure counts, with 15,000 attending on December 8 and 17,500 on December 22. Given the focus on Dresden, the cold season, and the proximity to Christmas, the demonstrations showed a remarkable capacity to mobilize. (5)
The initial demonstrations in October were promoted primarily via Facebook, drawing participants mainly from the organizers' extended social networks. These events gained traction through a “virtual snowball” effect, spreading among friends and acquaintances. By the fourth demonstration, the crowd began to include a noticeable number of football fans. Attendance, which typically consisted of young to middle-aged, predominantly male, and physically fit individuals, started to diversify slightly after November 10, when it surpassed 2,000.
Poster promoting PEGIDA’s 10th Anniversary protest in Dresden via the group’s telegram channel.
From the beginning, a few neo-Nazis were present, and their visibility increased as the gatherings grew larger. Among the organization’s members, two have political experience, including Thomas Tallaker, a city council member in Meissen from Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU). However, most members are more closely tied to Dresden’s business community, operating small service-sector companies. They maintain extensive connections within Dresden’s party and club scenes, as well as among bouncers and football hooligans. (5,20)
In 2016, Lutz Bachmann was convicted to a trial for inciting and use of hate speech against refugees. The charges that led to the trial, as well as an infamous selfie that showed Bachmann with a Hitler haircut and mustache, led him to temporarily step down from the movement (21).
The anti-Islamist movement has held its 250th and, according to its own statements, last rally after ten years. Hundreds of participants gathered in Dresden, as well as several counter-demonstrators. PEGIDA co-founder Bachmann had announced on social media that the rally held on October 20th of this year, would be the last of the ten-year-old movement, citing logistical and financial problems as reasons, despite his Telegram group being active with over 9000 subscribers. Groups on the latter mentioned channel, as well as on Facebook, share daily news and opinions, including support for the AfD party. (10,15)
Objectives & Ideology
PEGIDA is primarily an alliance that campaigns against what it perceives as the growing threat of Islamism in Germany and Europe. The demonstrations, which have remained peaceful to date, aim to highlight what the group views as misguided policies by the federal government. For participants, these protests also express a broader mistrust in societal institutions, including political parties, associations, churches, and mainstream media. The movement taps into general dissatisfaction with the political system and fear of cultural encroachment, which it frames through concerns about Islamism as a focal point. Officially, PEGIDA justified its stance by opposing support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in its fight against the Islamic State (IS) (2,4).
The "Six Points" of the PEGIDA organizers from January 12, 2015 (5):
1. We demand the creation of an immigration law that regulates the necessary, quality-based immigration and halts the currently widespread, uncontrolled quantity-based immigration. This should be modeled after the policies in Canada or Switzerland.
2. We demand the inclusion of both a right and a duty to integrate. This duty to integrate, if it truly comes into effect, will automatically alleviate many of people’s fears regarding Islamization, foreign infiltration, and the loss of our culture.
3. We demand consistent deportation and re-entry bans for Islamists and religious fanatics who have turned their backs on our country to fight in holy wars.
4. We demand the possibility of direct democracy at the federal level based on public referendums.
5. We demand an end to warmongering against Russia and a peaceful coexistence among Europeans without the increasing loss of authority of national parliaments within the EU states due to the absurd controls from Brussels.
6. We demand more resources for the internal security of our country! This includes an immediate stop to police staff reductions and equipping the police with the necessary, up-to-date resources to meet growing demands.
These points were extended by December 2015, where the following stance was published (3):
1) PEGIDA is in favour of accepting war refugees and politically or religiously persecuted people. This is a human duty!
2) PEGIDA is in favour of including the right to and the duty of integration in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (so far only the right to asylum has been enshrined there)!
3) PEGIDA is FOR decentralised accommodation for war refugees and persecuted people, instead of in partly inhumane homes!
4) PEGIDA is in favour of a pan-European distribution key for refugees and a fair distribution on the shoulders of all EU member states! (Central registration authority for refugees, which then distributes the refugees among the EU member states similar to the German Königstein key)
5. PEGIDA is in favour of a reduction in the care key for asylum seekers (number of refugees per social worker/caregiver - currently approx. 200
6. PEGIDA is FOR an asylum application procedure based on the Dutch or Swiss model and, until this is introduced, FOR an increase in funding for the BAMF (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) in order to massively reduce the duration of the application and processing procedure and enable faster integration!
