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Insurgency Overview The Rapid Support Forces (RSF) are a Sudanese government-funded and operated paramilitary force. The RSF grew out of the Janjaweed militias, which fought for the Sudanese government during the War in Darfur, and they engaged in anti-democratic operations during the 2019 Sudanese political crisis (Al Jazeera 2019) . The actions carried out by the RSF during the war in Darfur have been qualified as crimes against humanity for the rape and displacement of ethnic & religious minorities (Loeb 2015) . Nominally administered and commanded by the National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS) of the Sudanese government, they are commanded by the Sudanese Armed Forces during military operations. During the Khartoum Massacre, The RSF used heavy weaponry to disperse a protest and sit-in, killing over 100 people and wounding many more. The massacre in Khartoum occurred due to protests which opposed the creation of the Transitional Military Council (TMC) headed by the RSF commander Lieutenant General Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo “Hemetti” (formally the deputy leader of the TMC but known as the de facto real leader) (Tharoor 2019) . History & Foundations While not created for a specific political purpose, the RSF are the effective officialization of the pre-existing Janjaweed militias. This has made them an ‘official uniformed force’ (Dabanga Sudan 2014) and they have resumed activities constituting crimes against humanity (Hashim 2022) . The RSF was officially formed in August of 2013 under the previously mentioned NISS, following a restructuring of the Janjaweed militias in Sudan. This reformation of the Janjaweed followed attacks carried out by the Sudanese Revolutionary Front against the government of then-president Omar al-Bashir (SudanTribune 2014) . Objectives & Ideology Officially, the group has stated that its role is counterinsurgency and anti-terrorist operations (Rapid Support Forces 2022) . Nonetheless, the validity of these self-proclaimed objectives has been highly disputed, notably as the group has been accused of human rights violations and of enabling coup d’états by the country’s ruling political elite (TRT World 2021) . The forces which fall under the Rapid Support Forces umbrella do not have an overarching ideological basis, though they have been used by their leader, Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, as a tool to remain in power by cracking down on pro-democracy protests and other ‘anti-government’ activities (Henry 2019) . Military & Political Abilities The group has effective and embedded military and political capabilities. Due to the formation of the Janjaweed militias and the then officialization of the Janjaweed into the Rapid Support Forces, their ability has only developed. The group has an extensive armoury of equipment, including both light and heavy weaponry. Images of the group regularly feature small arms, such as AK-47s or PKM machine guns, as well as truck-mounted DShK heavy machine guns. The group has also been photographed receiving training from “white-skinned men in camouflaged green uniforms” where witnesses said they “speak Russian” (صوت الهامش 2019) . The group is therefore rumoured to be receiving training from the PMC Wagner Group who has been active in large portions of conflict-stricken Africa (Gadret 2022) . This possible training by former Russian and ex-soviet state military advisors could be adding expertise that could henceforth increase the lethality and effectiveness of the group as a fighting force. Approach to Resistance The group is known to be extremely violent (in comparison/relation to other regional groups) which have led to accusations of ethnic cleansing and rape/terror (Mwatana for Human Rights 2022) . Additionally, the group has taken on a more organised and military-style appearance since its formalisation under the Rapid Support Forces. This has led to the group being used as a counter-insurgent force in Yemen as a part of the Saudi coalition fighting against the Ansar Allah (Houthi) movement. The RSF’s experience in Sudan as a counterinsurgency force has been the main driving force behind its use in Yemen and the capabilities which the force holds to conduct these operations have been used extensively. The Saudi-led military force has been seeking to aggressively hold and clear large areas of territory in northern Yemen and – due to a lack of willingness to use its military – it has been quick to use the RSF’s counterinsurgency capabilities (Heras 2017) . International Relations & Alliances The officialization of the RSF has allowed the group to gain access to a wider set of contacts through their commander and the wider Sudanese government. This has come in varying forms, including the European Union funding the Sudanese government to control migration coming through Sudan and across the Sahara towards the Libyan coast (International Organisation for Migration 2016) . Although the EU has denied that the RSF has received any of the $155 million funding (European Commission 2017) , there have been accusations that due to the RSF's role in securing the border, they will in part receive funding indirectly (Dabanga Sudan 2016) . Sudan had spent several years trying to strengthen ties with Iran and its government with a military cooperation agreement being signed in 2008 (SudanTribune 2008) . Additionally, Iranian naval and logistical bases in Port Sudan were constructed in 2013 (Bodansky 2013) . However, with the Iranian refusal to help during the economic troubles which hit Sudan following South Sudanese independence in 2011, the Sudanese government began seeking support elsewhere (Al-Monitor 2015) . This included seeking support from the Qatari government (SudanTribune 2013) and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia (Gulf News 2015) which deposited large amounts of currency into the Sudanese central bank. This ‘buying’ of support from the Sudanese government has led directly to the RSF being utilised in the Yemen war and is evident in the forces’ extensive international contacts and their relations through the central Sudanese government. Works Cited (MLA-style) Al Jazeera. 2019. “Who Are Sudan’s RSF and Their Commander Hemeti?” Www.aljazeera.com. 2019. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2019/6/6/who-are-sudans-rsf-and-their-commander-hemeti Al-Monitor. 2015. “Sudan Gets $2.2B for Joining Saudi Arabia, Qatar in Yemen War.” Www.al-Monitor.com. November 23, 2015. https://www.al-monitor.com/originals/2015/11/sudan-saudi-arabia-war-yemen-houthi-economy.html Bodansky, Yossef. 2013. “Iran and Sudan Begin to Execute Moves to Dominate Central & Western Africa.” OilPrice.com. July 2, 2013. https://oilprice.com/Geopolitics/Africa/Iran-and-Sudan-Begin-to-Execute-Moves-to-Dominate-Central-Western-Africa.html. Dabanga Sudan. 2014. “‘Sudan Regime Revived Janjaweed to Attack Civilians’: Activists.” Radio Dabanga. June 27, 2014. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/sudan-regime-revived-janjaweed-to-attack-civilians-activists. ———. 2016. “EU: ‘No Support to Sudan’s RSF.’” Radio Dabanga. September 6, 2016. https://www.dabangasudan.org/en/all-news/article/eu-no-support-to-sudan-s-rsf. European Commission. 2017. “Parliamentary Question | Answer to Question No E-007564/16 | E-007564/2016(ASW) | European Parliament.” Www.europarl.europa.eu. February 10, 2017. https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/E-8-2016-007564-ASW_EN.html. Gadret, Barthélemy. 2022. “What Is Wagner Doing in Africa?” The Best of Africa. January 27, 2022. https://thebestofafrica.org/content/what-is-wagner-doing-in-africa. Gulf News. 2015. “Saudi Arabia Deposits $1b in Sudan Central Bank.” Gulfnews.com. August 13, 2015. https://gulfnews.com/world/mena/saudi-arabia-deposits-1b-in-sudan-central-bank-1.1566103. Hashim, Mohanad. 2022. “Darfur: Why Are Sudan’s Janjaweed on the Attack Again?” BBC News , April 26, 2022, sec. Africa. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-61217999. Henry, Jehanne. 2019. “‘They Were Shouting “Kill Them.”’” Human Rights Watch. November 17, 2019. https://www.hrw.org/report/2019/11/18/they-were-shouting-kill-them/sudans-violent-crackdown-protesters-khartoum. Heras, Nicholas A. 2017. “Sudan’s Controversial Rapid Support Forces Bolster Saudi Efforts in Yemen.” Jamestown. October 27, 2017. https://jamestown.org/program/sudans-controversial-rapid-support-forces-bolsters-saudi-efforts-yemen/. International Organisation for Migration. 2016. “EU-Horn of Africa Migration Route Initiative (Khartoum Process).” International Organization for Migration. February 26, 2016. https://www.iom.int/eu-horn-africa-migration-route-initiative-khartoum-process. Loeb, Jonathan. 2015. “‘Men with No Mercy.’” Human Rights Watch. September 9, 2015. https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/09/men-no-mercy/rapid-support-forces-attacks-against-civilians-darfur-sudan. Mwatana for Human Rights. 2022. “Yemen: Sudanese Forces of the Coalition Commit Sexual Violence in Hajjah - Yemen | ReliefWeb.” Reliefweb.int. October 23, 2022. https://reliefweb.int/report/yemen/yemen-sudanese-forces-coalition-commit-sexual-violence-hajjah. Rapid Support Forces. 2022. “Rapid Support Forces.” RSF. 2022. https://rsf.gov.sd/. SudanTribune. 2008. “Darfur Mission, a Test for Europe’s Capacity to Act in Africa Conflicts.” Sudan Tribune. Sudan Tribune. March 4, 2008. https://sudantribune.com/article26294/. ———. 2013. “Qatar to Deposit $1 Billion in Sudan’s Central Bank: Report.” Sudan Tribune. Sudan Tribune. October 2, 2013. https://sudantribune.com/article47301/. ———. 2014. “What about the Leaked Sudanese Regime Documents?” Sudan Tribune. Sudan Tribune. September 30, 2014. https://sudantribune.com/article51298/. صوت الهامش. 2019. “قوات روسية تدرب مليشيا الدعم السريع وترافقها للخرطوم - Russian Forces Train the Rapid Support Militia and Accompany It to Khartoum.” صوت الهامش. صوت الهامش. January 2, 2019. https://www.alhamish.com/%D9%82%D9%88%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%B3%D9%8A%D8%A9-%D8%AA%D8%AF%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D9%85%D9%84%D9%8A%D8%B4%D9%8A%D8%A7-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AF%D8%B9%D9%85- %D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B3%D8%B1%D9%8A%D8%B9-%D9%88%D8%AA/. Tharoor, Ishaan. 2019. “Analysis | the Warlord Wrecking Sudan’s Revolution.” Washington Post , June 18, 2019. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2019/06/18/warlord-wrecking-sudans-revolution/. TRT World. 2021. “Who Are Rapid Support Forces, the Coup Enablers in Sudan?” Who Are Rapid Support Forces, the Coup Enablers in Sudan? October 26, 2021. https://cms.trtworld.com/magazine/who-are-rapid-support-forces-the-coup-enablers-in-sudan-51078. Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview ​​ Hezbollah is a Lebanese Shia Islamist political party and militant group. It is led by Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah since 1992. As an organisation it has several wings, one being the paramilitary wing (known as the Jihad Council) and it has a political wing present within the Lebanese parliament (known as the ‘Loyalty to the Resistance Bloc’ party) (Levitt p15, 2013) . Established 3 years after the end of the 1982 Lebanon War by Shia clerics, it modelled itself after the revolutionary leader Ayatollah Khomeini and it adopted the name 'Hezbollah' following training received by Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps instructors (Shatz, 2004) . Listing several objectives in its 1985 manifesto, it took on an overtly anti-imperialist tone calling for the expulsion of "to expel the Americans, the French and their allies definitely from Lebanon, putting an end to any colonialist entity on our land" (Hezbollah, 1988) . Hezbollah has also participated in multiple conflicts from its inception and even organised volunteers to fight alongside the Bosniak army during the Bosnian war between 1992 and 1995 (Fisk, 2014) . Hezbollah has participated in Lebanese politics since 1990. When a national unity government was formed in 2008, they, along with allied parties, gained enough seats (11 out of 30) to attain a veto power, henceforth enabling them to have serious control over the flow of Lebanese politics (CFR, 2008) . In the 2018 Lebanese general election, the Hezbollah political wing held 12 seats and its alliance won the general election and gained a majority of 70 out of 128 seats in the parliament (Reuters Staff, 2018) . Maintaining strong support within Lebanon’s Shia community (BBC Middle East, 2005) and support amongst Lebanon’s Christian communities (Zirulnik, 2012) , it has also participated in Syria’s Civil war since 2012 on the side of the Syrian Government under Bashar al-Assad. Hezbollah militias have been deployed to Syria and Iraq in order to train local militias (Hashem, 2014) as well as fight against Islamic State forces (Sly and Haidamous, 2015) . Hezbollah has been designated as a terrorist organisation by several countries, as well as by the European Union (Kanter and Rudoren, 2013) and most of the Arab League with some exceptions, that being Lebanon and Iraq (Wedeman, 2017) . The Gulf Cooperation Council also designated the organisation as a terrorist group through a unanimous decision and said it would “take measures against the group’s interest in the Gulf countries” (Al-Tamimi, 2013) . Interestingly, Russia has not designated the group as a terrorist organisation but rather as a "legitimate socio-political force" (Reuters Staff, 2015) which may indicate its attempts to draw closer relations with Iran, who have consistently supported Hezbollah with both arms, funding and training through the IRGC (Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp) (Goldberg, 2002) . History & Foundations Hezbollah evolved into a formidable paramilitary force in Lebanon during the 1980s, influenced directly by Israel's 1982 invasion of the nation. Shortly after its inception, Hezbollah engaged in prolonged guerrilla warfare against Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, with Iranian financial and ideological support (BBC Middle East, 2010) . This newly-formed group extended its operations beyond Lebanon's borders, targeting Western interests such as the U.S. embassy in Beirut and the U.S. Marine barracks, resulting in significant casualties and global attention. These events solidified Hezbollah's reputation as a 'determined and formidable group', drawing both international condemnation and support from select nations. Hezbollah strategically positioned itself within Lebanon's socio-political landscape, becoming a major player and laying the groundwork for future conflicts that would profoundly impact the nation's history. Throughout the 1990s, Hezbollah continued to grow in power, solidifying its position in Lebanon's political and security landscape, while extending its influence further afield. The group's actions continued to involve protracted battles with Israeli forces in southern Lebanon, prompted by Hezbollah's persistent attacks. Israeli military offensives in 1992 ("Operation Accountability") and 1996 ("Operation Grapes of Wrath") responded to these attacks, resulting in civilian casualties and extensive displacement. However, these campaigns failed to weaken Hezbollah's resolve. Instead, the organisation balanced its roles as an armed force and a political actor, leveraging its military strength to bolster its political standing within Lebanon's complex political framework. As the decade progressed, Hezbollah's support in Lebanon grew, granting it significant influence and representation in the Lebanese parliament and administration. By openly supporting the Assad administration in the Syrian civil war, Hezbollah expanded its regional influence, albeit amid global controversy (Fanack, 2015) . The 1990s saw Hezbollah's military activities, political ambitions, and regional involvement intertwine, shaping Lebanon's socio-political structure and impacting the broader Middle East. In the 2000s, Hezbollah's complex and significant role in the Middle East continued to evolve. The organisation entered the new millennium with unwavering determination, eventually leading to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from southern Lebanon in 2000, partly due to Hezbollah's persistent resistance (Leung, 2003) . This withdrawal showcased Hezbollah's resilience and established its reputation as a formidable regional adversary. Hezbollah's use of hit-and-run tactics, such as ambushing Israeli patrols and launching rockets at Israeli settlements, severely strained Israel's military capabilities. Simultaneously, the group's social welfare initiatives, including support for hospitals, schools, and the families of "martyrs," garnered support within the Lebanese Shiite community, strengthening its domestic base. Tensions with Israel persisted, culminating in a full-scale conflict in 2006, triggered primarily by Hezbollah's capture of Israeli troops. This conflict resulted in extensive damage to Lebanon's infrastructure and civilian population. Hezbollah demonstrated its military capabilities by firing thousands of rockets into Israeli territory, forcing mass evacuations. Its use of advanced weapons, including anti-ship missiles, showcased its ability to counter Israeli aggression, raising concerns regionally and globally. The 2006 war further solidified Hezbollah's reputation as a fervently anti-Israel resistance group, drawing both criticism and support. While Saudi Arabia denounced Hezbollah's actions, some Arab states viewed them as part of the larger Arab-Israeli confrontation and offered implicit support. The conflict also exposed the limitations of Israel's military strength, prompting a reevaluation of its tactics (Nasrallah, 2006) . Hezbollah's political influence in Lebanon continued to grow, shaping the nation's governance and societal structure. Its increased involvement in the Syrian civil war further stoked regional tensions and global attention. Hezbollah played a pivotal role in supporting the Assad regime, contributing to its territorial gains and the shifting tide of the war. However, this military engagement sparked international criticism and strained relations with certain Arab nations, who saw Hezbollah's involvement in Syria as unwarranted interference. As the decade concluded, Hezbollah's multifaceted actions in the 2000s underscored the intricate interplay between its military endeavours, domestic political ascent, and regional involvement, significantly impacting the Middle East's geopolitical landscape. These events emphasised Hezbollah's dual identity as a political actor and an armed non-state entity, a defining feature that would continue to shape its identity in the years ahead. In the 2010s, Hezbollah maintained and expanded its influence, further shaping the Middle East's complex geopolitical landscape. Its dual status as a political organisation and an armed non-state actor remained central to its prominence in Lebanon and the region. Hezbollah deepened its involvement in the Syrian civil war, solidifying its regional power by steadfastly supporting the Assad government (Chulov, 2013) . Despite international scrutiny and tensions with some Arab states, Hezbollah retained its strong presence in Lebanon's domestic politics. However, its growing influence and alignment with Iran led to criticism and hostility from various Lebanese political factions, causing internal tensions. Furthermore, Hezbollah's conflicts with Israel escalated, occasionally resulting in clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border. Tensions increased due to allegations of Hezbollah attempting to acquire precision-guided missiles, which raised security concerns for Israel. The 2010s highlighted the complex nature of Hezbollah's actions, reshaping power dynamics and security in the Middle East. The 2020s continued to witness Hezbollah's influence, building on its established prominence and multifaceted role in the region. The organisation's diverse activities continued to impact regional geopolitics, raising concerns about stability and security. Hezbollah's sustained involvement in the Syrian civil war, coupled with its support for the Assad government, solidified its status as Iran's reliable partner. This dedication drew increased international scrutiny and strained relations with some Arab states. Hezbollah maintained a strong presence in Lebanon's domestic politics, exerting political influence and participating in governance. However, its expanding influence and alignment with Iran caused tensions and challenges within Lebanon. Moreover, Hezbollah's conflicts with Israel intensified, with occasional clashes along the Israel-Lebanon border. Heightened hostilities resulted from the organisation's alleged efforts to acquire precision-guided missiles, raising concerns for Israeli security. The complexities of Hezbollah's actions in the 2020s underscored its multifaceted nature and its pivotal role in reshaping power relations and security in the Middle East. Objectives & Ideology Hezbollah's ideology has been described as Shi’ite radicalism and it follows the Islamic Shi’a theology which was developed by the Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini (Jamail, 2006) . Although the group had originally been formed in order to transform Lebanon into an Islamic Republic (much like other groups in the region), this was abandoned in order to create a more inclusive country (BBC Middle East, 2010) . The group has several stated goals, with one of its most well-known being the elimination of the State of Israel. It has argued that continued hostilities against Israel are justified as retaliation for what they claim is Israeli occupation of Lebanese core territory (Mitnick, 2006) . Also due to the fact that Hezbollah considers Israel to be an illegitimate invading force, they frame their resistance of Israeli incursions into Lebanese territory and also any actions they carry out against Israeli forces as acts of defensive jihad, further legitimising (amongst Islamist circles) their actions (Memri, 1999) . Regarding Israel and Judaism, there have been accusations that Hezbollah is anti-semitic in nature. This involves statements from Hezbollah's secretary general Hassan Nasrallah in which he