![The Storm-Z insignia. Storm-V unit insignia replace the Z with a V but are otherwise identical.](https://static.wixstatic.com/media/3e9b1c_8f334ea1e39f4804a45fc7e6deb11481~mv2.png/v1/fill/w_980,h_980,al_c,q_90,usm_0.66_1.00_0.01,enc_auto/3e9b1c_8f334ea1e39f4804a45fc7e6deb11481~mv2.png)
Overview
In the aftermath of the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the mounting manpower needs of the war effort led the Russian military complex to look everywhere for men who could be easily swayed into joining the war. Russian prisons became the most fertile grounds to recruit men willing to do anything to escape their imprisonment. The “Shtorm” series of penal units is the result of this recruitment drive. Shtorm units continue to operate despite some reforms to this day.
History & Foundations
Throughout modern military history, penal battalions have been formed by various military forces to resolve manpower shortages whenever the war effort demanded more men than could be recruited by ordinary means.
Penal units were sometimes formed by undisciplined and insubordinate regular soldiers who had been punished by military law, but at various points they could also be supplemented with civilian inmates, from petty criminals to murderers and sex offenders.
The Soviet Union established such units during World War II, with hundreds of thousands serving (and dying) in these units until the final defeat of the Third Reich. After the war’s end, these units were disbanded, and no trace remained of them in the Soviet military tradition.
In the aftermath of the Russian invasion of Ukraine in 2022, the Russian military establishment came under intense pressure to provide the manpower necessary for a conventional war fought against a regular army; the decision not to implement the mass mobilization of Russian society further exacerbated the needs of the armed forces.
The first actor to intercept this need for manpower was PMC Wagner, the now infamous mercenary group that played a key role in the second year of the conflict. Starting in July 2022, PMC Wagner was given free rein in recruiting from Russian prisons, and it was thus able to bolster its presence in Ukrainian battlefields with cheap and disposable manpower. One year later, it was estimated that almost 50,000 former convicts had served in Ukraine (1). The most significant factor driving penal enlistment was the promise that a six-month tour in Ukraine would qualify one for a full presidential pardon (2).
After the Wagner Group managed to deliver several major operational victories (including the capture of Bakhmut), notwithstanding the heavy casualty rate, penal recruitment was considered a successful experiment, and the Russian government founded the Shtorm-Z detachments. The exact date of founding is unknown, but these detachments were deployed in Ukraine by April 2023, when their existence became known (3).
Throughout 2023, Storm-Z detachments were deployed wherever needed, often to plug the gaps in Russian battle lines (4).
Storm Gladiator, a unit created under the Storm-Z program, was noted for its effectiveness during the operations that were carried out on the Ukrainian front in late 2023 (5). Due to the high rate of casualties, the unit was reportedly disbanded in early 2024, with its surviving members reassigned to other Storm-Z units, possibly in the capacity of petty officers and trainers (6).
In June 2023, Vladimir Putin signed a new law implementing the creation of Storm-V detachments, which remain units staffed primarily by convicts (7). According to the new provisions, Storm-V soldiers are treated as contract soldiers of the Russian Armed Forces and receive full pay, but they no longer receive full pardons for their crimes and instead can only hope to be paroled (8).
Storm-V units have seen action in the 2023–24 Battle of Avdeevka and have been deployed in the ongoing Battle of Chasiv Yar (9).
Ideology & Objectives
Russian penal units are part of the war effort of the Russian state, and as such, they theoretically contribute to the objectives set by the Russian military as part of the Russo-Ukrainian War.
As penal units are staffed mostly by convicts, it is difficult to establish exactly to what extent ideology or genuine support for the so-called Special Military Operation plays a role. Available open-source information contributes to a mixed picture of these units: footage shows hopeless soldiers in despair when faced with the abysmal conditions of the battlefield (10), while other sources depict individuals willing to do anything to restore their social standing and escape Russian prisons. For example, Storm Gladiator’s chief of staff was reportedly identified as a former FSB officer who was imprisoned in 2019 on charges of extortion and bribery (11).