7) PEGIDA is in favour of increasing funding for the police and AGAINST job cuts in the police force!
8) PEGIDA is in favour of exhausting and implementing the existing laws on asylum and deportation!
9) PEGIDA is in favour of a zero-tolerance policy towards asylum seekers and migrants who have committed criminal offences!
10) PEGIDA is in favour of resistance against a misogynistic, violent political ideology, but not against Muslims living and integrating here!
11) PEGIDA is in favour of immigration along the lines of Switzerland, Australia, Canada or South Africa!
12) PEGIDA is in favour of sexual self-determination!
13) PEGIDA is in favour of the preservation and protection of our Christian-Jewish occidental culture!
14) PEGIDA is in favour of the introduction of referendums based on the Swiss model!
15. PEGIDA is AGAINST the supply of weapons to anti-constitutional, banned organisations such as the PKK
16. PEGIDA is AGAINST allowing parallel societies/parallel courts in our midst, such as Sharia courts, Sharia police, justices of the peace, etc.
17. PEGIDA is AGAINST this insane ‘gender mainstreaming’, also often called ‘genderisation’, the almost obsessive, politically correct gender neutralisation of our language!
18 PEGIDA is AGAINST radicalism, whether religiously or politically motivated!
19. PEGIDA is AGAINST hate preachers, regardless of which religion they belong to!
A study on PEGIDA done by Patzelt, W. J. in 2015 revealed that 54% of PEGIDA participants are motivated to attend these Monday demonstrations due to "dissatisfaction with politics." "Criticism of the media and the public" motivates 20%. "Fundamental reservations about immigrants and asylum seekers" are cited by 15% of respondents, while "protest against religious or ideologically motivated violence" accounts for 5%. The remainder falls under other reasons. According to Vorländer's findings, the "dissatisfaction with politics" reported by 54% of respondents includes a "generally perceived distance between the people and politicians" (23%), "dissatisfaction with the political system of the Federal Republic" (18%), and "general dissatisfaction with politics" (15%).
The demonstrators are particularly dissatisfied with asylum policy (20%) as well as immigration and integration policy (14%). Following at a distance are dissatisfaction with economic and social policy (6%) and with foreign and security policy (4%) (6). Some of the frequent chants of the demonstrations include language that was used by the National Socialist movement, such as referring to the press by “lying” and “system press” and ”traitor to the people” for politicians (18,20).
The Wirmer flag (also known commercially as the flag of the German resistance on July 20th or the Stauffenberg flag) is frequently seen in the PEGIDA rallies, to the extent that it is now also referred to as the “PEGIDA flag” (16,17). Josef Wirmer, a key figure in the German resistance during World War II, designed a flag intended to represent Germany following the planned 1944 assassination of Hitler. This flag was later considered in 1948-49 by the Parliamentary Council as a potential federal flag and served, in a modified form, as the CDU party flag from 1953 to around 1970, also influencing the FDP's symbols. After this period, it largely faded from public view (17,14). In 1999, Reinhold Oberlercher of the neo-Nazi German College repurposed the flag as a symbol for his proposed "Fourth Reich," bringing it into use among right-wing extremist groups. Horst Mahler further popularized it within the Reich Citizens' movement in 2003. Over time, the flag’s use by far-right groups became associated with extremist and populist circles (14).
Military & Political Abilities
Although PEGIDA has no direct political affiliation, Germany’s parties Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) are particularly focused on winning over PEGIDA supporters, they are competing with the German far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) for their support, the only political party with whom PEGIDA has held a formal discussion with. PEGIDA and the AfD share ideological common ground, such as the former’s stance on asylum and immigration (5,20).
From the outset, PEGIDA has stressed its commitment to non-violent street demonstrations. However, there have been some issues, including aggressive comments on Facebook and a few incidents requiring police intervention, which are discussed in more detail in the following section (9).
In a study done by the TU Dresden regarding the political positions of the PEGIDA participants claims that they are essentially located between the center and the right-wing fringe, with more inclination towards the right than the left. However, they are likely much further to the right than this table reflects. On the one hand, according to the impressions of the interviewees, particularly those demonstration participants who, judging by their overall demeanor, were their overall demeanor, a very right-wing attitude was to be expected. On the other hand, there seemed to be some demonstrators who appeared to be somewhat reluctant to clearly identify themselves. The study continued to ask about specific political parties and found that of those who have any trust in parties, they were primarily close to the far-right AfD (page 8 of work 5).