denies the holocaust and has stated that “God imprinted blasphemy on the Jews’ hearts” (Weinthal, 2012) . There have also been efforts by Hezbollah-aligned attorneys -- as well as other legal organisations within Lebanon -- to remove what they consider ‘Israeli influence’ in the education system of Lebanon. For example, this has involved pressuring schools to drop chapters of Anne Frank's Diary, an effort which has been deemed a “blatant expression of holocaust denial” and an “intimidation campaign” (JTA, 2009) . However, in response, Hezbollah's Al-Manar television asked how long Lebanon would “remain an open arena for the zionist invasion of education” (JTA, 2009) . Military & Political Abilities Hezbollah has extensive military and political abilities which rival many of the local regions' states and its integration into the Lebanese state has proven beneficial for the organisation in terms of both its military and political abilities. This is due to the fact that as it is now a legitimate party within Lebanon it has utilised its position in several ways in order to enhance the aforementioned abilities. Hezbollah's political abilities have been enhanced by its integration into the Lebanese state through its holding of 13 seats in Lebanon's parliament. Hezbollah has been described as “the most powerful political movement in Lebanon” (Byman, 2008) and it has formed several political alliances within the country. One of these alliances is with the March 8 Alliance, which Hezbollah joined in March of 2005. This Alliance is a coalition of political parties and other independent candidates in Lebanon, formed in 2005, and is marked by its pro-Syrian government stance. The origins for the name of the alliance is a reference to a mass demonstration called for by large political parties in downtown Beirut, in response to the Cedar Revolution (which called for the removal of pro-Syrian government influences as well as the withdrawal of Syrian troops from Lebanon). This demonstration, however, thanked Syria for their help in stopping the Lebanese Civil War and the aid which the Syrian government provided in supporting Lebanese resistance to Israeli occupation years prior. Simultaneously, it instead opposed the withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon (Mouawad, 2005) . The March 8 Alliance holds 61 out of the 128 seats in the Lebanese Parliament and also holds 16 out of the 24 seats in the Cabinet of Lebanon. This allows Hezbollah to exercise a significant degree of authority and sway in Lebanese politics. Hezbollah's military abilities are extensive and consist of several ‘wings’, much like the military branches found in state forces. It does not reveal the numbers of armed fighters which fight for the organisation, although the Gulf Research Centre, a Dubai-based think tank, has estimated that Hezbollah's armed wing comprises around 1,000 full time fighters and a further 6,000-10,000 volunteers (International Institute for Strategic Studies, 2006) . It has been described as being militarily greater than the Lebanese army (Voice Of America, 2013) . In terms of equipment, Hezbollah has an extensive arsenal, including small arms from Eastern-bloc firearms such as AK-47s, AKMs and also AK-74s, to NATO firearms such as M16 rifles which have been sourced from Syria. The group has also acquired platforms such as the ORSIS T5000 sniper rifle, which is Russian in origin (Frantzman, 2023) and Iranian drone platforms. These Iranian drone platforms are actually more likely to be domestically-produced copies of Iranian technology provided to the group by the Iranian military and government, which enable Hezbollah to produce drones within Lebanese territory (The Associated Press, 2022) and these drones have been known to penetrate Israeli air defence systems (Hambling, 2016) . Hezbollah also possesses large quantities of unguided and guided rockets numbering from around 15,000 on the eve of the 2006 Lebanon War, in which they fired around 4,000 at Israel during the 34 day conflict. However, as of 2018, they have expanded their rocket arsenal which is now estimated to number at 130,000 (Shaikh and Williams, 2018) . Following the October 7th attacks in Israel by Hamas, Hezbollah has shown support for the latter by firing shells across the Israel-Lebanon border, as well as demonstrating solidarity and attempting to infiltrate Israel. According to some experts, Iran and Hezbollah likely advised and trained Hamas on how to attack Israel. However, Hamas claims that neither Iran nor Hezbollah was involved in planning its 2023 operation (CFR, n.d.) . Hezbollah has indicated a willingness to further support Hamas, which could escalate tensions and lead to more significant regional instability. However, how far Hezbollah will engage in this conflict remains uncertain, as deeper involvement could risk their political position within Lebanon. Approach to Resistance Hezbollah is extremely violent in its pursuit of the destruction of the state of Israel and the furthering of Iranian interests in the region. It has been involved in several instances of armed conflict with Israel such as the South Lebanon conflict from 1982-2000. The group has also allegedly utilised suicide attacks on some occasions, including the 1992 Israeli Embassy attack in Buanos Aires which killed 29 people in Argentina. This attack was attributed to the group given that Hezbollah operatives were revealed to have been apart of the atack (Alegra, 2023) . Hezbollah also provided fighters to muslim forces during the Bosnian war in order to defend muslim communities from Serbian attacks (Fisk, 2014) . They have also been implicated in the assassination of various figures in and around the Middle East, such as the assassination of Rafic Hariri, the former Lebanese Prime Minister who was killed alongside 21 other people by a roadside bomb in Beirut (BBC Middle East, 2020) . They have also operated widely outside of the Middle East and Lebanon, with Hezbollah operating openly in South America in Paraguay. In particular, there are allegations that the Venezuelan government has aided them in the form of money laundering amongst other methods of support (StratFor, 2018) . International Relations & Potential Alliances Hezbollah has several significant international relations. It has close relations with Iran and Hezbollah regards the Iranian spiritual leader, Ali Khamenei, as “its ultimate authority” (Halliday, 2006) . The group also has close ties to the Syrian government under Bashar Al-Assad and, since 2012, the group has helped the Syrian government during the Syrian Civil War in the fight against rebel groups (Al Jazeera, 2014) . They also have relations with several other Islamic movements such as Hamas (CRS, 2006) and they also have an alleged relationship with al-Qaeda -- a claim made by Israeli and US military intelligence. Nevertheless, due to the disagreements between the Sunni and Shia religious sects, this seems unlikely and Hezbollah has released statements claiming that these allegations were propagated by US intelligence to “mislead international public opinion so as to sway it against Hezbollah and cover up Israel's crimes against the Palestinian people” (People's Daily, 2006) . Multiple nations such as the USA, the UK, Israel, and organisations such as the EU, the Gulf Cooperation Council, and the Arab League have declared the group as a terrorist organisation, whereas some nations such as France have only declared the military wing a terrorist organisation whilst viewing the political wing as a legitimate sociopolitical organisation (JNS, 2013) . Similarly, Russia has also refused to label the entirety of Hezbollah a terror organisation and instead considers it a legitimate sociopolitical organisation (Times Of Israel, 2015) . Works Cited (MLA-style) Al Jazeera. “Hezbollah in Syria’s War.” Www.aljazeera.com , 2 May 2014, www.aljazeera.com/news/2014/5/2/the-role-of-hezbollah-in-syrias-war. Al-Tamimi, Sultan. “GCC: Hezbollah Terror Group.” Arab News , 3 June 2013, www.arabnews.com/news/453834. Alegra, Shlomo. “Hezbollah’s Deadly Attacks: Targeting Americans and Israelis.” Blogs.timesofisrael.com , 13 Aug. 2023, blogs.timesofisrael.com/hezbollahs-deadly-attacks-targeting-americans-and-israelis/. BBC Middle East. “Huge Beirut Protest Backs Syria.” News.bbc.co.uk , 8 Mar. 2005, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4329201.stm. ---. “Rafik Hariri Tribunal: Guilty Verdict over Assassination of Lebanon Ex-PM.” BBC News , 18 Aug. 2020, www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-53601710. ---. “Who Are Hezbollah?” News.bbc.co.uk , 4 July 2010, news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4314423.stm. Byman, Daniel. “Hezbollah: Most Powerful Political Movement in Lebanon - Council on Foreign Relations.” Council on Foreign Relations , 29 May 2008, web.archive.org/web/20130617010638/www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-most-powerful-political-movement-lebanon/p16378?breadcrumb=%2F. CFR. “Hezbollah (A.k.a. Hizbollah, Hizbu’llah) - Council on Foreign Relations.” Web.archive.org , Council on Foreign Relations, 13 Sept. 2008, web.archive.org/web/20080913091527/www.cfr.org/publication/9155/hezbollah.html?breadcrumb=%2F. CFR. “What Is Hezbollah?” Council on Foreign Relations , Council on Foreign Relations, www.cfr.org/backgrounder/what-hezbollah. Chulov, Martin. “Hezbollah’s Role in Syrian Conflict Ushers New Reality for Its Supporters.” The Guardian , 24 May 2013, www.theguardian.com/world/2013/may/24/hezbollah-syria-new-reality-supporters. CRS. Lebanon: The Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict . 21 July 2006, sgp.fas.org/crs/mideast/RL33566.pdf. Fanack. “Hezbollah and the Price of Supporting Al-Assad.” The MENA Chronicle | Fanack , 27 July 2015, fanack.com/politics/features-insights/hezbollah-supporting-al-assad~47565/. Fisk, Robert. “It’s No Wonder Today’s Jihadis Have Set out on the Path to War In.” The Independent , 8 Sept. 2014, www.independent.co.uk/voices/comment/after-the-atrocities-committed-against-muslims-in-bosnia-it-is-no-wonder-today-s-jihadis-have-set-9717384.html. Frantzman, Seth J. “What Does Hezbollah’s ‘Attack Video’ on Israel Reveal? - Analysis.” The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com , 17 July 2023, www.jpost.com/middle-east/article-750376. Goldberg, Jeffrey. “In the Party of God - Are Terrorists in Lebanon Preparing for a Larger War?” The New Yorker , 6 Oct. 2002, www.newyorker.com/magazine/2002/10/14/in-the-party-of-god. Halliday, Fred. “A Lebanese Fragment: Two Days with Hizbollah Fred Halliday - OpenDemocracy.” Web.archive.org , 20 July 2006, web.archive.org/web/20060820114015/www.opendemocracy.net/globalization/hizbollah_3757.jsp. Hambling, David. “How Did Hezbollah’s Drone Evade a Patriot Missile?” Popular Mechanics , 29 July 2016, www.popularmechanics.com/flight/drones/a22114/hezbollah-drone-israel-patriot-missile/. Hashem, Ali. “Hezbollah Arrives in Iraq.” Www.al-Monitor.com , 26 Nov. 2014, www.al-monitor.com/originals/2014/11/iran-iraq-shiites-isis.html#Hezbollah. Hezbollah. “The Hizzballah Program: An Open Letter.” International Institute for Counter Terrorism , The Jerusalem Quarterly, 1 Jan. 1988, www.ict.org.il/UserFiles/The%20Hizballah%20Program%20-%20An%20Open%20Letter.pdf. International Institute for Strategic Studies. “International Institute for Strategic StudiesHezbollah a Force to Be Reckoned With.” IISS - International Institute for Strategic Studies , 18 July 2006, web.archive.org/web/20080607095136/www.iiss.org/whats-new/iiss-in-the-press/press-coverage-2006/july-2006/hezbollah-a-force-to-be-reckoned-with. Jamail, Dahr. “Hezbollah’s Transformation.” Web.archive.org , 20 July 2006, web.archive.org/web/20060720154531/www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/HG20Ak02.html. JNS. “Jewish Leaders Applaud Hezbollah Terror Designation by France - Algemeiner.com.” Www.algemeiner.com , 4 Apr. 2013, www.algemeiner.com/2013/04/04/jewish-leaders-applaud-hezbollah-terror-designation-by-france/. JTA. “Hezbollah Pressures School into Dropping ‘Anne Frank.’” The Forward , 9 Nov. 2009, forward.com/news/breaking-news/118631/hezbollah-pressures-school-into-dropping-anne-fran/. Kanter, James, and Jodi Rudoren. “European Union Adds Military Wing of Hezbollah to List of Terrorist Organizations.” The New York Times , 22 July 2013, www.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/world/middleeast/european-union-adds-hezbollah-wing-to-terror-list.html. Leung, Rebecca. “Hezbollah: ‘A-Team of Terrorists.’” Www.cbsnews.com , 18 Apr. 2003, www.cbsnews.com/news/hezbollah-a-team-of-terrorists/. Levitt, Matthew. Hezbollah : The Global Footprint of Lebanon’s Party of God . Georgetown University Press, 2013, p. 15. Memri. “Secretary General of Hizbullah Discusses the New Israeli Government and Hizbullah’s Struggle Against...” MEMRI , Middle East Media Research Institute, 23 June 1999, www.memri.org/reports/secretary-general-hizbullah-discusses-new-israeli-government-and-hizbullah%E2%80%99s-struggle. Mitnick, Joshua. “Behind the Dispute over Shebaa Farms.” Christian Science Monitor , 22 Aug. 2006, www.csmonitor.com/2006/0822/p10s01-wome.html. Mouawad, Jad. “Hezbollah Leads Huge Pro-Syrian Protest in Central Beirut.” The New York Times , 8 Mar. 2005, www.nytimes.com/2005/03/08/international/middleeast/hezbollah-leads-huge-prosyrian-protest-in-central.html. Nasrallah, Sayyed. “Sayyed Nasrallah Speech on the Divine Victory Rally in Beirut on 22-09-2006.” English.alahednews.com.lb , 22 Sept. 2006, www.english.alahednews.com.lb/709/447. Peoples Daily. “Lebanon’s Hezbollah Denies Link with Al-Qaeda.” En.people.cn , 18 June 2006, en.people.cn/200207/01/eng20020701_98923.shtml. Reuters Staff. “Factbox: Hezbollah and Allies Gain Sway in Lebanon Parliament.” Reuters , 22 May 2018, www.reuters.com/article/us-lebanon-election-parliament-factbox-idUSKCN1IN1OJ. ---. “Russia Says Hezbollah Not a Terrorist Group: Ifax.” Reuters , 15 Nov. 2015, www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-terrorgro-idUSKCN0T412520151115. Shaikh, Shaan, and Ian Williams. “Missiles and Rockets of Hezbollah | Missile Threat.” Missile Threat , 2018, missilethreat.csis.org/country/hezbollahs-rocket-arsenal/. Shatz, Adam. “In Search of Hezbollah | by Adam Shatz | the New York Review of Books.” Www.nybooks.com , 29 Apr. 2004, www.nybooks.com/articles/17060. Sly, Liz, and Suzan Haidamous. “Lebanon’s Hezbollah Acknowledges Battling the Islamic State in Iraq.” Washington Post , The Washington Post, 16 Feb. 2015, www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/lebanons-hezbollah-acknowledges-battling-the-islamic-state-in-iraq/2015/02/16/4448b21a-b619-11e4-bc30-a4e75503948a_story.html. Stalinksy, Steven. “Hezbollah’s Nazi Tactics - the New York Sun.” Web.archive.org , 26 July 2006, web.archive.org/web/20171010024529/www.nysun.com/foreign/hezbollahs-nazi-tactics/36717/. StratFor. “Hezbollah in South America: The Threat to Businesses.” Stratfor , 5 Feb. 2018, worldview.stratfor.com/article/hezbollah-south-america-threat-businesses. The Associated Press. “Hezbollah Claims It’s Making Drones and Missiles in Lebanon; Chief Offers Export Opportunity.” Defense News , 16 Feb. 2022, www.defensenews.com/global/mideast-africa/2022/02/16/hezbollah-claims-its-making-drones-and-missiles-in-lebanon-chief-offers-export-opportunity/. Times Of Israel. “Russia Says Hezbollah, Hamas Not Terror Groups.” Www.timesofisrael.com , 16 Nov. 2015, www.timesofisrael.com/russia-says-hezbollah-hamas-not-terror-groups/. Voice Of America. “Hezbollah Upsets the Balance in Lebanon.” Voice of America , 21 June 2013, web.archive.org/web/20130621233109/www.voanews.com/content/lebanon-syria-hezbollah/1682124.html. Wedeman, Ben. “Arab League States Condemn Hezbollah as ‘Terrorist Organization.’” CNN , 19 Nov. 2017, edition.cnn.com/2017/11/19/middleeast/saudi-arabia-iran-arab-league/index.html. Weinthal, Benjamin. “Analysis: Hezbollah’s Lethal Anti-Semitism.” The Jerusalem Post | JPost.com , 12 Nov. 2012, www.jpost.com/International/Analysis-Hezbollahs-lethal-anti-Semitism. Zirulnik, Ariel. “In Hezbollah Stronghold, Lebanese Christians Find Respect, Stability.” Christian Science Monitor , 21 Dec. 2012, www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2012/1221/In-Hezbollah-stronghold-Lebanese-Christians-find-respect-stability. Additional Resources

Group Overview Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), known more commonly as Tahrir al-Sham, is an active militant Sunni Islamist group active in the Syrian Civil War. The group was formed in early 2017 as a merger between multiple Islamist groups, including the Ansar al-Din Front, Jaysh al-Sunna, and Liwa al-Haqq, amongst others (Hummel 2017). The group is led by former members and leaders of multiple organisations such as Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat Fatah al-Sham (Davison 2017). History & Foundations Initially formed as a jihadist and Salafist response to the Assad regime, HTS quickly formed a unified anti-Assad front. Interestingly, one of the precursor organisations to HTS -- Jabhat al-Nusra -- was al-Qaeda’s affiliate organisation in Syria. Their leader, Abu Mohammad al-Jolani, had established his own source of funding through donors in the Persian Gulf and became a renowned insurgent leader. In July 2016, following the split of al-Qaeda from the Islamic State, Al-Nusra'a leadership announced a ‘rebranding’ of the organisation into Jabhat Fatah al-Sham and severed ties with al-Qaeda. However, many analysts speculated that this was just a severing of public relations and that the group would continue to have a secret relationship with al-Qaeda (Hassan 2017). The following year, the organisation (Jabhat Fatah al-Sham) rebranded itself into Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), and due to non-communication between the new HTS leadership and al-Qaeda, the split was viewed as illegal. Hence, the new Salafist organisation was publicly criticised for sowing fitna (division) by emphasising Syrian nationalism over the wider Salafist goal (Hummel 2018). Objectives & Ideology HTS has multiple objectives which are more locally focused on Syria and include the establishment of Islamic rule, as well as the toppling of the Assad Regime and the expelling of Iranian militias (Joscelyn 2017). Following the end of the Siege of Fu’a and Kafriya in 2018, HTS managed to remove Iranian-backed militias from the Syrian territory in which they operate (Al Jazeera 2018). One of HTS’s leaders, Abu Jaber, as well as several other of the leadership present within the group are known to hold Salafist Jihadist beliefs. This has influenced the group’s operations. However, a focus upon jihadism and the overthrow of a perceived anti-Islamist government within Syria has become the focus of HTS's objectives, much like the other AQ-aligned groups which are currently undertaking similar efforts in their own regions, such as AQIS (Al-Qaeda in Sinai Peninsula). Insurgent Abilities The military abilities of HTS are quite extensive due to the large number of recruits they claim to hold (12,000-15,000 militants), which has allowed them to conduct large-scale attacks. This has also allowed the jihadist group to participate directly in numerous large theatres of the Syrian civil war, such as the aforementioned siege of al-Fu’ah and Kafriya (or even the Daraa offensive in 2017). The group's tactics are very similar to other jihadist organisations and include suicide bombings. In 2017, Tahrir al-Sham suicide bombers attacked the headquarters of the Syrian Military Intelligence Directorate in Homs and killed dozens of people, including the head of military intelligence in the region (Miles 2017). The group also produces its own 120 mm and 160 mm mortar cannons which it uses both offensively and defensively. Additionally, the group possesses numerous small arms and has been known to utilise flatbed trucks with attached heavy machine guns (known as technicals). This specific equipment has also been used by the group to shoot down a Syrian Fighter jet (Reuters 2019). Approach to Resistance The militant actions of the group involve violence to a significant extent, notably in order to achieve the group's stated aims of removing Iranian influence from Syria and toppling the Assad regime in Damascus. This has resulted in the group attacking the Syrian Army directly, and even engaging in battles against Syrian allies such as Russian forces. Russian warplanes have responded by targeting HTS positions (IWS 2021). The group has also been accused of carrying out attacks on civilians, which has led to the group being referred to as ‘Hetesh’ -- which is meant as a negative nickname, similar to the label ‘Daesh’ which was applied to ISIL as they were seen as no different (Tweedie 2017). International Relations & Potential Alliances HTS has a strenuous relationship with Al-Qaeda as it is claimed the group is operating as a secret arm of AQ within Syria, despite previous claims of separation. However, Ayman al-Zawahiri has opposed the split of HTS from AQ, saying that it was done without his consent and several prominent members of AQ’s leadership have claimed that the military leader of HTS, Abu Muhammad al-Julani, is a tool of foreign powers (Katz 2018). There is a speculated alliance between HTS and Turkey, with the Turkish government designating HTS as a terrorist organisation whilst at the same time actively allowing it to fight alongside the TFSA (Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army). This has been speculated to be an attempt by the Turkish government to divide the elements of HTS from their more militaristic and dogmatic principles, and to bring it under Turkish control to combat the Assad regime and other Turkish-opposed groups in Northern Syria (Yüksel 2019). Works Cited (MLA-style) Al Jazeera. 2018. “Thousands Set to Be Evacuated from Two Syrian Towns.” Www.aljazeera.com. July 18, 2018. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2018/7/18/syria-buses-arrive-to-evacuate-two-rebel-besieged-shia-towns. CSIS. 2018. “Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS) | Center for Strategic and International Studies.” Www.csis.org. 2018. https://www.csis.org/programs/transnational-threats-project/past-projects/terrorism-backgrounders/hayat-tahrir-al-sham. Davison, John. 2017. “Syria Islamist Factions, Including Former al Qaeda Branch, Join Forces: Statement.” Reuters , January 28, 2017, sec. World News. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-rebels-idUSKBN15C0MV. Hassan, Hassan. 2017. “Jabhat al Nusra and al Qaeda: The Riddle, the Ruse and the Reality.” The National. November 1, 2017. https://www.thenationalnews.com/opinion/comment/jabhat-al-nusra-and-al-qaeda-the-riddle-the-ruse-and-the-reality-1.672221. Hummel, Kristina. 2017. “The Formation of Hay’at Tahrir Al-Sham and Wider Tensions in the Syrian Insurgency.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. February 22, 2017. https://ctc.westpoint.edu/the-formation-of-hayat-tahrir-al-sham-and-wider-tensions-in-the-syrian-insurgency/. ———. 2018. “How Al-Qa`ida Lost Control of Its Syrian Affiliate: The inside Story.” Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. February 15, 2018. https://ctc.usma.edu/al-qaida-lost-control-syrian-affiliate-inside-story/. IWS. 2021. “Russian Warplanes Responded to HTS Attacks in Idlib Countryside + Video.” Islamic World News. November 23, 2021. https://english.iswnews.com/21439/russian-warplanes-responded-to-hts-attacks-in-idlib-countryside-video/. Joscelyn, Thomas. 2017. “Hay’at Tahrir al Sham Leader Calls for ‘Unity’ in Syrian Insurgency | FDD’s Long War Journal.” Www.longwarjournal.org. February 10, 2017. https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/02/hayat-tahrir-al-sham-leader-calls-for-unity-in-syrian-insurgency.php. Katz, Rita. 2018. “Has Al-Qaeda Replanted Its Flag in Syria?” News.siteintelgroup.com. March 28, 2018. https://news.siteintelgroup.com/blog/index.php/categories/jihad/entry/434-has-al-qaeda-replanted-its-flag-in-syria-1. Miles, John Irish, Stephanie Nebehay, Tom. 2017. “Bombings, Air Strikes in Syria Rattle Geneva Peace Talks.” Reuters , February 25, 2017. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-idUSKBN16405J. Reuters. 2019. “Jihadist Group Claims It Shot down Syrian Warplane over Idlib.” Haaretz , August 15, 2019. https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/syria/2019-08-15/ty-article/syrian-warplane-crashes-after-being-targeted-by-rebels-war-monitor-says/0000017f-ef89-da6f-a77f-ff8f118b0000?v=1667224698742. Tweedie, James. 2017. “Al-Qaida-Linked Hetesh ‘Stockpiling Chemical Weapons.’” Morning Star. October 29, 2017. https://morningstaronline.co.uk/article/f-2nd-syria-chemical-weapons. Yüksel, Engin. 2019. “Key Characteristics of Turkish Use of Syrian Armed Proxies | Strategies of Turkish Proxy Warfare in Northern Syria.” Www.clingendael.org. November 2019. https://www.clingendael.org/pub/2019/strategies-of-turkish-proxy-warfare-in-northern-syria/4-key-characteristics-of-turkish-use-of-syrian-armed-proxies/. Gallery Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview PEGIDA, short for "Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamization of the West," first emerged on October 20, 2014, in Dresden, Germany. This group of demonstrators quickly gained attention with slogans such as "Non-violent & united against religious wars on German soil," "Against religious fanaticism and every kind of radicalism. Together without violence," and "No Sharia in Europe." By late 2014 and early 2015, PEGIDA rallies attracted over 20,000 supporters, with similar movements springing up in other German cities (2,5) . Primarily, PEGIDA positions itself as an alliance opposed to the perceived spread of Islamism in Germany and Europe. Its demonstrations, which have remained largely peaceful, aim to protest what supporters see as the federal government’s misguided policies on immigration and integration. Beyond opposition to Islamism, many participants view PEGIDA’s protests as a way to express broader dissatisfaction with the political system and a growing distrust of institutions such as political parties, the media, churches, and associations. These concerns are often centered around fears of cultural change, particularly the perceived threat of foreign influence, with Islamism acting as a focal point for these anxieties. (2) History & Foundations Lutz Bachmann is regarded as the founder of the PEGIDA movement, having launched a Facebook group called “Peaceful Europeans Against the Islamization of the West” on October 11, 2014, focused on “rescuing the West”. This initiative was a response to violent clashes in early October between Kurds and Salafists in Hamburg and Celle amid the struggle over control of the Syrian city of Kobane. The group quickly gained thousands of followers and began holding Monday protests in Dresden with Bachmann, attracting participants that included members of right-wing extremist parties, after the first public gathering in front of Dresden’s Frauenkirche on October 20, 2014, which initially was attended by only 350 people (1,2) . This number of attendees grew to 500 by October 27 and doubled to 1,000 by November 3 and continued to climb, reaching over 3,000 by November 17. Around this time, PEGIDA began drawing attention from both regional and national media, which fueled further interest and increased turnout. On November 24, 5,500 people participated, and by December 1, this number rose to 7,500. In December, participation reached five-figure counts, with 15,000 attending on December 8 and 17,500 on December 22. Given the focus on Dresden, the cold season, and the proximity to Christmas, the demonstrations showed a remarkable capacity to mobilize. (5) The initial demonstrations in October were promoted primarily via Facebook, drawing participants mainly from the organizers' extended social networks. These events gained traction through a “virtual snowball” effect, spreading among friends and acquaintances. By the fourth demonstration, the crowd began to include a noticeable number of football fans. Attendance, which typically consisted of young to middle-aged, predominantly male, and physically fit individuals, started to diversify slightly after November 10, when it surpassed 2,000. Poster promoting PEGIDA’s 10th Anniversary protest in Dresden via the group’s telegram channel . From the beginning, a few neo-Nazis were present, and their visibility increased as the gatherings grew larger. Among the organization’s members, two have political experience, including Thomas Tallaker, a city council member in Meissen from Germany’s Christian Democratic Union (CDU). However, most members are more closely tied to Dresden’s business community, operating small service-sector companies. They maintain extensive connections within Dresden’s party and club scenes, as well as among bouncers and football hooligans. (5,20) In 2016, Lutz Bachmann was convicted to a trial for inciting and use of hate speech against refugees. The charges that led to the trial, as well as an infamous selfie that showed Bachmann with a Hitler haircut and mustache, led him to temporarily step down from the movement (21) . The anti-Islamist movement has held its 250th and, according to its own statements, last rally after ten years. Hundreds of participants gathered in Dresden, as well as several counter-demonstrators. PEGIDA co-founder Bachmann had announced on social media that the rally held on October 20th of this year, would be the last of the ten-year-old movement, citing logistical and financial problems as reasons, despite his Telegram group being active with over 9000 subscribers. Groups on the latter mentioned channel, as well as on Facebook, share daily news and opinions, including support for the AfD party. (10,15) Objectives & Ideology PEGIDA  is primarily an alliance that campaigns against what it perceives as the growing threat of Islamism in Germany and Europe. The demonstrations, which have remained peaceful to date, aim to highlight what the group views as misguided policies by the federal government. For participants, these protests also express a broader mistrust in societal institutions, including political parties, associations, churches, and mainstream media. The movement taps into general dissatisfaction with the political system and fear of cultural encroachment, which it frames through concerns about Islamism as a focal point. Officially, PEGIDA justified its stance by opposing support for the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) in its fight against the Islamic State (IS) (2,4) . The "Six Points" of the PEGIDA organizers from January 12, 2015 (5) : 1. We demand the creation of an immigration law that regulates the necessary, quality-based immigration and halts the currently widespread, uncontrolled quantity-based immigration. This should be modeled after the policies in Canada or Switzerland.     2. We demand the inclusion of both a right and a duty to integrate. This duty to integrate, if it truly comes into effect, will automatically alleviate many of people’s fears regarding Islamization, foreign infiltration, and the loss of our culture. 3. We demand consistent deportation and re-entry bans for Islamists and religious fanatics who have turned their backs on our country to fight in holy wars. 4. We demand the possibility of direct democracy at the federal level based on public referendums. 5. We demand an end to warmongering against Russia and a peaceful coexistence among Europeans without the increasing loss of authority of national parliaments within the EU states due to the absurd controls from Brussels. 6. We demand more resources for the internal security of our country! This includes an immediate stop to police staff reductions and equipping the police with the necessary, up-to-date resources to meet growing demands. These points were extended by December 2015, where the following stance was published (3) : 1) PEGIDA is in favour of accepting war refugees and politically or religiously persecuted people. This is a human duty!  2) PEGIDA is in favour of including the right to and the duty of integration in the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany (so far only the right to asylum has been enshrined there)!  3) PEGIDA is FOR decentralised accommodation for war refugees and persecuted people, instead of in partly inhumane homes!  4) PEGIDA is in favour of a pan-European distribution key for refugees and a fair distribution on the shoulders of all EU member states! (Central registration authority for refugees, which then distributes the refugees among the EU member states similar to the German Königstein key)  5. PEGIDA is in favour of a reduction in the care key for asylum seekers (number of refugees per social worker/caregiver - currently approx. 200  6. PEGIDA is FOR an asylum application procedure based on the Dutch or Swiss model and, until this is introduced, FOR an increase in funding for the BAMF (Federal Office for Migration and Refugees) in order to massively reduce the duration of the application and processing procedure and enable faster integration!  7) PEGIDA is in favour of increasing funding for the police and AGAINST job cuts in the police force!  8) PEGIDA is in favour of exhausting and implementing the existing laws on asylum and deportation!  9) PEGIDA is in favour of a zero-tolerance policy towards asylum seekers and migrants who have committed criminal offences!  10) PEGIDA is in favour of resistance against a misogynistic, violent political ideology, but not against Muslims living and integrating here!  11) PEGIDA is in favour of immigration along the lines of Switzerland, Australia, Canada or South Africa!  12) PEGIDA is in favour of sexual self-determination!  13) PEGIDA is in favour of the preservation and protection of our Christian-Jewish occidental culture!  14) PEGIDA is in favour of the introduction of referendums based on the Swiss model!  15. PEGIDA is AGAINST the supply of weapons to anti-constitutional, banned organisations such as the PKK  16. PEGIDA is AGAINST allowing parallel societies/parallel courts in our midst, such as Sharia courts, Sharia police, justices of the peace, etc.  17. PEGIDA is AGAINST this insane ‘gender mainstreaming’, also often called ‘genderisation’, the almost obsessive, politically correct gender neutralisation of our language!  18 PEGIDA is AGAINST radicalism, whether religiously or politically motivated!  19. PEGIDA is AGAINST hate preachers, regardless of which religion they belong to! A study on PEGIDA done by Patzelt, W. J. in 2015 revealed that 54% of PEGIDA participants are motivated to attend these Monday demonstrations due to "dissatisfaction with politics." "Criticism of the media and the public" motivates 20%. "Fundamental reservations about immigrants and asylum seekers" are cited by 15% of respondents, while "protest against religious or ideologically motivated violence" accounts for 5%. The remainder falls under other reasons. According to Vorländer's findings, the "dissatisfaction with politics" reported by 54% of respondents includes a "generally perceived distance between the people and politicians" (23%), "dissatisfaction with the political system of the Federal Republic" (18%), and "general dissatisfaction with politics" (15%). The demonstrators are particularly dissatisfied with asylum policy (20%) as well as immigration and integration policy (14%). Following at a distance are dissatisfaction with economic and social policy (6%) and with foreign and security policy (4%) (6) . Some of the frequent chants of the demonstrations include language that was used by the National Socialist movement, such as referring to the press by “lying” and “system press” and ”traitor to the people” for politicians (18,20). The Wirmer flag (also known commercially as the flag of the German resistance on July 20th or the Stauffenberg flag) is frequently seen in the PEGIDA rallies, to the extent that it is now also referred to as the “PEGIDA flag” (16,17) . Josef Wirmer, a key figure in the German resistance during World War II, designed a flag intended to represent Germany following the planned 1944 assassination of Hitler. This flag was later considered in 1948-49 by the Parliamentary Council as a potential federal flag and served, in a modified form, as the CDU party flag from 1953 to around 1970, also influencing the FDP's symbols. After this period, it largely faded from public view (17,14) . In 1999, Reinhold Oberlercher of the neo-Nazi German College repurposed the flag as a symbol for his proposed "Fourth Reich," bringing it into use among right-wing extremist groups. Horst Mahler further popularized it within the Reich Citizens' movement in 2003. Over time, the flag’s use by far-right groups became associated with extremist and populist circles (14). Military & Political Abilities Although PEGIDA has no direct political affiliation, Germany’s parties Christian Democratic Union (CDU) and the Christian Social Union (CSU) are particularly focused on winning over PEGIDA supporters, they are competing with the German far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) for their support, the only political party with whom PEGIDA has held a formal discussion with. PEGIDA and the AfD share ideological common ground, such as the former’s stance on asylum and immigration (5,20). From the outset, PEGIDA has stressed its commitment to non-violent street demonstrations. However, there have been some issues, including aggressive comments on Facebook and a few incidents requiring police intervention, which are discussed in more detail in the following section (9) . In a study done by the TU Dresden regarding the political positions of the PEGIDA participants claims that they are essentially located between the center and the right-wing fringe, with more inclination towards the right than the left. However, they are likely much further to the right than this table reflects. On the one hand, according to the impressions of the interviewees, particularly those demonstration participants who, judging by their overall demeanor, were their overall demeanor, a very right-wing attitude was to be expected. On the other hand, there seemed to be some demonstrators who appeared to be somewhat reluctant to clearly identify themselves. The study continued to ask about specific political parties and found that of those who have any trust in parties, they were primarily close to the far-right AfD (page 8 of work 5) . Approach to Resistance While PEGIDA’s organizers have emphasized a commitment to weekly peaceful demonstrations, some events associated with the group have escalated into conflicts. For example, at the very first rally in October 2014, clashes occurred when some participants attacked counter-demonstrators. Later that December, tensions flared when PEGIDA’s march was halted by a blockade on Terrassenufer, leading some attendees to attempt a forced passage, with police and event stewards stepping in to maintain order. Additionally, reports emerged of incidents involving violence against migrants, such as an attack at Dresden's Centrums Galerie following a December rally. Another disturbance took place on January 5, when a group of protesters broke away from the planned march route, pushing toward the city center before being stopped by police. (9) According to authorities figures, there were over 900 crimes since the first demonstration in October 2014 to November 2015, ranging from physical assaults to the use of symbols of unconstitutional organizations. There have also been planned attacks on refugee homes, which has led to a believed connection between the increase of these attacks and the PEGIDA movement, due to the group’s use of hate speech, racial slurs and violence inciting, such as setting up mock gallows to ‘hang’ Angela Merkel for her pro-refugee stance (23) . International Relations & Alliances PEGIDA has also gained momentum in other parts of Europe, boosted by the refugee crisis. Affiliate groups protested across in the Netherlands, France, the Czech Republic, the Republic of Ireland and the U.K., among other countries. The Freedom Party of Austria, under Heinz-Christian Strache, has endorsed PEGIDA since December 2014. By January 2015, small gatherings of PEGIDA supporters, ranging from 15 to 200 people, were held in multiple Norwegian cities. Around 200 PEGIDA supporters assembled in Copenhagen, Denmark, on January 19, and about 80 to 100 participants rallied in Malmö, Sweden, on February 9. In Linköping, Sweden, on March 2, four PEGIDA supporters faced approximately 300 counter-protesters (8,11) . The Belgian PEGIDA branch, linked to members of the far-right Vlaams Belang party and the separatist group Voorpost, is regarded as a hub for racist and neo-fascist, Islamophobic views. In Prague, approximately 2,000 people gathered in a series of opposing demonstrations, bringing together both supporters and opponents of PEGIDA (22) . In the UK, around 300 PEGIDA supporters were met by 1,500 counter-demonstrators at their first rally in Newcastle upon Tyne on February 28, 2015. A similar scene unfolded in Edinburgh on March 21, where a large counter-demonstration opposed a small PEGIDA turnout. Prominent English Defence League activist Tommy Robinson was one of the organizers of the British PEGIDA branch (13) . Many PEGIDA Facebook groups can be seen with followers in the Netherlands, the Baltics and Poland, which has over 4000 followers at the time of writing. The German political parties CDU and CSU, in particular, are competing with the AfD (Alternative for Germany) for support from PEGIDA’s followers. Saxony’s AfD chairwoman, Frauke Petry, acknowledged these "content overlaps" to the press after a meeting with PEGIDA's organizing team on January 7, which remains PEGIDA’s only formal engagement with a political party to date. This alignment is unsurprising, as PEGIDA’s demands on asylum and immigration closely mirror those in the AfD’s platform. AfD’s vice-chairman, Alexander Gauland, has gone so far as to label PEGIDA a "natural ally." While a long-term political partnership between AfD and PEGIDA is not yet established, there is clear potential for the movement to push Germany’s political discourse significantly rightward (7) . From the outset, PEGIDA has stressed its commitment to non-violent street demonstrations. However, there have been some issues, including aggressive comments on Facebook and a few incidents requiring police intervention, which are discussed in more detail in the following section. (9) Bibliography The Economist (2015) ‘The uprising of the decent’, The Economist , 8 January. Available at: https://www.economist.com/europe/2015/01/08/the-uprising-of-the-decent . LPB BW (no date) ‘Pegida’, Landeszentrale für politische Bildung Baden-Württemberg . Available at:   https://www.lpb-bw.de/pegida . Menschen in Dresden (2014) Pegida Positionspapier , 12 December. Available at:   https://www.menschen-in-dresden.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/12/pegida-positionspapier.pdf . Deutschlandfunk (2024) ‘Letzte Pegida-Kundgebung: Mehrere Gegendemonstrationen’, Deutschlandfunk , 2024. Available at:   https://www.deutschlandfunk.de/letzte-pegida-kundgebung-mehrere-gegendemonstrationen-100.html . Patzelt, W. J. (2015) Was und wie denken PEGIDA-Demonstranten? Analyse der PEGIDA-Demonstranten am 25. Januar 2015, Dresden. Ein Forschungsbericht , Dresden, 2 February. Available at:   https://tu-dresden.de/gsw/phil/powi/polsys/ressourcen/dateien/forschung/pegida/patzelt-analyse-pegida-2015-01.pdf?lang=en . Technische Universität Dresden (2023) Pressemitteilung der TU Dresden zur Präsentation des Abschlussberichts: PEGIDA – Ein Phänomen und seine Wirkungen , Dresden, 12 October. Available at:   https://tu-dresden.de/ressourcen/dateien/aktuelles/news/Downloads/praespeg?lang=en . Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung (2023) Lutz Bachmann kündigt Ende von PEGIDA an , Frankfurt, 28 October. Available at:   https://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/lutz-bachmann-kuendigt-ende-von-pegida-an-110045780.html .  Westcott, L. (2016) ‘Anti-Islam organization PEGIDA exporting hate across Europe’, Newsweek , 9 February. Available at:   https://www.newsweek.com/anti-islam-organization-pegida-exporting-hate-across-europe-426805 . Spiegel Staff (2015) ‘Anti-Muslim PEGIDA movement rattles Germany’, Spiegel International , 14 January. Available at:   https://www.spiegel.de/international/germany/anti-muslim-pegida-movement-rattles-germany-a-1009245.html . on violence and context  Oltermann, P. (2015) ‘Germany’s PEGIDA anti-Islam movement unravelling’, The Telegraph , 28 January. Available at:   https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/11375165/Germanys-Pegida-anti-Islam-movement-unravelling.html . Deutsche Welle (2015) ‘PEGIDA Denmark takes cue from Germany’, DW , 18 January. Available at:   https://www.dw.com/en/pegida-denmark-takes-cue-from-germany/a-18201808 . The Telegraph (2015) ‘Anti-Islamist movement PEGIDA surfaces in Spain’, The Telegraph , 14 January. Available at:   https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/spain/11345766/Anti-Islamist-movement-Pegida-surfaces-in-Spain.html .  