Additionally, regular Russian soldiers can also be sent to Storm-Z/V detachments as a punishment for drunkenness, insubordination, or other breaches of the military code (12).
Political & Military Abilities
Storm-Z/V detachments are formed from Russian convicts who are desperate to escape their detention. As such, these penal soldiers often lack the motivation and the morale to hold their own on the battlefield, and many surrender whenever given the chance (13).
Further compounding their tactical inferiority when compared to regular military units is the limited training they receive, reportedly between just 10 to 15 days (14). While Russia is a country that retains a conscription-based model of military recruitment, and therefore it is likely that many penal recruits have had at least some prior experience in the military, years may have passed since they last served, and such little training highlights the disregard for the individuals who join Storm-Z/V units.
Storm-Z/V detachments are equipped as light infantry with few or no motor vehicles available to them, and are mostly employed as small fireteams in highly saturated urban environments (15).
Works Cited
(1) - Camut, N. Over 20,000 Wagner troops killed, 40,000 wounded in Ukraine: Prigozhin-linked channel. In: Politico.eu, 20.07.2023. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/russia-ukraine-war-over-20000-wagner-troops-were-killed-prigozhin/
(2) - Nikolskaya, P. & Tsvetkova, M. 'They're just meat': Russia deploys punishment battalions in echo of Stalin. In: Reuters, 03.10.2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/theyre-just-meat-russia-deploys-punishment-battalions-echo-stalin-2023-10-03/
(3) - Battersby, B. & Boyer, D. Russian Assault Groups’ Evolution in Ukraine. In: TRADOC G2, 12/15/2023. Available at: https://oe.tradoc.army.mil/2023/12/15/tradoc-russian-assault-groups-evolution-in-ukraine/
(4) - Hird, Karolina et al. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 6, 2023. In: ISW, 06/04/2023. Available at: https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-april-6-2023
(5) - Belovodyev, D. Storm Gladiator: How Russia Uses Recruited Convicts To Fight In 'Fierce' Assault Units In Ukraine. In : Radio Free Europe /RL, 05.02.2024. Available at: https://www.rferl.org/a/russia-recruited-convicts-fierce-assault-units-storm-gladiator-/32806371.html
(6) - Ibidem.
(7) - Ibidem.
(8) - Fokht, E. et al. “If you sign up now, get ready to die, mate.” Life on the Ukrainian front for Moscow’s new ‘Storm V’ convict soldiers. In: BBC News Russian, 28.01.2024. Available at: https://bbcrussian.substack.com/p/new-deal-russian-convicts-fighting-in-ukraine
(9) - Fornusek, M. Ukraine reports heavy battles in Bakhmut direction as Russia pulls in reserves. In: The Kyiv Independent, 27.04.2024. Available at: https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-reports-heavy-battles-in-bakhmut-direction-as-russia-pulls-in-reserves/
(10) - Battersby, B. & Boyer, D. Russian Assault Groups’ Evolution in Ukraine. Cit.
(11) - Belovodyev, D. Storm Gladiator: How Russia Uses Recruited Convicts To Fight In 'Fierce' Assault Units In Ukraine. Cit.
(12) - Nikolskaya, P. & Tsvetkova, M. 'They're just meat': Russia deploys punishment battalions in echo of Stalin. In: Reuters, 03.10.2023. https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/theyre-just-meat-russia-deploys-punishment-battalions-echo-stalin-2023-10-03/
(13) - Battersby, B. & Boyer, D. Russian Assault Groups’ Evolution in Ukraine. Cit.
(14) - Hird, Karolina et al. Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, April 6, 2023. Cit.
(15) - Battersby, B. & Boyer, D. Russian Assault Groups’ Evolution in Ukraine. Cit.
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