Approach to Resistance
While PEGIDA’s organizers have emphasized a commitment to weekly peaceful demonstrations, some events associated with the group have escalated into conflicts. For example, at the very first rally in October 2014, clashes occurred when some participants attacked counter-demonstrators. Later that December, tensions flared when PEGIDA’s march was halted by a blockade on Terrassenufer, leading some attendees to attempt a forced passage, with police and event stewards stepping in to maintain order. Additionally, reports emerged of incidents involving violence against migrants, such as an attack at Dresden's Centrums Galerie following a December rally. Another disturbance took place on January 5, when a group of protesters broke away from the planned march route, pushing toward the city center before being stopped by police. (9) According to authorities figures, there were over 900 crimes since the first demonstration in October 2014 to November 2015, ranging from physical assaults to the use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations. There have also been planned attacks on refugee homes, which has led to a believed connection between the increase of these attacks and the PEGIDA movement, due to the group’s use of hate speech, racial slurs and violence inciting, such as setting up mock gallows to ‘hang’ Angela Merkel for her pro-refugee stance (23).
International Relations & Alliances
PEGIDA has also gained momentum in other parts of Europe, boosted by the refugee crisis. Affiliate groups protested across in the Netherlands, France, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Ireland and the U.K., among other countries. The Freedom Party of Austria, under Heinz-Christian Strache, has endorsed PEGIDA since December 2014. By January 2015, small gatherings of PEGIDA supporters, ranging from 15 to 200 people, were held in multiple Norwegian cities. Around 200 PEGIDA supporters assembled in Copenhagen, Denmark, on January 19, and about 80 to 100 participants rallied in Malmö, Sweden, on February 9. In Linköping, Sweden, on March 2, four PEGIDA supporters faced approximately 300 counter-protesters (8,11).
The Belgian PEGIDA branch, linked to members of the far-right Vlaams Belang party and the separatist group Voorpost, is regarded as a hub for racist and neo-fascist, Islamophobic views. In Prague, approximately 2,000 people gathered in a series of opposing demonstrations, bringing together both supporters and opponents of PEGIDA (22).
In the UK, around 300 PEGIDA supporters were met by 1,500 counter-demonstrators at their first rally in Newcastle upon Tyne on February 28, 2015. A similar scene unfolded in Edinburgh on March 21, where a large counter-demonstration opposed a small PEGIDA turnout. Prominent English Defence League activist Tommy Robinson was one of the organizers of the British PEGIDA branch (13) .
Many PEGIDA Facebook groups can be seen with followers in the Netherlands, the Baltics and Poland, which has over 4000 followers at the time of writing.
The German political parties CDU and CSU, in particular, are competing with the AfD (Alternative for Germany) for support from PEGIDA’s followers. Saxony’s AfD chairwoman, Frauke Petry, acknowledged these "content overlaps" to the press after a meeting with PEGIDA's organizing team on January 7, which remains PEGIDA’s only formal engagement with a political party to date. This alignment is unsurprising, as PEGIDA’s demands on asylum and immigration closely mirror those in the AfD’s platform. AfD’s vice-chairman, Alexander Gauland, has gone so far as to label PEGIDA a "natural ally." While a long-term political partnership between AfD and PEGIDA is not yet established, there is clear potential for the movement to push Germany’s political discourse significantly rightward (7).
From the outset, PEGIDA has stressed its commitment to non-violent street demonstrations. However, there have been some issues, including aggressive comments on Facebook and a few incidents requiring police intervention, which are discussed in more detail in the following section. (9)
Bibliography
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In the study by the TU Dresden, the political positions of the PEGIDA participants: they are essentially located between the center and the right-wing fringe, with more inclination towards the right than the left. However, they are probably much further to the right than this table reflects. On the one hand, according to the impressions of the interviewees, particularly those demonstration participants who, judging by their overall demeanor, were their overall demeanor, a very right-wing attitude was to be expected. On the other hand, there seemed to be some demonstrators who appeared to be somewhat reluctant to clearly identify themselves. The study continued to ask about specific political parties and found that of those who have any trust in parties, they were primarily close to the far-right AfD. (page 8 of work 5)