BBC News (2015) ‘Pegida: Anti-Islam march in Newcastle draws hundreds’, BBC News , 28 February. Available at:   https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-england-tyne-31657167.(uk) Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2015) ‘Sind sie das Volk? PEGIDA – Die “Patriotischen Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes”’, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung , 1 May. Available at:   https://www.bpb.de/themen/parteien/rechtspopulismus/199153/sind-sie-das-volk-pegida-die-patriotischen-europaeer-gegen-die-islamisierung-des-abendlandes/ . Bachmann, Lutz ‘Pegida-Unterstutzer’, Discussions available at    https://t.me/s/lutzbachmann Fichtner, U. (2015) ‘PEGIDA und die Wirmer-Fahne: “Ich bin entsetzt”’, Spiegel Politik , 30 July. Available at:   https://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/pegida-und-die-wirmer-fahne-ich-bin-entsetzt-a-1046072.html . Das Versteckspiel (no date) ‘Wirmer-Flagge, Wirmer-Fahne’, Die Symbolwelt der neuen Bewegung von rechts . Available at:   https://dasversteckspiel.de/die-symbolwelt/neue-bewegung-von-rechts/wirmer-flagge-wirmer-fahne-232.html . Schulze, F. (2015) ‘Die “Lügenpresse”: Ein Begriff und seine Geschichte’, Publikative , 1 January. Available at:   http://www.publikative.org/2015/01/01/die-luegenpresse-ein-begriff-und-seine-geschichte/ . Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung (2023) ‘PEGIDA’, Dossier Rechtsextremismus . Available at:   https://www.bpb.de/themen/rechtsextremismus/dossier-rechtsextremismus/500835/pegida/ . Social Europe Support (2015) ‘Undertsanding PEGIDA in context”, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung. Available at: https://www.socialeurope.eu/wp-content/uploads/2015/03/Pegida-eBook.pdf Deutsche Welle (2016) ‘PEGIDA leader Lutz Bachmann denies xenophobic remarks’, DW , 19 April. Available at:   https://www.dw.com/en/pegida-leader-lutz-bachmann-denies-xenophobic-remarks/a-19199027 . Reuters Staff (2016) ‘Anti-Islam movement PEGIDA stages protests across Europe’, Reuters , 6 February. Available at:   https://www.reuters.com/article/world/anti-islam-movement-pegida-stages-protests-across-europe-idUSKCN0VF0PQ . Benjakob, O. (2019) ‘How the German far-right appropriates ideals of non-violent resistance’, openDemocracy , 13 February. Available at: https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/countering-radical-right/how-german-far-right-appropriates-ideals-non-violent-resistance/ In the study by the TU Dresden, the political positions of the PEGIDA participants: they are essentially located between the center and the right-wing fringe, with more inclination towards the right than the left. However, they are probably much further to the right than this table reflects. On the one hand, according to the impressions of the interviewees, particularly those demonstration participants who, judging by their overall demeanor, were their overall demeanor, a very right-wing attitude was to be expected. On the other hand, there seemed to be some demonstrators who appeared to be somewhat reluctant to clearly identify themselves. The study continued to ask about specific political parties and found that of those who have any trust in parties, they were primarily close to the far-right AfD. (page 8 of work 5 )

Insurgency Overview The American Nazi Party (ANP) was a neo-Nazi organization founded in 1959 by George Lincoln Rockwell, a veteran Naval Pilot, whose paranoia and racism fueled his obsession with what he believed was a Jewish international conspiracy to destroy the white race.  In 1950, anti-Semitic and far-right propaganda led Rockwell to read Hitler’s Mein Kampf  and experience what he described as a “spiritual awakening.”  For years, he tried to secretly promote his newfound Nazi beliefs in far-right organizations and right-wing propaganda, but in 1958 he was exposed after an explosion at a Jewish synagogue revealed his connections to neo-Nazi’s associated with the terrorist attack.  In response, Rockwell hoisted a Swastika banner at his home for all to see and went public as a Nazi. He started the World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists (WUFENS) which transitioned to the American Nazi Party.  In 1962, he co-founded an international organization of National Socialists named the World Union of National Socialist (WUNS).  As leader of the ANP, Rockwell and his Stormtroopers aimed at using provocation through street demonstrations and propaganda to garner mass publicity and support in hopes of becoming a large political movement.  Rockwell sought to exploit fears of the white Christian majority by emphasizing social tensions surrounding race riots and economic instability and offering the solution of the ANP.   ANP’s solution involved deporting black Americans to Africa and sending “Jewish-traitors and their collaborators” to the gas chambers. In the mid to late 60s, Rockwell began to tone down the Nazi imagery and shift strategy from the dogmatic German-Nordic Nazism of Hitler to a pan-white movement based on “white unity.”  This caused a rift within the ANP that would eventually lead to its dissolution. In 1967, Rockwell decided the party should  be rebranded as the National Socialist White Peoples Party (NSWPP).  The same year a disaffected ANP officer, John Patler, assassinated Rockwell from the rooftop of a laundromat.    Following Rockwell’s death, Matt Koehl succeeded him as the party’s leader.  He moved the NSWPP away from politics and reoriented it into a spiritual and insular movement based on “Aryan purity” and neo-paganism.  This shift caused the party to split and fracture, forming new organizations such as William Pierce’s National Alliance.  In 1982, Koehl moved the small, but loyal remaining party members to Wisconsin and rebranded as the New Order.  Koehl died in 2014.  Since then, the party has continued in isolation and obscurity, preferring to avoid communication with the media about its leadership and activities. History & Foundations George Lincoln Rockwell was born on March 9, 1918, in Bloomington, Illinois.  His parents were famous vaudeville performers.  His father, George Lovejoy “Doc” Rockwell, was a fun and charming man, but showed little affection to his children.  His mother, Claire Shade Rockwell, was sweet but passive.  Following their divorce, Rockwell would spend summers with his father in Boothbay Harbor, Maine and the rest of the year in Atlantic City, New Jersey with his mother and domineering aunt. (1)   As a teenager, Rockwell began to turn his frustrations with his aunt outward.  For example, during his senior year he rebelled against a teacher he didn’t like by refusing to do any classwork.  Later, at Hebron Academy, a college preparatory school, Rockwell organized a group of boys to terrorize a teacher until he quit his job. (1)   At Brown University,  he developed an interest in advertising, illustration, and media.  He revived the college campus humor magazine, Sir Brown! and honed his skills as an illustrator and cartoonist while working as arts editor for the school magazine.  This was also the time during which he began developing a fascination with esoteric political tracts and conspiracy theories.  By his second year at Brown, he began to complain the university was a haven for “intellectual dishonesty” and “infected” with communism. (1)   In 1941, Rockwell joined the Navy as a pilot, serving in both the Atlantic and Pacific theaters.  He primarily flew on transport and reconnaissance missions.  While in service he married his first wife, Judith Aultman.  By 1945, he was promoted to Lieutenant Commander and received special decorations for his service.  (1)   Following the war, Rockwell enrolled at Pratt University, a prestigious art college in New York City.  While there, he won a prestigious illustration competition sponsored by New York Society of Illustrators and received a $1,000 cash prize and national notoriety.  Despite the success, he dropped out and pursued advertising in Maine.  His pursuits appeared promising, but his temper would consistently sabotage every opportunity for success. (1,2)   In 1950, the US Navy called him back up for service at the start of the Korean War.  He relocated his family to San Diego, California to serve as a pilot instructor. By this time, his marriage was in shambles.  He felt his wife was too “strong-willed.”  He began to develop insomnia, staying up late and following far-right politics.  He attended John Birch Society meetings and obsessed over Senator Joe McCarthy and the Red Scare.  He started to develop a paranoia that communist were infiltrating every American institution.  This paranoia led him down an anti-Semitic, anti-communist rabbit-hole directly to Hitler’s Mein Kampf  and a “spiritual awakening.”  In private, he started identifying as a Nazi (1)   In 1952, he was transferred to Keflavik Naval Air Station in Iceland and promoted to Commander.  His first marriage ended in divorce.  With nothing to do, he spent all his free time reading the anti-Semitic literature of Gerald L. K. Smith and Conde McGinley, Hitler’s Mein Kampf,  and The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion.  He then met his second wife, Thora Hallgrimmson.  They quickly married and spent their honeymoon in Berchtesgaden where they visited the site of Hitler’s Eagles Nest.  (1)   In 1954, Rockwell returned to Maine with his new wife and child before relocating to Washington, D.C. to start a magazine designed for the wives of U.S. Servicemen called U.S. Lady .  He believed his magazine could subliminally influence women into accepting traditional gender roles and avoid “race-mixing.”  The magazine was relatively successful but due to arguments he was forced out.  Following this failure, Rockwell began freelancing as an independent contractor for right-wing publications.  During these years, he faced enormous financial and emotional pressure.   In 1958, he involved himself in John G. Crommelin’s campaign for governor of Alabama.  Crommelin, a white supremacist and former Naval officer, shared Rockwell’s anti-Semitism.  In fact, Rockwell borrowed a lot of Crommelin’s anti-Semitic theoretical framework.  His campaign was a magnet for far-right extremists like Connie Lynch, Edward Fields, James K. Warner, Matt Koehl, Emory Burke, Gordon Winrod, Wallace Allen, and George Bright.  With these men, Rockwell co-founded the National States’ Rights Party, a far-right, white supremacist organization based in Georgia.  (1)   The same year, Rockwell was introduced to DeWest Hooker and Harrold Arrowsmith Jr.  Hooker, a wealthy businessman, was being investigated by the FBI for his pro-Nazi and anti-Semitic beliefs, but more importantly for the recruitment of New York City youth into his National Youth League (NYL) to picket “Jewish-Communism.” Hooker convinced Rockwell that mainstream right-wing groups secretly shared sympathies with Nazism but were too afraid to be open about it.  He persuaded Rockwell that if he went public as a full-blown Nazi, many would follow his lead.  Arrowsmith, a retired millionaire and extreme anti-Semite, offered to be Rockwell’s financial backer to start the National Committee to Free America from Jewish Domination (NCFAJD).  Arrowsmith put a down payment on a house in Arlington, VA and lent him a second-hand printing press for printing and distributing anti-Semitic propaganda.  (1,2)   Rockwell’s first operation with NCFAJD was to picket the White House with anti-Semitic signs and hand out anti-Semitic literature with youth from Hooker’s NYL.  The literature claimed that the United States government was secretly being forced by “the Jews” to send marines to protect Israel’s puppet regime in Lebanon. (1,2)   On October 12, 1958, fifty sticks of dynamite went off at the Hebrew Benevolent Congregation synagogue in Atlanta, Georgia.  Wallace Allen, one of the founders of The Columbians, the first openly neo-Nazi organization in postwar America, was indicted in connection to the bombing.  Rockwell had been using his printing press to supply the National States’ Rights Party (of which Allen was a member) with literature and propaganda.  Police found a cache of letters from Rockwell to Allen with ambiguous but suggestive phrases. News reports identified Rockwell as a suspect and radical Nazi.  Arrowsmith no longer wanted anything to do with him. His house began to be assaulted with bricks and cherry bombs and his wife and children left for Iceland.  (1)   Rockwell hit rock bottom.  His 2nd wife asked for a divorce.  His reputation was destroyed.  And he was unable to find work.  He began to drink heavily and became suicidal.  His father became ashamed of him.  His brother reached out with an ultimatum that he either go to therapy or their relationship would be over.  Rockwell made his choice and the only family member that didn’t ostracize him was his mother.  Alone in a dilapidated house with no running water or electricity, he sank into complete despair.  In that despair, he experienced another “spiritual awakening” that convinced him that he was the successor to Hitler’s Third Reich and called to start his own Nazi party to become America’s Führer.   Thus, he created the World Union of Free Enterprise National Socialists (WUFENS), which later rebranded as the American Nazi Party.  He displayed a large, well-lit Nazi banner for all to see and began recruiting young, disaffected men into his ranks of Stormtroopers, including several from Hooker’s National Youth League.   In 1960, the Navy revoked his commission in the Naval Reserves.  He had been charged with espousing race and religious hatred.  He used the situation to publicize what he felt was persecution by “high-ranking Jews” in which he specifically named Anna M. Rosenburg, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower.  He became ineligible for his pension with only six months from military retirement.  (1)   The ANP began holding demonstrations and handing out leaflets in Washington, D.C.  Eventually, riots broke out between Stormtroopers and the enraged Jewish community, particularly members of the Jewish War Veterans.  Rockwell and his Stormtroopers were arrested for disorderly conduct and received their first major publicity.  Rockwell was ordered to be cross-examined in a psychiatric hospital for 30 days to see if he was mentally fit to stand trial.  The Anti-Defamation League of B’nai B’rith presented violent illustrations he had published in his college magazine, Sir Brown!  as evidence of his insanity.  He was released after 10 days and determined fit to stand trial.  (1,2)   Rockwell sought more notoriety and publicity.  He began planning a demonstration in New York City, home to the nation’s largest Jewish population (many survivors of the holocaust) and national news media.  Rockwell saw New York City as the “pulsing heart of Marxism in the USA.” (2)  Jewish community organizers fought to keep Rockwell from speaking, but the ACLU came to Rockwell’s defense on the grounds of free speech.  In response, a riot of over 200 anti-Nazi protesters broke out in the rotunda of the supreme court building of NYC.  While Rockwell won the right to speak, he no longer felt it was necessary since he had already got the publicity he needed. (1)   In 1961, Rockwell and a handful of Stormtroopers drove a Hate Bus to New Orleans to mock the Freedom Riders struggle to integrate public transportation in the South.  He also held music fundraisers he called “Hate-o-nannies” and began indoctrinating recruits in chapters nationwide such as Chicago, Los Angeles, and Dallas. (1)   In 1962, the ANP toured America in hopes of increasing their publicity and gaining new supporters.  It was largely a failure.  Quarantine, the strategy of persuading local media and Jewish organizations to ignore Rockwell (what he termed the ‘paper curtain’) was relatively successful in keeping the ANP’s tour largely unnoticed.  In fact, when Rockwell attempted to speak in NYC on Hitler’s Birthday, April 20th, which coincided with Good Friday and the second day of Passover, the Jewish War Veterans and other organizations finally agreed on the strategy and ignored Rockwell. (1,2)   Image of Rockwell holding a press conference Source: Internet Archive, American Nazi Party Rockwell began to look for new tactics to break through the Quarantine.  When the Nation of Islam (NOI) held a National Convention at the Chicago Temple of Islam, Rockwell exploited Elijah Muhammad’s desire for racial segregation by delivering a speech on the “Lincoln Plan”, a plan where the US government would spend $50 billion dollars over the course of 10 years to establish a settlement for black Americans in Africa.  When he described Muhammad as the “Adolf Hitler of the black man,” he made national headlines once again. (1,2)   Despite travel bans, Rockwell entered Gloucestershire, England for a meeting with National Socialists leaders from seven nations and laid out plans for a National Socialist world revolution in the Cotswold Agreement.  This laid the foundations for the World Union of National Socialist (WUNS) of which Rockwell became the supreme commander.  At this meeting he met for the first time with Savitri Devi, a Nazi mystic, Bruno Ludtke, an ex-SS officer, and Colin Jordan, leader of the British National Socialist Movement (NSM).  All three would have a profound influence on Rockwell. (1)   By 1963, Rockwell would discover the lucrative college lecture circuit.  It held no fertile ground for ANP recruitment but earned him a steady income for the first time in his life.  He would continue to give lectures at universities until his death in 1967.  He was able to sell out to crowds of 2-3 thousand students, but only as a spectacle with no actual political power. (1)   Rockwell hated Martin Luther King Jr.  He believed King was a communist and part of the communist agenda.  When stormtrooper, Roy James, punched King in the face in Birmingham, Alabama, Rockwell awarded him the “Order of Adolf Hitler Silver Medal.”  In 1963, Dr. King was about to make his infamous “March on Washington.”  Rockwell planned to hold a counterdemonstration, but only gathered around 90 men and women… “several of them undercover police, feds, and Jewish community organizers.” (1)   There is exactly one way for us to win…and that is to fight on racial grounds; to think, to act, above all, to vote as whites and nothing else. -George Lincoln Rockwell   In 1965, Rockwell ran for governor in Virginia.  His campaign focused on anti-Segregation and toned down the Nazi imagery to be more palatable to a wider public.  Stormtroopers became “campaign aides” and dropped the Nazi uniform for suits and ties.  Race riots were erupting across American cities and Rockwell believed “white unity” should be the central motif of the movement.  While 6,500 votes were inconsequential in the race for governor, Rockwell saw it as a win.  (1)   Image of Rockwell during his Gubernatorial Campaign Source: Internet Archive, American Nazi Party With a budget of $1500, with a total press blackout, and with a ‘Kosher conservative’ [splitting the vote] …I got 7,000 people to vote for a Nazi . -George Lincoln Rockwell   In 1966, Stokely Carmichael, leader of the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee, coined the term “Black Power” to describe a growing movement of militant black Americans.  Rockwell decided to promote “White Power” as a counter-slogan for militant whites.  By mid-summer, the slogan gained nationwide popularity amongst racists.  Rockwell believed this new concept of “race unity” was “fundamental to success.” (1)   Rockwell’s “white unity” was based on pan-white inclusion, which stood in stark contrast to Hitler’s Aryanism, which was exclusively German-Nordic.  He came to the belief that Hitler’s strategic mistake had been the exclusion of Slavs, Poles, Greeks, Turks, etc.  Rockwell believed that “the dark peoples of the earth, led by the Jews” outnumbered “Whites” by “7:1.”  He preached that the entire “white race” was in a fight for its survival.  This shift in strategy caused a rift in the ANP between hard-core Nazis and those open to pan-white inclusion.  The more dogmatic ‘Aryan Unity’ faction within ANP was led by Matt Koehl and included William Pierce, Frank Drager, and Alan Welch.  Others, such as John Patler (formerly Patsalos), son of Greek immigrants, welcomed the change. (1,2)   In 1966, Martin Luther King Jr. was preparing to march for open housing in Chicago, one of the largest and most segregated cities in America.  Rockwell led a ‘White Power’ faction to counter King’s march with the white working class, mostly Polish and Italian Americans, that made up the area.  He passed out “White Power” T-shirts and coalesced under a “White Power” banner.  The crowd responded to King’s demonstration by throwing rocks and shouting racist vitriol. (1)   I’ve been in many demonstrations all across the South…[and] I have never seen—even in Mississippi and Alabama—mobs as hostile and hate-filled. -Martin Luther King Jr.   After the demonstration, King said it was one of the most violent and hateful responses he’d ever experienced.  Rockwell’s counterdemonstration in Chicago was captured on television and received tremendous publicity, but the victory was largely illusory.  Many who participated in the demonstration admitted they were caught up in the heat of the moment and embarrassed by their behavior towards King’s march.  Leaders of the community strongly rejected Rockwell’s message.  (1)   On January 1st, 1967, Rockwell rebranded his party as the National Socialist White People’s Party (NSWPP).  He was no longer concerned with Nazi dogmatism and felt confident in this shift in strategy.  He also got rid of John Palter, an ANP officer and long-time loyalist to Rockwell and the party.  Patler had become erratic and a source of tension.  On August 25, 1967, the disaffected Patler shot Rockwell from the roof of a laundromat.  Rockwell was pierced in the aorta while backing out of the parking lot and died at the scene.  Patler was found guilty and sentenced to 20 years in prison. The ANP tried to give Rockwell a Nazi burial, but were consistently denied.  There was a standoff at Culpepper National Cemetery and Matt Koehl, Rockwell’s successor, used the conflict to gain publicity.  Koehl eventually had Rockwell cremated and thus George Lincoln Rockwell became the first martyr in the American neo-Nazi mythos. (1)   Under Koehl’s leadership, the NSWPP shifted away from Rockwell’s political doctrine.  Koehl’s vision of National Socialism was less political and primarily spiritual.  He was profoundly influenced by Savitri Devi’s “Esoteric Hitlerism”, which reveres Hitler as a messianic figure.  He moved the party away from the political theatrics of Rockwell, preferring an insular organization centered around Aryan purity and neo-paganism.  This shift in orientation led most party members to split from the group and join or found their own organizations such as the National Alliance, led by William Luther Pierce and the National Socialist Liberation Front led by Joseph Tomassi.  Koehl was left with a small but loyal following and in 1982 moved the headquarters to Wisconsin to maintain a low profile.  Following relocation, the party rebranded as the New Order.  Koehl passed away in 2014.  The party continues but remains obscure, avoiding media and information on its leadership or activities. (1) Objectives & Ideology I am, and must be…the Apostle of Adolf Hitler, who was the greatest world savior in two thousand years…like Saint Paul…I once misunderstood, hated and fought.  I must, like the early Christians, drive out the ‘evil spirits’ of materialism, greed, selfishness, short-sightedness and cowardice, and stand defiant, even in the midst of the ‘lions of the Coliseum’, if that be my fate, to give the world once more that ‘Polar Star’ of direction, purpose, hope, loyalty, and love which can no longer be supplied by the infiltrated religions. -George Lincoln Rockwell   George Lincoln Rockwell and the American Nazi Party’s heritage can be traced back to the 1930s, when pro-fascist, pro-German groups like the German-American Bund, Silver Shirt League, and the Christian Front were preaching anti-Semitic and ultranationalist ideas in the pre-war era.  During this time, anti-Semitism had made its way into the cultural mainstream via popular anti-Semitic publications, such as The International Jew: The World’s Foremost Problem  by Ford Motor Company founder Henry Ford.  Ford’s book and newspaper, The Dearborn Independent , spread anti-Semitic propaganda and promoted the fabricated Protocols of the Elders of Zion , which claimed there was a Jewish conspiracy for world domination.  While serving in the Korean War, Rockwell was heavily influenced by anti-communists like Senator Joe McCarthy and anti-Semitic propagandists like Gerald L. K. Smith and Conde McGinley which led him down a far-right political rabbit hole until he reached Hitler’s Mein Kampf .  Rockwell’s political theories attempted to stitch together the fears brought by the Red Scare of the 50s and the racial tensions of the 60s with his anti-Semitic and racist beliefs.  Rockwell’s National Socialist convictions were not just political but spiritual.  He claimed to have reoccurring dreams of meeting Hitler’s ghost and was further encouraged by Savitri Devi and Bruno Ludtke that his spiritual destiny was to bring National Socialism to the world and save the Aryan race.  (1)   In his book, “White Power,” Rockwell describes ANP’s thesis:   1. Western Society is sick. 2. The youth are spiritually empty. 3. This is not natural, but an effort conspired by “liberals” and “Chart-Foragers” aka Jews. 4. Those leading the nation are purposefully causing its collapse. 5. Those leading the nation are Jews. 6. There is an international Jewish conspiracy to smash Western Civilization because Jewish people are inherently paranoid and thrive in degeneracy and chaos. 7. There are two segments using the “divide and conquer” strategy in order to conquer the world.  The first segment, “Friends of the Captain”, promote conspiracy by “gathering up gold by fake speculation and unfair merchandising” …then buying media outlets and using them to brainwash people and promote a class war. 8.  The other segment, “friends of the crew” promote violent class war from below. (3)   Rockwell goes on to describe the “ideal” society his party intended to create:   1. White America 2. White World Solidarity 3. A new social order based on racial values. 4. An “honest economy” that ends both economic freeloading (welfare) and economic exploitation. 5. White self-defense where all white citizens are allowed to keep and bear arms and “maintain vigilance against enemies internal and external.” 6. A government led by the strongest, smartest, and wisest men. 7. Spiritual rebirth centered around racial idealism. 8. Promotion of Aryan culture. 9. A healthy, clean, wholesome environment where pollution is eliminated, and resources conserved. 10. A better race where the best qualities are emphasized, and weaknesses and flaws eliminated (eugenics). (3)   The American Nazi Party had a five-phase plan.  Fortunately, they never succeeded beyond phase one.   Phase 1: Use provocative and shocking tactics to garner media attention and maximize publicity to raise awareness of the party.   Phase 2: Gain political legitimacy by running for office and presenting the party’s ideas to the mainstream.   Phase 3: Build a mass movement amongst disaffected white working-class and middle-class Americans.  Rockwell believed race-wars and economic collapse were imminent and hoped to exploit these chaotic conditions to “use political power to fight and win back American heritage and enforce the Constitution for the benefit of the White Christian people.”    We will build our trained, hardcore Nazis into nationwide mass organizations…inflamed with a holy zeal as fired the American Revolutionist. -George Lincoln Rockwell (1)   Phase 4.  Achieve political power.  Rockwell believed he would gain millions of ANP supporters that would elect him as President of the United States in 1972 along with stacking the Senate and House of Representatives with people from his party.     Phase 5: “The Final Settlement” (1,2,3,4) The Final Settlement:   Rockwell’s ultimate goal was to purge all Jews, leftist, queers, and non-whites from American society.   I’m going to completely separate the black and white races and preserve the white Christian domination in this country, and I’m going to have the Jew Communists and any other traitors gassed for treason. -George Lincoln Rockwell (4)   Rockwell believed Elijah Muhammed’s Nation of Islam would help organize and direct the ‘Lincoln Plan’ to send black Americans to a settlement in Africa.  The plan would utilize $50 billion dollars supplied by the US government and payed out over the course of ten years to settle and colonize part of Africa.  Those who refused to “voluntarily” leave for Africa would be stripped of citizenship, placed in concentration camps, and become wards of the state.  (4)   I’d also purge the queers.  I despise them worst of all…They’re the ultimate symbol of a decaying civilization. -George Lincoln Rockwell (4) Military & Political Abilities  Rockwell enlisted a small “revolutionary cadre of fighters” or “Stormtroopers” to implement ANP’s plans.  While membership figures were never released, it is evident he never received the financial or numerical support to carry through with his objectives.  Rockwell only gave the illusion that ANP was a large and growing movement.    Stormtroopers, Party Members, and Supporters   No reliable sources place membership above 200 active members and a few thousand supporters. (1) However, Rockwell would claim in Playboy Magazine to have 500 stormtroopers, 1,500 party members, and 15,000 correspondents (including thousands more abroad in the WUNS movement). (4)   Weapons   Rockwell claimed he and the stormtroopers only carried rifles and handguns for self-defense purposes.  He claimed the party didn’t participate in terrorism not for moral reasons but because it didn’t serve the interest of the party.   “I feel that terrorism is a valid weapon in guerilla warfare…if it would work.  A hundred years ago, I’d have been a Klansmen with a rope and gun and the whole business…but today, it plays directly into the hands of Martin Luther [King]…it manufactures martyrs…” (4)   Funding:   Tony Ulasewicz, New York City Police Department monitored Rockwell from 58’ to 67’. He once visited Rockwell at his home and reported:  [Rockwell’s] glowing, published accounts of his party’s progress had been nothing more than a pack of lies…I noticed that bullet holes punctured the walls of his house…I also saw a stack of unpaid bills high on the table.  Rockwell’s electricity had been turned off, and he used kerosene lamps to light the place…whatever Hitler’s ghost had promised Rockwell, it hadn’t yet arrived.   According to the Anti-Defamation League, ANP’s annual income was no more than 20k.  In fact, Stormtroopers had to find jobs and turn over their paychecks to the party.  They were constantly on the verge of bankruptcy.  Rockwell was selling his own valuables at local pawnshops to pay court-mandated child support payments.  He lost a battle with the IRS and had ANP’s headquarters on Randolph Street in Arlington confiscated along with its belongings.   The ANP’s most notable contributors were the following:   Harrold Arrowsmith Jr., a retired millionaire, provided him with $20k of support by putting a down payment on a house in Arlington, Virginia, providing a secondhand printing press, and $2500 in cash.  The relationship ended abruptly following the Atlanta synagogue bombing. (1)   Mr. and Mrs. Floyd Fleming of Arlington, VA bought ANP a new house on North Randolph Street (which got confiscated by the IRS).  They spent about $30-$50k on the party despite earning a modest income as sign painters. (1)   Mr. and Mrs. Robert Surrey of Dallas, TX “used…money for bails and fines for Stormtroopers…[and] raised better than $20k in a three-year period for the party.”  Rockwell cryptically mentioned ANP’s “backers in Dallas” in public statements.  He probably meant to give the allusion that oil money from right wing reactionaries such as the multi-millionaire oil baron and reactionary H. L. Hunt were donating to the party.  To the contrary, the Surrey’s were middle-class.  (1)   Ray York of California, introduced to Rockwell by the Surreys, contributed around $25k in cash, services, and rent-free use of his property. (1)   Other income came from ANP’s newsletter, Nazi and White Power merchandise (literature, stickers, shirts, etc.), initiation fees, small donations, and fundraising events like the racist music jamborees they called “Hate-o’-nannies.”.(4)   From 1963 to 1967, Rockwell began to earn a steady income on the college lecture circuit reportedly earning around $350 a lecture by the time of his death. (1)   Rockwell’s mom also sent money when asked. (1) Approach to Resistance Rockwell’s strategy was to exploit the chaos of what he believed was a coming ‘race war’ and ‘economic collapse’ to implement ANP’s platform.  He thought he could win a mass following by provoking his enemies by antagonizing them in street demonstrations and passing out hate literature.  Once he gained people’s attention, he planned to run for political office and use that platform to legitimize his party’s ideas.  Rockwell believed with enough publicity, ANP would gain mass public support, attract financing from wealthy right-wing reactionaries, and establish political power for his party.   He was wrong.  His party’s publicity peaked in the early 60s and never gained legitimacy or a mass following.  He never gained any significant political power and spent his entire career on the fringe of the far-right. (1)   Rockwell struggled to break through what he termed the “paper curtain” which he believed was a conspiracy by Jewish controlled institutions in media, banking, government, and commerce to silence him.  In reality, Jewish organizations were organizing around the “Quarantine Strategy” developed by Dr. Solomon Anthill Fineberg of the American Jewish Committee (AJC).  The strategy had been used years before to deal with anti-Semites like Gerald L. K. Smith.  The strategy consisted of two components:   1. Coordination amongst major American Jewish community organizations to minimize public confrontation between the anti-Semite and their opponents to deny them a dramatic event and invite publicity. 2. The dissemination of back-ground information and tactics on the anti-Semite to media outlets to convince them the rabble-rouser had nothing newsworthy to say. (1)   Rockwell needed the publicity to get his contributions in…just the threat of him coming was good for a couple grand. Tony Ulasewicz, NYPD   The quarantine strategy worked.  The ANP were literally starving for attention.   [stormtroopers] ARE EATING STALE BREAD AND 10-CENT-A-POUND MEAT INTENDED FOR DOGS!…they can’t fight because they are hungry and COLD…we have no money for the heat bill. -George Lincoln Rockwell     White Power Strategy   In 1965, Rockwell toned down the Nazi symbolism for a “cleaner” image focused on “white unity” as the central motif.  The strategic focus on white unity was meant to exploit racial tensions around desegregation.  Rockwell’s emphasis on “white unity” broke with the dogmatic teachings fundamental to Nazi belief of German-Nordic racial superiority.  It also differed from the Ku Klux Klan whose members were anti-Catholic Protestants and Nativists.  While this strategy had profound influence on the future of neo-Nazism and racists groups in the United States and elsewhere, it ultimately led to a rift in the party which contributed to its dissolution following Rockwell’s death.  The American public remained uninterested.  They decided that Martin Luther King’s dream was more noble than Rockwell’s white nationalist movement.  (1,3)   Holocaust Denial   “I don’t believe for one minute that any 6,000,000 Jews were exterminated by Hitler.  It never happened.  The photographs you’ve seen passed off as pictures of dead Jews are frauds, pure and simple.” George Lincoln Rockwell (4)   Rockwell introduced Holocaust Denial into the American anti-Semitic Zeitgeist.  He believed that pre-war, pro-fascist organizations like Christian Front, the German-American Bund, and Silver Shirt Legion, which had hundreds of thousands of followers, were evidence of his party’s potential.  He believed the memory of the Holocaust was holding his movement back.  His solution was to attempt to distort historic memory and remove the stigma from Nazism by sharing what today some might call “alternative facts”.  Many of these “facts” and “arguments” were introduced to Rockwell by his mentor, the ex-SS officer Bruno Ludtke.  Ludtke sent Rockwell writings from Harry Barnes, Charles Tansill, Fred Utley, David Hoggan’s The Myth of the Six Million  and an article published anonymously in a German-language Argentinian magazine, Der Web.  These writings came to mark Holocaust denial of the 20th century.  They included conspiracy theories of “supposed Zionist control of Allied interrogation of German war prisoners, inflation of mortality data for purpose of increasing reparations, fabrication of confessions, eliciting confessions by torture, and manipulating prewar census data to create the illusion of genocide.”  (1)   Rockwell promoted these ideas in an interview with Alex Haley in Playboy Magazine.  In the interview, he bragged about having published an article for Sir! , a popular men’s magazine, titled “When Nazis Tried Human Vivisection” (1958) under the name Lewcor (Rockwel backwards).  He admitted everything in the article was completely made up.  For Rockwell, this was proof the media were out to discredit the Nazis.  He is considered the father of American Holocaust denial. (4)   Alliances & Relationships Christian Identity   Rockwell saw Christianity as weak, feminine, and Jewish, but long entertained the idea of a Christian front with a pseudo-Christian exterior and National Socialism at its core.  In 1964, Rockwell met with Wesley Swift to discuss merging elements of National Socialism with Christian Identity. (1)   Christian Identity is the 20th century American variation of 19th century British Israelism.  British Israelism is the belief that “the British are lineal descendants of the ‘ten lost tribes of Israel” which dates as far back as the 17th century.  John Wilson, a 19th century millenialist, turned it into a religious movement and Joseph Wild, a Congregationalist minister in Brookyln made it popular in the United States by the last quarter of the 19th century.  It experienced a resurgence in the 20s amongst white supremacist and anti-Semites because it saw white, Anglo-Americans as “true Israelites” and “God’s Chosen People.” (1)   During the 1930s, Gerald Winrod and Wesley Swift shaped the first churches recognized as Christian Identity around a doctrine of racial purity which became successful in parts of California and the southeastern US.  Richard Butler, a former Lockheed aerospace engineer and member of the fascist Silver Shirt Legion saw Nazi politics and Christian Identity as inseparable.  Christian Identity holds that Jews are not the Biblical Israelites, but the “literal spawn of Satan”.  It pitted Aryans as the true Israelites engaged in an apocalyptic struggle with Satanic Jews. (1)   Rockwell sent one of his trusted ANP officers, Ralph Perry Forbes, to join CI as a minister in California.  Forbes built a large congregation and enshrined Rockwell into CI as “God’s latter-day apostle to America and all the lost sheep of the nations of true Israel.”  Thus, CI became a haven for American Nazis and their ideological descendants. (1)     World Union of National Socialist (WUNS)   WUNS was an international network of Nazi organizations whose members included:   United States: GLR’s American Nazi Party United Kingdom: Colin Jordan’s British National Socialist Movement West Germany: Bruno Ludtke’s underground movements Canada: The Canadian Nazi Party France: Yves Jeanne’s French National Socialist Movement Argentina: Horst Eichmann’s (Adolf Eichmann’s son) Argentine National Socialist Party Japan: The Greater Japan Patriotic Society Chile: Former SS colonel Franz Heinz Pfeiffer’s Chilean National Socialist Party South Africa: Ray K. Rudman’s South African Anglo-Norman Union   Including chapters in Belgium, Denmark, Austria, Sweden, Rhodesia, Iceland, Spain, Hungary, Italy, Switzerland, Uruguay, and Puerto Rico (1)   The WUNS movement was stifled by legal and logistical challenges due to strict laws surrounding Nazi activities post-World War 2, but it planted seeds and influenced neo-Nazi and far-right extremist groups around the world.  (1)     Schisms   ANP/NSWPP split off into several factions.  Matt Koehl, Rockwell’s chief lieutenant and formal successor, retained the party name and headquarters, but later moved to the mid-west and changed the party to the New Order, embracing Esoteric Hitlerism as a religion and losing interest in the political movement.  Other schisms of ANP include the National Socialist Front, National Socialist Party of America, National Alliance, Northwest Front, Knights of the Ku Klux Klan and the Christian Defense League.  (1)   Former Members of ANP   David Duke-Founder of the Knights of the Ku Klux Klan organization. Frank Collin-founder of National Socialist Party of America Harold Covington-founder of Northwest Front James Mason-former convict, author of Siege, promoter of Fascist Terrorism, and former associate of cult leader Charles Manson Kurt Saxon-author of The Poor Man’s James Bond Joseph Tommasi-founder of the National Socialist Liberation Front William Pierce-author of the Turner Diaries Arthur Jones-Republican candidate for Illinois’s 3rd congressional district in the November 2018 midterm elections Tom Metzger (ANP affiliate)-founder of the White Aryan Resistance (WAR) (1) Works Cited 1. Simonelli, Frederick J.  The American Fuehrer: George Lincoln Rockwell and the American Nazi Party . Chicago, Illinois: University of Illinois Press, 1999.   2. This Time the World (pink) Rockwell, George L. This Time the World .  Arlington, Virginia: Stormtrooper Publications, 1961.   3. Rockwell, George L. White Power . Arlington, Virginia: The National Socialists White People’s Party, 1967.   4. Haley, Alex. “Interview: George Lincoln Rockwell.”  Playboy , April 1966. Additional Resources

Movement Overview: The 4B movement is a primarily online feminist movement in South Korea which seeks to withhold sex, dating, marriage and childbearing from men, and convince other women to do the same. The name of the movement comes from the fact the names of sex ( bisekseu - 비섹스), dating ( biyeonae  -   비연애), marriage ( bihon  - 비혼) and giving birth ( bichulsan - 비출산) all begin with a B sound in Korean. The movement is also referred to as the 4 Nos, since women who adhere to it say “No,” to these four things. Like many movements that are born on the internet, 4B is more of a collection of shared ideals than a hierarchical group with leadership; there isn’t even an official website for the movement (8) . Most of the people professing ideas of the movement would likely refer to themselves simply as “feminists” and not necessarily say that they are in an organized group. It has been claimed that the movement has anywhere from 5,000 to 50,000 members, but due to the online nature of the movement it is impossible to put a concrete number down (3)(4)(6) . History & Foundations Compared to many Western countries, South Korea is very patriarchal. In addition, looks and beauty are obsessed over in South Korea, and 24% of all cosmetic surgeries on Earth take place in South Korea, with the cosmetic surgery industry being worth over 10 billion dollars. In South Korea, similarly to many East Asian countries, one must usually attach a picture of one’s face to job applications so becoming “prettier” can even be a necessity for employment (1) . If women do end up getting a job, they don’t have much to look forward to, as the gender pay gap in South Korea is the highest in the developed world (5) . As with most societies, beauty standards are generally harsher for women than they are for men in South Korea, which leads to 46% of female college students having had a cosmetic procedure done (1) . Seoul, for example, is reportedly littered with cosmetic surgery advertisements such as TV screens and billboards hawking procedures to achieve South Korea’s female beauty standards of “round doe-like eyes, flawless porcelain skin, a slim sub-110-pound body, and a small V-shaped face.” (2) . These beauty standards being more harshly enforced on women than men can be highlighted by a Gallup Korea poll which found that 31% of South Korean women in their 30s had plastic surgery compared to 4% of their male counterparts (2) . In addition to beauty standards and other non-physical forms of discrimination, South Korea is well above the worldwide average on physical abuse of women as well. The rate of intimate partner violence in the country is 41.5% compared to 30% in the rest of the world (5) . The rate of women victims of murder, robbery, arson, and rape rose 16 percentage points from 72.5% in 1995 to 88.7% in 2014. A Statistics Korea survey showed 67.9% of women responding that they felt “fearful” of crime in 2010. By 2014, the percentage was up to 79.6% (7) . In 2016, a young woman was murdered by a man in a public bathroom. Despite the fact that the man was quoted as saying that he killed the woman because “women always ignored [him],” police did not classify the murder as a hate crime. This caused widespread indignation among South Korean women and catalyzed many online feminist groups, including the birth of 4B as a named movement (6)(7) . Objectives & Ideology 4B doesn’t necessarily have a wide societal end goal, because it is seen more as not fighting the patriarchy, but swearing off men for good (5) . Once a woman makes this decision, they have already achieved their objective.  The ideology of 4B is firmly feminist, but some adherents are much more radical about their feminism than others. There is internal debate in the movement about whether people who follow 4B can be friends with men at all, or be friends with other women who date men (5) . Capabilities The biggest capability 4B has is the ability to organize women online for in-person protests. The online sphere serves to spread the message of 4B and galvanize women to its cause. However, since 4B is not a hierarchical movement, at the end of the day the capabilities are very reduced beyond encouraging women to get out and protest. Approach to Resistance In 2018, after a woman was sentenced to 10 months in prison for posting a nude photo of a male art model to the internet, between 20-55,000 women took to the streets of Seoul. Spy-cams (where someone is secretly filmed in a voyeuristic manner) and revenge porn are common crimes in South Korea, but most men are not punished to the levels that this woman was, and many South Korean women pointed to this incident as an example of the hypocrisy between how men and women are treated in South Korea.  The number of spy-cam crimes rose from 1,100 in 2010 to more than 6,500 in 2017. Organizers said that women live in constant fear of being secretly filmed in South Korea. The prevalence of these crimes have made the country, like Japan, mandate that all smartphone cameras make a loud shutter sound that can not be turned off. Some of the protestors shaved their head as a demonstration against the societal expectation of how a South Korean woman should look (6)(10) . Relations & Alliances The 4B movement is closely related to the Escape the Corset movement. Escape the Corset is a larger and less radical movement that seeks to change South Korea’s societal expectation around female beauty standards. Women who espouse the movement often cut their hair short and don’t wear makeup (6) . Besides Escape the Corset, 4B is generally associated with the broader feminist movement in South Korea, albeit the more radical set. Standing against 4B, there has been a long-standing anti-feminist movement in South Korea that predates 4B. The anti-feminists say that women’s pay gaps are exaggerated (despite being the widest in any country in the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development), and women’s issues receive too much attention (11) .  Men have shown up to feminist protests as counter protestors, with the New York Times reporting, “Dozens of young men, mostly dressed in black, taunted the protesters, squealing and chanting, “Dozens of young men, mostly dressed in black, taunted the protesters, squealing and chanting, “Thud! Thud!” to imitate the noise they said the “ugly feminist pigs” made when they walked. “Out with man haters!” they shouted. “Feminism is a mental illness!”” Man on Solidarity, one of the largest of these groups, has a YouTube channel with over 450,000 subscribers (12) . Another big sticking point for anti-feminists is the fact that military service is mandatory for men in South Korea but isn’t required for women, but feminists argue that women are often forced to drop out of the workforce when they give birth (9)(11) . Works Cited: https://www.hmsreview.org/issue-7/2022/8/a-look-at-south-korean-plastic-surgery https://ojs.stanford.edu/ojs/index.php/sjfgss/article/view/2118 https://www.asianews.it/news-en/South-Korean-radical-feminism:-No-dating,-sex,-marriage-or-children--48879.html https://www.scmp.com/news/asia/east-asia/article/3041058/why-south-korean-women-are-turning-their-backs-sex-marriage-and https://theweek.com/culture-life/what-is-south-korea-4b-movement https://www.thecut.com/2023/03/4b-movement-feminism-south-korea.html https://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/744756.html https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2024/09/12/defying-patriarchy-south-koreas-4b-movement-and-womens-rejection-of-future-maker-role/ https://www.vice.com/en/article/south-korea-incel-gender-wars-election-womens-rights/ https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-44751327 https://koreajoongangdaily.joins.com/2022/02/27/why/WHY-2030-generation/20220227143213424.html https://www.nytimes.com/2022/01/01/world/asia/south-korea-men-anti-feminists.html Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview The Revolutionary Forces of the G9 Family and Allies, known simply as the G9, is an alliance of gangs known for its role in the ongoing Haitian gang war. Formed in 2020 by former police officer Jimmy "Barbecue" Chérizier, the gang is the most powerful faction in the conflict. Influenced by Chérizier’s police experience, the G9 is heavily armed and organized into a hierarchical paramilitary (1) . In the absence of a meaningful state presence, the G9 aims to establish control over the country through violence. Chérizier hopes to legitimize his power and has established a larger coalition known as Viv Ansanm, which currently controls over 80% of the Haitian capital of Port-au-Prince. The gang was supported by assassinated Haitian president Jovenel Moïse, who provided the G9 with weapons, funding, and immunity in exchange for maintaining order on the streets when government forces could not (2) . Although Chérizier claims that the G9 is a revolutionary organization with the goal of taking back Haiti from a corrupt government and restoring power to the people, the gang is mostly focused on street-level conflict with rival gangs and police that has led to the deaths of over four thousand Haitians. It is also responsible for several massacres and jailbreaks, and its members are known for extortion, kidnapping, and drug trafficking. The gang has thousands of members, many of them teenagers (1) . Chérizier speaking to G9 gang members: History & Foundations Since the colonial period and the Haitian Revolution, Haiti has long been a hotbed for violence and political turmoil. State-sponsored gangs go back to the regime of François “Papa Doc” Duvalier from 1957 to 1971, during which he employed death squads to attack his political rivals and suppress dissent (1) . Recent years have brought a sequence of destabilizing events, starting with the 2010 earthquake that destroyed the country’s infrastructure, caused USD $8 billion in damage, and killed over 200 thousand people (3) . After the earthquake, gang violence surged as the government and UN forces were incapable of maintaining control over the devastated nation (1) . In 2017, Jovenel Moïse was hand-picked to replace Michel Martelly as president by Martelly himself. Martelly oversaw widespread corruption and government support for gangs during the country’s post-hurricane recovery (4) . Moïse’s presidency was marked by parliamentary deadlock as the state crumbled and gangs stepped into its place (1) . With UN forces gone, no presence of authority, and another hurricane in 2018, Haiti found itself in a dire situation (5) . Jimmy Chérizier was raised in the Delmas neighborhood of Port-au-Prince, which would go on to become his stronghold. It is disputed whether he got his nickname “Barbecue” from his mother’s chicken stand or from his alleged habit of burning his enemies alive. During the post-hurricane instability in Haiti, Chérizier served in a special unit in the Haitian National Police, where he was alleged to have overseen massacres and extrajudicial killings. He was fired from the police force in 2018, but by then he had already formed the Delmas 6 gang based out of his childhood neighborhood (6) . Chérizier began to unite with other gangs supported by then-president Moïse in 2020. With Moïse’s support, the gangs began to attack other anti-government gangs to expand their territory while committing massacres against civilians in the process. In a June 2020 YouTube video, Chérizier announced the formation of the G9 Alliance (7) . Initially consisting of nine gangs, the “family” soon expanded to over 12 (8) . Chérizier leading his gang in a march: After the formation of the alliance, the G9 attacked the Port-au-Prince neighborhood of Cité Soleil, a stronghold for anti-government gangs. During the assault, the gang killed at least 111 people, including many civilians, while authorities stood by (7) . The next month, the rival G-Pep alliance was formed. Based out of neighborhoods under attack by the G9 such as Cité Soleil, the gang is backed by opposition parties and prominent businessmen (9) . The cycle of violence escalated, with both gangs engaging in street warfare in which civilians were often caught in the crossfire or were targeted as residents of rival neighborhoods. The situation in the country became more desperate as gangs expanded their control, infrastructure crumbled, businesses closed, and the economy disintegrated. All the while, the police, military, and government were powerless to stop the conflict. Not only were they outmanned and outgunned by the gangs, but even if they could quell the violence they were directed not to by corrupt government officials, including President Moïse himself (10) (7) . In the middle of the night on July 7th, 2021, 28 mercenaries stormed Moïse’s home in Port-au-Prince and assassinated him (11) . The mercenaries, 26 Colombians and two Haitian Americans, were hired by Counter Terrorist Unit Security, a company based out of Florida. Many of them were former Colombian military soldiers and were told that their mission in Haiti would be to provide security to government officials (29) . It is still unknown who was ultimately behind the assassination. However several of Moïse’s political rivals and his widow, Martine Moïse, have been charged for their involvement (12) . After Moïse’s assassination, Chérizier and other gang leaders exploited the weakness of the government to further expand their control. Despite calling for the president’s resignation a week before his death, Chérizier held a memorial for Moïse filled with G9 members and had his men participate in the manhunt for the assailants (13) (14) . He began to espouse more explicitly political rhetoric, stating that Haiti’s elite, opposition politicians, and foreign imperialists conspired to assassinate Moïse. He declared that he was leading an armed revolution against these parties, marking a shift in the G9’s role in the conflict (15) . Instead of solely fighting for control of territory against rival gangs, Chérizier sought to unite Haiti's gangs against his political enemies, such as the new government. The G9 took control of Terminal Varreux, Haiti’s major oil terminal, for leverage over Ariel Henry, the country’s new president (16) . However, all the while the G9 and G-Pep continued fighting. In April 2022, the G9 and their allies Chen Mechan clashed with the 400 Mawozo, the largest gang in Haiti, in the Plaine du Cul-de-Sac suburb of Port-au-Prince. Over 200 people were killed in the span of two weeks, the vast majority of whom were civilians murdered for associating with a rival gang. Following the battle, the 400 Mawozo joined the conflict on the side of G-Pep, giving them a fighting chance against the G9. Another 89 people were killed in two days in July of 2022 during a battle for control of the Cité Soleil neighborhood, a G-Pep stronghold (17) . Both battles resulted in little change in territory. In the wake of the violence, vigilante groups formed against gangs and law enforcement (18) . With almost all of Port-au-Prince and the surrounding area in the hands of gangs, the United Nations Security Council signed off on a resolution allowing a foreign intervention of troops led by Kenya and supported by the United States. The resolution came after the Haitian government requested international help fighting the G9 and other gangs the previous year (19). However, when President Ariel Henry flew to Kenya to sign off on the intervention on February 29, 2024, the G9 attacked the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, Haiti’s largest airport, to prevent Henry’s return. In the days following, gangs stormed two prisons and freed almost 5,000 inmates. They took control of the country’s main port and attacked government and police buildings while Chérizier demanded Henry’s resignation. Henry gave in to the demands on March 12th (20) . In February 2024, G9, G-Pep, and other gangs united to form the Viv Ansanm coalition, meaning “Living Together,” to take on government and foreign forces. The coalition is led by Chérizier, as he hopes to use it to achieve his political ambitions. However, members of the coalition do occasionally still fight amongst each other (2) . In June 2024, the Multinational Security Support Mission in Haiti was deployed to bolster the local police’s efforts against the G9 and other gangs. So far, Kenya, Benin, The Bahamas, and Jamaica have deployed personnel on the ground, with several other countries having pledged troops. The mission is backed by the UN and has received over USD $18 million in funding from the United States, Canada, and France (21) . Chérizier sees the intervention as an act of imperialism and has mobilized the G9 and the Viv Ansanm to fight against it (22) . Objectives & Ideology The G9 is unlike other gangs in the sense that it is not a criminal enterprise with the goal of profit. The gang war in Haiti is fueled by competing factions vying for control. With its well-organized structure and the ambitious Chérizier at its head, the G9 has come to be the strongest of these factions. At the onset of the conflict, the G9 and other gangs were backed by politicians in exchange for political support. The gangs were allowed to do as they pleased and even received material support, as was the case with the G9 and the Moïse government. Politicians would send resources to the areas controlled by aligned gangs while neglecting those controlled by rivals. This arrangement also allowed politicians to control neighborhoods that the police could not due to the rampant violence (7) . As their power became legitimized through government support, the G9 found itself filling a power vacuum. However as the state deteriorated following Moïse’s assassination and the ousting of Henry, it became clear that the politicians created a monster they could not control, and the gangs began focusing their efforts on police, infrastructure, and government institutions (2) . Chérizier has done everything in his power to accelerate the collapse of the government so he can seize power in its place. Chérizier has branded himself as a left-wing populist, using black nationalist and anticolonial rhetoric appealing to Haiti’s long history of struggle against colonialism. He has popularized an image of himself in the likeness of Che Guevara (23) . He claims that he is leading a revolution against Haiti’s corrupt elite and foreign powers that seek to encroach upon the country’s sovereignty. However, no evidence suggests the G9 rank and file are motivated by ideology, and although Chérizier has taken the fight to Haiti’s most powerful people, his talk of revolution serves as little more than a weak facade. The G9 frequently targets the civilians Chérizier claims to defend and the gang has held Haiti’s supply chain hostage to further their power, preventing vital goods from reaching a desperate population. Furthermore, before Moïse’s assassination, the G9 were affiliated with the center-right Haitian Tèt Kale Party (PHTK). The PHTK has been accused of the same corruption that Chérizier claims to be fighting against (1) . Political & Military Capabilities In comparison to other gangs active in Haiti at the moment, the G9 is a well-organized, heavily armed group with an established hierarchy. Although it is not the largest gang in the country, Chérizier’s police background helped him distinguish the G9 from the numerous other disorganized gangs, allowing the G9 to establish itself at the top of the pack. The G9 is organized in a paramilitary structure with various commanders and lieutenants. The original nine gangs that formed the coalition are Chérizier’s own Delmas 6 Gang, the Belekou gang, Baz Pilate, Baz Krache Dife, Nan Ti Bwa, Nan Boston, the Simon Pelé gang, Baz Nan Chabon, and Waf Jérémie. Many members are teenagers from poor backgrounds (1) . Young Haitians have few opportunities, making the power and prestige that comes with joining gangs appealing. Although it is unknown how many members the G9 has, there are around 12,000 gang members in Haiti spread throughout over 200 different gangs (24) (9) . The G9 and other gangs currently control over 80% of Port-au-Prince and the surrounding area, as the local police and multinational intervention do not have the resources to combat them at this point (2) . The gang is armed with military-grade weapons trafficked from the USA, including AR-15s and AK-47s. Firearms are obtained through strawman purchases in states with weak gun control laws and then shipped to Florida, where they make their way through the Caribbean Sea to Haiti, typically hidden in shipping containers containing consumer goods. There are also smaller streams of weapons coming from Jamaica and the Dominican Republic. Some weapons legally obtained by Haitian police and security forces are also resold to or stolen by gangs. The arms market in Haiti is a particularly lucrative business, as weapons sold in Haiti can fetch up to 20 times their value in the USA (10) . A G9 weapons cache: Approach to Resistance The G9 has solidified control over its territory through street conflict with government forces and rival gangs. Fighting is extremely close quarters, with gangs battling it out block by block. The G9 extorts and kidnaps for ransom the residents of their neighborhoods as a source of income. However, it also provides public services, such as distributing food and water, in an effort to maintain Chérizier’s image as a Robin Hood figure (1) . The gang does not hold the same grace for rival neighborhoods, carrying out numerous extrajudicial killings and massacres to exert their control. During these massacres, rape and torture are common (7) . The G9 is active in drug trafficking, as Haiti is a trans-shipment point for cocaine and marijuana coming from South America to the US and Europe; however, this is not one of its main focuses. Although Haiti’s weak law enforcement agencies are ill-equipped to deal with the flow of drugs in and out of the country, major drug trafficking organizations regard the situation in Haiti as too chaotic to move their merchandise through. In recent years, drug trafficking through Haiti has declined as South American traffickers have opted to use the Central American corridor instead. While Haiti is not a large drug market, the narcotics flowing through the country are also distributed by gangs domestically. The G9 controls key ports in Port-au-Prince used for arms and drug trafficking (10) . As the conflict has escalated and the gang has focused its efforts against the government, it has taken to capturing vital infrastructure, such as Terminal Varreux and the Toussaint Louverture International Airport, to use as bargaining chips. These operations, as well as the 2024 jailbreaks, have also weakened the government and allowed the gang to expand its power. These destructive actions have accelerated Haiti’s collapse, allowing gangs to fill the void and Chérizier to become one of the country’s most powerful men. Relations & Alliances The G9’s alliances and rivalries frequently change based on Chérizier’s opportunistic whims. One day he may be condemning one group and the next he will find himself standing alongside them. For instance, the G-Pep alliance, which until recently was the G9’s most formidable rival, has now allied with the G9 in the Viv Ansanm coalition. G-Pep formed in reaction to the G9’s terror (9) . The two gangs were backed by opposing parties, with the center-right PHTK supporting the G9 and the center-left Struggling People's Organization and other opposition parties supporting G-Pep (25) . The gangs have a complicated relationship with the government and police. Although Chérizier claims to be fighting against a corrupt state and has attacked police and government targets, the G9 and other gangs have often been granted amnesty from the government for their affiliation with politicians (7) . Furthermore, many gang members are former police officers or soldiers, including Chérizier himself (6) . The Bwa Kale vigilante movement sprung up in 2022 after the massacres in the Cité Soleil and Plaine du Cul-de-Sac neighborhoods, using brutal tactics against the G9 and other gangs. Vigilantes have been known to lynch and burn their victims alive. Vigilantes killed over 300 people in 2023 alone (26) . Chérizier has been sanctioned by the United States Department of the Treasury and the United Nations Security Council in an attempt to stop the flow of weapons to the G9 (27) . The G9’s escalation of the conflict has led to the UN-backed intervention. The multinational coalition has pledged 2,500 personnel to fight the gangs, but only 600 have arrived thus far after months of delays (28) . Although there is a history of human rights abuses from the previous UN intervention in the country, 63% of Haitians polled in 2023 said that they support an intervention. However, Chérizier has used that history, including widespread sexual abuse by peacekeepers and a cholera outbreak stemming from a UN facility that killed over 9,300 Haitians, to legitimize his fight against the foreign force (22) (30) . Haitians living in gang-controlled areas are still reliant on gangs for basic necessities in the absence of a functioning economy and state. Meanwhile, the disoriented and corrupt Haitian National Police is ill-prepared to receive coalition forces. There is also a lack of clarity on the mission’s mandate, chain of command, and human rights oversight (31) . Works Cited (APA) (1) - Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (2022). Gangs of Haiti: Expansion, power, and an escalating crisis . https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/GITOC-Gangs-of-Haiti.pdf . (2) - Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (2024). Viv Ansanm: How a gang coalition has transformed violence in Port-au-Prince . https://riskbulletins.globalinitiative.net/ht-obs-001/01-viv-ansanm-gang-coalition-violence-port-au-prince.html . (3) - National Centre For Environmental Information. (2010). Significant Earthquake Information: Haiti 2010. https://www.ngdc.noaa.gov/hazel/view/hazards/earthquake/event-more-info/8732#:~:text=The%20official%20estimate%20settled%20on,170%2C000%20buried%20in%20mass%20graves.&text=Ref%20%237096%3A,the%20UN%20mission%20in%20Haiti . (4) - Psaledakis, D. and Webber, C. (2024, August 20). US sanctions Haiti's ex-president Martelly, citing drug trafficking. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/us-imposes-sanctions-former-haitian-president-over-drug-trafficking-2024-08-20/ . (5) - United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2018). Haiti: 2018 Earthquake Situation report No. 1. https://www.unocha.org/publications/report/haiti/haiti-2018-earthquake-situation-report-no-1-07-october-2018 . (6) - Coto, D. (2019, June 7). Leader or killer? A day with ‘Barbecue’ in Haiti’s capital. The Associated Press . https://apnews.com/article/ebc2cee089f149309bd73afa07816a63 . (7) - Bui, J. and Gunasekera, N. (2021). Killing with Impunity: State-Sanctioned Massacres in Haiti . Harvard Law School International Human Rights Clinic. https://hrp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/2022/10/Killing_With_Impunity-1.pdf . (8) - Coto, D. (2022, October 21). Who’s behind Haiti’s powerful gang alliance? PBS . https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/whos-behind-haitis-powerful-gang-alliance . (9) - Da Rin, D. (2022, July 27). New Gang Battle Lines Scar Haiti as Political Deadlock Persists. International Crisis Group . https://www.crisisgroup.org/latin-america-caribbean/haiti/new-gang-battle-lines-scar-haiti-political-deadlock-persists . (10) - Muggah, R. (2023). Haiti’s criminal markets: Mapping trends in firearms and drug trafficking . United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime. https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/toc/Haiti_assessment_UNODC.pdf . (11) - Phillips, T., Beaumont, P. and Delone, J.D. (2021, July 8). Haiti security forces arrest six alleged gunmen after president’s assassination. The Guardian . https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/jul/08/haiti-president-assassination-arrests-gunmen-latest . (12) - Al Jazeera. (2024, February 20). Haiti President Moise’s widow, ex-PM among 50 charged in his assassination. https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/20/haiti-president-moises-widow-ex-pm-among-50-charged-in-his-assassination . (13) - Lemaire, S. and Vilme, M. (2021, July 7). Haiti Prime Minister Appeals for Calm After President Shot Dead. Voice of America . https://www.voanews.com/a/americas_haiti-prime-minister-appeals-calm-after-president-shot-dead/6207936.html . (14) - Celiné, S. (2021, July 27). Gang boss leads protest rally against Moïse assassination. The Haitian Times . https://haitiantimes.com/2021/07/27/gang-boss-leads-protest-rally-against-moise-assassination/ . (15) - Sanon, R. and Paultre, A. (2021, June 24). Haiti gang leader launches 'revolution' as violence escalates. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/haiti-gang-leader-launches-revolution-violence-escalates-2021-06-24/ . (16) - Wilson, M. (2021, November 18). A Faustian Bargain: The Cost of Restoring Haiti’s Fuel Supply. Insight Crime . https://insightcrime.org/news/a-faustian-bargain-the-cost-of-restoring-haitis-fuel-supply/ . (17) - Charles, J. (2022, July 13). Gang continues deadly attack on Haiti slum, sparking violent protests over fuel shortages. Miami Herald . https://www.miamiherald.com/news/nation-world/world/americas/haiti/article263446333.html . (18) - Dyer, E. (2023, May 8). In Haiti, a grassroots vigilante movement is fighting back against gang warfare. CBC . https://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/haiti-bwa-kale-port-au-prince-gang-warfare-1.6833758 . (19) - Nichols, M. (2023, October 3). UN approves Haiti security mission to fight gangs. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/un-authorizes-haiti-security-mission-fight-gangs-2023-10-02/ . (20) - Coto, D. (2024, April 25). With fear and hope, Haiti warily welcomes new governing council as gang-ravaged country seeks peace. The Associated Press . https://apnews.com/article/haiti-ariel-lhenry-resigns-violence-gangs-government-22868c51b5f4c9ca5a8d69fcb5df376b . (21) - UN News. (2024, May 20). Haiti: Multinational mission and the ‘inexorable requirement to restore security conditions’. https://news.un.org/en/story/2024/05/1149831 . (22) - S.L. (2023, August 8). Foreign intervention, Barbecue warns and threatens. Haiti Libre . https://www.haitilibre.com/en/news-40275-haiti-flash-foreign-intervention-barbecue-warns-and-threatens-video.html . (23) - Misra, A. (2024, March 12). Jimmy ‘Barbecue’ Chérizier: the gangster behind the violence in Haiti who may have political aspirations of his own. The Conversation . https://theconversation.com/jimmy-barbecue-cherizier-the-gangster-behind-the-violence-in-haiti-who-may-have-political-aspirations-of-his-own-225514 . (24) - Besheer, M. (2024, July 3). Haiti's prime minister vows ‘new era’ for gang-plagued nation. Voice of America . https://www.voanews.com/a/haiti-prime-minister-vows-new-era-for-gang-plagued-nation/7684245.html . (25) - Mistler-Ferguson, S. (2022, July 21). G9 vs. G-PEP – The Two Gang Alliances Tearing Haiti Apart. Insight Crime . https://insightcrime.org/news/g9-gpep-two-gang-alliances-tearing-haiti-apart/ . (26) - Woodford, I. and Morland, S. (2023, August 18). UN says over 350 killed by Haiti vigilante groups as thousands flee gang warfare. Reuters . https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/more-than-350-killed-by-haiti-vigilante-groups-thousands-flee-gang-warfare-says-2023-08-18/ . (27) - Besheer, M. (2022, October 21). UN Authorizes Sanctions on Haitian Gangs. Voice of America . https://www.voanews.com/a/un-authorizes-sanctions-on-haitian-gangs-/6800038.html . (28) - Andrew-Gee, E. (2024, May 31). Haiti’s gangs ramp up violence against police as nation awaits intervention by foreign forces. The Globe and Mail . https://www.theglobeandmail.com/world/article-haitis-gangs-ramp-up-violence-as-nation-awaits-intervention-by-foreign/ . (29) - Turkewitz, J. and Kurmanaev, A. (2021, July 13). Big Dreams and False Claims: How Colombians Got Embroiled in Haiti Assassination. The New York Times . https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/13/world/americas/haiti-colombia-military-veterans.html . (30) - Osgood, B. (2024, March 14). What is the history of foreign interventions in Haiti? Al Jazeera . https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/3/14/what-is-the-history-of-foreign-interventions-in-haiti . (31) - Global Initiative Against Transnational Organized Crime. (2024, June 18). Who is in charge of the Haiti mission? https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/who-is-in-charge-of-the-haiti-mission/ . Additional Resources The Gangs Controlling Haiti: A Dead President, Amish Hostages, and a Psycho Named BBQ - The Underworld Podcast Inside the World’s Most Dangerous Gang War - Rolling Stone

Insurgency Overview Cossacks have a centuries-long history in Ukraine and have fought countless wars against invaders from all great powers surrounding the region. The cultural relevance of the Cossacks increased during the nineteenth century, when they became, on the one hand, a romantic model for Ukrainian intellectuals, and on the other deeply tied to the autocratic tsarist regime. Originally, Cossacks were organized communities with a mixed ethnic heritage that were subsequently coopted to fight for the tsar in the borderlands of the Russian Empire. Following the Russian Civil War, Cossacks went through periods of repression and rehabilitation under Soviet rule. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Cossacks have played an intermittent role in many post-Soviet conflicts. Their military activities increased in relevance after the 2014 secession of Donetsk and Lugansk from Ukraine, culminating in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, with many Cossack communities indirectly supporting or joining Russian forces. Video from the channel of the commander of the Dnepr Cossack Brigade, a Russian unit staffed by Cossacks: History & Foundations Cossack history is deeply connected to Ukraine, and vice versa. Originally a nomadic people, Cossacks eventually established ties with the Russian monarchy, which employed them as ad hoc military forces in the borderlands of the Russian Empire while also allowing them a degree of autonomy as communities. Through their history, Cossacks eventually became an ethnic group that identified more with a certain geographic area—roughly encompassing the lands between the Volga and Dnepr rivers and the Caucasus—and their militarized lifestyle more than a specific population. The earliest autonomous polities that emerged in modern Ukraine were the self-ruling Cossacks, broadly united under the authority of the Cossack Hetmanate, until Catherine the Great of Russia’s great centralizing and modernizing drive led to the Hetmanate’s abolishment during the eighteenth century. As Imperial Russia imposed stricter control on what had once been a chaotic borderland of little interest to the tsars, the legacy of Cossack identity contributed to and contrasted with the self-understanding of the people inhabiting the region, which became known as Little Russia (1) . The ethnonym Little Russian became a contested term in the nineteenth century, when a nascent movement of Ukrainian nationalism opposed the idea that Ukrainians had much in common with Russia proper. Throughout the era of romanticism nationalism, a Ukrainian mythology rooted in Cossack identity was developed by Ukrainian intellectuals (2) . Cossacks once again appeared as significant actors in Ukrainian history during the collapse of the Russian Empire in 1917, when the region became a battleground between various warring factions. One of the most notable was the short-lived pro-German and White-affiliated (i.e., opposing the Bolsheviks) Second Hetmanate, aptly named after Pavlo Skoropadskij, its leader and hetman, the highest rank in the Cossack military hierarchy. Remarkably, almost all sides fighting in Ukraine at the time used Cossack symbology to some extent, including the soviets, or revolutionary workers’ councils (3) . Another remarkable event in Cossack history was the formation of the Don Republic, also known as the Almighty Don Host, a self-proclaimed independent Cossack republic that controlled parts of the Donbas and other regions to the east of modern Ukraine’s borders between 1918 and 1920. This brief separatist state was the last time Cossacks mobilized to restore a form of political independence that had been lost by the end of the eighteenth century and that never again materialized. While Cossacks fought on all sides of the Russian Civil War, and some did side with the Bolsheviks as recounted in Šolochov’s masterly tetralogy Quiet Flows the Don ¸ the majority fought with separatist, nationalist, or White-affiliated factions, which led to the implementation of decossackization and collectivization measures after the war (4) . State policy against Cossacks eased during the 1930s, and by the time of Germany’s invasion of the USSR in 1941, Cossacks had been reintegrated into Soviet society. While thousands of Cossacks did fight for the Third Reich in collaborationist units (5) , the overwhelming majority remained loyal to the Soviet Union, where entire divisions were formed specifically out of Cossacks (6) . Amid the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, which was preceded by years of cultural and economic liberalization, Cossack identity re-emerged, most prominently in Ukraine and Russia. In Ukraine, the symbolism of the newly independent state drew much from Cossack heritage, drawing an ideal connection between Ukrainian identity and Cossack identity as a form of “national pedagogism” (7) . This has also created a limited cultural mobilization, spurred more by Ukrainian secular authorities than genuine popular sentiment, that has sought to integrate Cossack identity into a wider Ukrainian identity (8) . Nevertheless, the great majority of registered and unregistered Cossacks live in the Russian Federation, where a more structured integration of Cossacks into public life began in the mid-1990s (9) . In 1994, the Russian state established an official register of Cossack hosts, allowing Cossack communities to receive official recognition, in addition to financial and institutional support (10) . Their status was further expanded under Putin’s rule and they are now legally able to perform non-military public security duties (11) . In 2012, the Cossack Party of the Russian Federation was registered as a political party, remaining active today. Other organizations related to Cossack identity, such as the All-Russian Cossack Society, have since emerged (12) . With the most recent additions of the Black Sea Cossack Host (2021) and the North-West Cossack Host (2023), the total number of registered hosts in Russia has reached fourteen (13) . However, the great majority of Russia’s Cossacks remain unregistered and under informal self-governing arrangements within their own communities. Population estimates range between two and seven million Cossacks in the Russian Federation, with at least 200,000–300,000 performing paramilitary duties or being otherwise employed in state service (14) . Objectives & Ideology The majority of Cossacks active in the Russo-Ukrainian War side with Russia, and therefore fully support the Russian state agenda regarding the annexation of significant parts of Ukraine. Cossacks, as exemplified by their history of service to the Russian Empire, and notwithstanding their service under the Soviet Union, have long been regarded as culturally and politically ultraconservative; Cossacks fighting in the Donbas on the separatist side since 2014 have been known to hold beliefs that can be summarized in the motto: “For the Tsar, the Faith, and the Fatherland” (15) . Representatives of Russian Cossack organizations have expressed full support for Russian military and political objectives in the war, stating that the conflict is a “holy war,” as the areas where the majority of the fighting is currently taking place are regarded as ancestral Cossack homelands (16) . Military & Political Abilities Some Cossack units were involved in operations in Ukraine as early as 2014, when several militias emerged in the Donbas region and elsewhere in eastern and southern Ukraine as “self-defense” groups, supposedly formed as neighborhood watches to prevent operations of the Maidan-aligned groups, such as Right Sector (17) . Cossacks have a history of fierce independence, and those fighting on the separatist side in Donbas were often at odds with the leaders of the Lugansk and Donetsk People’s Republics (18) . Some of these joined the loose grouping known as the Union of Donbass Volunteers, a paramilitary association that has served as a rallying point for all militiamen involved in the Donbas conflict since 2014. Since then, the relationship of many Russian Cossacks with the Russian state has significantly intensified, with institutional cooperation and support increasing at all levels. When the Russo-Ukrainian War broke out in 2022, Cossack participation was initially negligible. In April 2022, sources reported a total combat strength of 4,000 Cossacks, up from 1,400 earlier that month and possibly bolstering up to 5,500 fighters divided into two paramilitary units, the Don and Tavrida detachments (19) . By late 2023, this number had grown to over 25,000, with Cossack troops mostly organized in the “Combat Reserves” detachments known as BARS (20) . BARS units began the activation process in late 2021, creating a structure of military reservists previously absent from the Russian Armed Forces (21) . Appeals by politicians close to Russian Cossack organizations for heavier equipment to be provided to Cossack units in late 2023 indicated that many Cossack units had been operating as light infantry formations until then (22) . The continued creation of new Cossack units has led to the effective replacement of PMC Wagner’s role on the Ukrainian front, including the formation of Cossack PMCs (23) . Relations & Alliances Russian Cossacks have been undergoing an unprecedented historical phase of “re-Cossackisation” in partnership with the Russian state. However, this movement is not limited to the borders of the Russian Federation, involving a burgeoning network of ties within former Soviet countries, as well as independent Cossack communities abroad (24) . The Union of Cossack Warriors of Russia and Abroad represents about 30,000 Cossacks living outside the borders of Russia proper and has established ties with Kazakh and Kyrgyz Cossacks, but also with individual Cossacks from Belgium, Germany, and Finland (25) . Works Cited (1) - Cfr. Sysin, F. E. The Cossack Chronicles and the Development of Modern Ukrainian Culture and National Identity. In: Harvard Ukrainian Studies, 14, 3/3, 1990. (2) - Sysyn, F. The Reemergence of the Ukrainian Nation and Cossack Mythology. In: Social Research, 58, 4, 1991. pp. 850-851. (3) - Ibidem. (4) - Holquist, P. "Conduct Merciless Mass Terror": Decossackization on the Don, 1919. In: Cahiers du Monde russe, 38, 1/2, 1997. pp. 127-148. (5) - Cfr. Ratushnyak, O. V. The Cossacks on the side of the Third Reich (1949-1945 ГГ.). In: Science and Society, 1, 2013. pp. 222-236. (6) - Cfr. Trut, V. P. & Narezhny, A. I. On the Participation of Don Cossacks in World War II in 1941. In: Bylye God, 36, 2, 2015. pp. 428-433. (7) - Cfr. Bureychak, T. & Petrenko, O. Heroic Masculinity in Post-Soviet Ukraine: Cossacks, UPA and “Svoboda”. In: East/West: Journal of Ukrainian Studies, 2, 2, 2015. pp. 6-9. (8) - Ibidem. (9) - Macievskiy, G. O. State and the Cossacks: On the Way to Public Service. In: Vestnik Volgogradskogo Gosudarstvennogo Universiteta, 24, 4, Volgograd, 2019. (10) - Ibidem. (11) - Darczewska, J. Putin's Cossacks -  Folklore, Business or Politics?. In: Point of View, 68, Warsaw, 2017. pp. 18-21. (12) - http://kaprf.ru/   (13) - Arnold, R. Moscow Moves to Establish Cossack Hosts in Occupied Ukrainian Territories. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor – The Jamestown Foundation, 25.01.2024. Available at: https://jamestown.org/program/moscow-moves-to-establish-zaporizhzhian-cossack-host/  [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (14) - Darczewska, J. Putin's Cossacks -  Folklore, Business or Politics?. Cit. pp. 15, 24-25. (15) - Arnold, R. Geschichte der Beziehungen der Kosaken zum Kreml. In: Russland-Analysen, 415, 08.03.2022. DOI: 10.31205/RA.415.01 (16) - Arnold, R. Cossack Warriors From Russia and Abroad Meet in Moscow. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20, 181, 28.11.2023. https://jamestown.org/program/cossack-warriors-from-russia-and-abroad-meet-in-moscow/  [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (17) - Arnold, R. Russian Special Services Employ Cossacks, Ukrainian Religious Institutions Against Kyiv. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 17, 52, 16/04/2020 [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (18) - Ibidem. (19) - Arnold, R. Cossacks and the Battle for Donbas. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 19, 59, 25/04/2022. https://jamestown.org/program/cossacks-and-the-battle-for-donbas/   [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (20) - Arnold, R. The Kremlin Uses Registered Cossacks as a Means of Stealth Mobilization. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20, 155, 10/10/2023 https://jamestown.org/program/the-kremlin-uses-registered-cossacks-as-a-means-of-stealth-mobilization/  [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (21) -  https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/russia/reserves-bars.htm   (22) - Kozyin, N. Казаки хотят получить танки и артиллерию. In: Parlamentskaya Gazeta, 22.11.2023 https://www.pnp.ru/social/kazaki-khotyat-poluchit-tanki-i-artilleriyu.html  [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (23) - Arnold, R. Cossack Fighters Replace Wagner Forces in Ukraine. In: : Eurasia Daily Monitor, 21, 5, 16.01.2024 https://jamestown.org/program/cossack-fighters-replace-wagner-forces-in-ukraine/  [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (24) - Arnold, R. Cossack Warriors From Russia and Abroad Meet in Moscow. In: Eurasia Daily Monitor, 20, 181. 28.11.2023 https://jamestown.org/program/cossack-warriors-from-russia-and-abroad-meet-in-moscow/   [Last consulted: 16.06.2024] (25) - Ibidem.

Introduction & Overview The Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) is a self-proclaimed secular Palestinian Marxist-Lenninist and Socialist organization, created shortly after the Six-Day War/June War with Israel in December of 1967. The PFLP was established by George Habash, who originally had ties with the Harakat al-Qawmiyyin al-Arab (Arab Nationalist Movement (ANM)). ANM was formed in the 1950s in Beirut, the capital of Lebanon in response to Israel’s occupation of Palestine and to promote Arab unity. After the Six-Day War with Israel, three Palestinian Nationalist insurgent groups merged — The Revenge Youth, Heroes of Return, and the Palestinian Liberation Front to create the Popular Front for Liberation of Palestine alongside The Arab Nationalist Movement. With these three groups merging and through the resources of the ANM, and its various military colleagues in Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, the Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine was created. The PFLP first joined the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1968, the umbrella organization that's in charge of the Palestinian Nationalist movement. Both remained in agreement on an armed struggle in its early years, the PFLP and PLO opposed several peace talks between Israel and Palestine throughout the years; the PFLP has also removed themselves from the organization to reject peace accords but rejoined despite solution disagreements. (1) History & Foundations The Arab Revolt or Great Arab Revolt, was initiated by Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif of Mecca, in 1916, and marked a significant chapter in the struggle for Arab independence from Ottoman rule in Palestine. However, in 1917, the Balfour Declaration displayed British support for a Jewish national home in Palestine, further solidifying the groundwork for tensions between Arab and Jewish communities in the region. The League of Nations was an international organization until 1946. It was founded after World War I to promote peace and cooperation among countries to prevent another global war. The League of Nations ultimately granted Britain the mandate to assist Palestine after the defeat of the Ottoman Empire at the end of World War I.  After World War I, the Sykes-Picot Agreement placed Palestine under British control, then in 1947, the United Nations Partition Plan, Resolution 181, aimed to address the competing national aspirations by proposing separate Arab and Jewish states. The plan's rejection by Arab leaders led to the declaration of the State of Israel in 1948, which was followed by an invasion by Arab states, sparking the first Arab-Israeli War of 1948-1949. After the first Arab-Israeli war, massive displacement ensued as a result of an Israeli victory. An estimated 700,000 Palestinians were displaced, with many fleeing to neighboring Arab states, although many stayed within Israel’s new borders within the West Bank, and Gaza. With Israel’s victory, they gained independence and recognition as a country first by the United States, and the Soviet Union. As of 2020, Israel is recognized by 165 countries. More conflicts followed after the 1948-49 war, including the Suez Crisis of 1956 and then the Six-Day War of 1967, which also escalated the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, resulting in the Israeli occupation of territories including the West Bank, Gaza Strip, and Golan Heights. These events contributed to the displacement of Palestinians, latching them into continuing cycles of brutal violence, poverty, and further resistance. The signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 offered hope for a peaceful resolution, but successive deteriorations became constant regarding negotiations. (2) During the creation of the Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine, a document was released that outlined the PFLP’s principles, and their goals. The PFLP firstly opposes Zionism and considers it a colonialist movement that aims to displace the Palestinian people from their homeland. The founding document further states that the PFLP advocates for a secular and democratic state, where all citizens enjoy equal rights. The document also emphasizes the importance of their armed struggle as a legitimate means to resist occupation and achieve liberation. Through this emphasis, they call for the mobilization of all Palestinian people, and the Arab nations in a unified armed struggle against Israel, the World Zionist Organization, and lastly, what the document states as a ‘third force,’ which is  ‘that of world imperialism led by the United States of America. (3) By the 1980s, with the rise of Islamist movements like Hamas, and the Islamic Jihad, and with the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine started to lose its influence in the Palestinian resistance movements in Gaza and the West Bank. The PFLP remained marginally aligned with the Palestinian movement’s armed struggle, including in the first and second Intifada. The first Intifada, which began on December 9th, 1987 happened due to an Israeli truck driver killing four Palestinian refugees in an automobile accident who were from the Jabalia Refugee Camp. Protests and civil disobedience erupted in response throughout the West Bank and Gaza. During the first Intifada, the Israeli army killed 1,087 Palestinians, 240 of whom were children. 100 Israeli civilians and 60 Israeli soldiers were killed. (4) The PFLP remained active in the Palestinian movement during the Second Intifada from 2000 to 2005. (5) Objectives & Ideologies  The PFLP openly opposes Zionism, a nationalist movement that emerged in the late 19th century and advocated for the establishment of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, which was then in the 19th century part of the Ottoman Empire. The Zionist movement, created by Theodor Herzl, strongly advocated establishing a sovereign Jewish state. Theodor Herzl focused on Palestine as the primary location for a Jewish homeland due to its historical and biblical connections to the Jewish people. However, The Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine considers Zionism a colonialist movement that aims to displace the Palestinian people from their homeland instead of assimilating them. The PFLP also opposes a two-state solution and instead calls for the creation of a democratic Palestinian state in all of historic Palestine through armed struggle, and for Jerusalem to be Palestine’s capital. The PFLP’s founding document's conclusion calls for the mobilization of all Palestinian people and Arab nations in a unified fight against imperialism and Zionism. The PFLP also pledges solidarity with revolutionary movements worldwide, viewing the Palestinian struggle as a part of a broader global struggle against imperialism and colonialism. It also emphasizes their commitment to social justice, economic equality, and the rights of workers and peasants in Palestine. (6)  Military & Political Capabilities  The PFLP is assumed to have 18 Political Bureau members, most of whose identities are unknow; however, it is known that at the last General Conference, held in 2001, Ahmad Sa’adat was re-elected as Secretary General. As for military capabilities, the PFLP and its umbrella organization since 1968, PLO (Palestinian Liberation Organization) have a variety of suppliers. Syria has provided financial support and training, and the PFLP-General Command also maintains its headquarters in Damascus, Syria. They have also received support from Russia, China, and Iran. The PFLP has remained an off-and-on significant player within the Palestinian movement. Although often rejecting any peace negotiation and politically detached, the PFLP has remained marginally fastened to the movement's armed struggle. (7)   Since Hamas' attack and subsequent Israeli air and ground operation on October 7th, 2023, the PFLP has posted a variety of texts, videos, and photographs displaying targeted cyber and armed attacks on Israeli watchtowers and military checkpoints along the Gaza Strip border. Along with these statements taking credit for terror attacks and cyber-attacks, the PFLP’s Central Media Department released a statement on the October 7th attack against Israel:  "The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) said that the solid mountains of the sons of the resistance came out united in response to the call of Palestine, the call of Jerusalem and Al-Aqsa, in which the nature of the conflict is restored and the dignity of the Arab nation is restored, determined to achieve a strategic victory over this enemy in a battle that will open the door of return and redraw the history of Palestine and the region. The PFLP called on our heroic people throughout Palestine to actively participate in the battle of the "Al-Aqsa Flood", both from its position and with the tools it possesses, to attack the enemy army and its settlers, cut off its supply routes, sabotage its vital facilities, and chase the Zionist invaders who are terrified in front of the strikes of the resistance and their proxy strikes in every inch of the land of Palestine. The Front stressed its call to all those who carry weapons, especially the sons of the security services, to engage in the battle of the Palestinian people against their enemy, and to position themselves in the natural position of every free Palestinian struggling for salvation from the occupation, and to achieve the goals and rights of all our people. The Front said that the timing of the battle coinciding with the glorious October War is an invitation to the sons of the Arab nation and the peoples of the region to realize their position in the overall conflict with the Zionist enemy and in this particular battle and to carry out their duties alongside their rebellious people fighting in occupied Palestine." (8) Approach to Resistance Predominantly fighting for a one-state solution in the Palestinian and Israeli conflict, the PFLP rejects any peace negotiations. The PFLP’s tactics have changed since its early years, switching from hijackings that aimed to put the Palestinian cause on the world stage to firing a combination of rockets and mortars from the Gaza Strip into Israel. Additionally, the PFLP also uses suicide bombings against the State of Israel. (9) Internal Relations and Alliances With the Popular Front for The Liberation of Palestine first joining the PLO, in 1968, the PFLP has had a variety of alliances since its creation. It has received support from Russia, China, Iran, and Syria. (10) Works Cited “Terrorism Profile – the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).” The Mackenzie Institute , 21 Jan. 2016, mackenzieinstitute.com/terrorism-profile-the-popular-front-for-the-liberation-of-palestine-pflp/ .   Charif, Maher. “The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – PFLP.” Palquest , palquest.palestine-studies.org/en/highlight/23332/popular-front-liberation-palestine-%E2%80%93-pflp . Library, Jewish Virtual. “Palestinian Terror Groups.” Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) , 2021, www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/popular-front-for-the-liberation-of-palestine-pflp .  News, BBC. “Profile: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).” BBC News , BBC, 18 Nov. 2014, www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30099510 .  “Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).” ECFR , 3 July 2023, ecfr.eu/special/mapping_palestinian_politics/popular_front_for_the_liberation_of_palestine/ .  Charif, Maher. “The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – PFLP.” Palquest , 2024, palquest.palestine-studies.org/en/highlight/23332/popular-front-liberation-palestine-%E2%80%93-pflp .  Dean, Laura. “The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine: Marxists with a History of Global Ties.” The World from PRX , 30 July 2016, theworld.org/stories/2016/07/30/popular-front-liberation-palestine-marxists-history-global-ties .  Monitor, NGO. “PFLP Involvement in the October 7 Atrocities " Ngomonitor.” Ngomonitor , 30 Jan. 2024, www.ngo-monitor.org/reports/pflp-involvement-in-the-october-7-atrocities/ .  Kilani, Ramsis. “Strategies for Liberation: Old and New Arguments in the Palestinian Left • International Socialism.” International Socialism , 26 June 2024, isj.org.uk/strategies-for-liberation-old-and-new-arguments-in-the-palestinian-left/ .  10. “Timeline: Key Events in the Israel-Arab and Israeli-Palestinian Conflict.” AJC , American Jewish Committee, 26 Feb. 2024, www.ajc.org/IsraelConflictTimeline . Additional Resources

Overview The Mullah Dadullah Front was an extreme insurgent faction of the Taliban in Afghanistan, named after a notoriously violent Taliban commander, who was killed in 2007. The Mullah Dadullah Front split from the Taliban by 2013, and under a commander called Najibullah the Feda’i Mahaz, they actively sought publicity through the method of high-profile killings. By 2014, their spokesperson was claiming that the group opposed the Taliban’s stance on peace talks. The Mullah Dadullah Front was part of a wider context of fragmentation within the Taliban in the early 2010s, which culminated in 2015 with a larger-scale fragmentation, though this was ultimately later recovered and reunified from. The namesake of the Front, Mullah Dadullah, was killed in a raid by NATO forces; he was known for having controversially introduced the use of suicide bombings to the conflict in Aghanistan during the 2000s, and for engaging directly with the Western press, which was extremely rare at the time. The death of Dadullah had a lasting effect on the Taliban commander class: after his loss, it was several years before any of them would come into the public eye for disagreeing with their leadership. (1) The Mullah Dadullah Front were most well known for the killing of Arsala Rahmani, a senior member of the Afghan High Peace Council, who had also served as a Deputy Education Minister during the Taliban’s rule in Afghanistan. Rahmani was assassinated in a shooting carried out in Kabul, which the Front later claimed responsibility for. (2) The assassination demonstrated the Mullah Dadullah Front’s ability at the time to dominate the news cycle around the negotiations between the Afghan government and the wider international community; it showed that there were many factions of the Taliban in the 2010s that went against the leadership’s propagated narrative of reconciliation, and instead were determined to exert control by other means. (3) History & Origins The origins of the Mullah Dadullah Front are inextricably tied to the ongoing factionalism and fragmentation of the Taliban in Afghanistan, throughout the conflict of the 2010s. While the word ‘fragmented’ is often used broadly to describe the Taliban’s loosely connected proliferation of groups and branches, it should also be understood as a more specific expression of division and factionalism within the organization. Practically, this means the splitting of the group into different splinter entities, which have their own politically distinct boundaries, and which join other existing groups, operate totally separately, or side with the state. Therefore, the fragmentation of decision making throughout the Taliban at this time stemmed from their being various ideological and pragmatic factions within the wider umbrella of the group; the Mullah Dadullah Front was part of this landscape. As early as 2007, there were signs of internal fragmentation within the Taliban; while there was no outright rejection of the authority of the Taliban leader, Mullah Omar, various figures and factions began to emerge from this time that gradually became defined and politically distinct from the leadership. Prior to the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan by the US, the Taliban had actually developed a defined hierarchical structure that was not common among other mujahideen armed groups during this time, and their survival after the American invasion is thought by many to be due to the persistence but also, the looseness, of this hierarchy, which in large part consisted of personal, networked relationships and organization between top leaders and commanders. It was common for more local commanders to implicitly be left to pursue their own interests, as long as they broadly adhered to Taliban ideology. (1) Then, in 2007, the Taliban’s senior commander and the Mullah Dadullah Front’s namesake, Mullah Dadullah, was killed by NATO special forces, and rumors of betrayal surrounded his death, which contributed to a general feeling of apathy among the wider command. There followed the death or arrest of three other senior Taliban figures, and Mullah Omar’s other deputies began implementing a wave of reforms in an attempt to further solidify and institutionalize the Taliban with the aim of keeping the movement coherent, and managed under the central leadership. However, by early in 2012, there were signs that more factionalism was causing further fragmentation, and the Mullah Dadullah Front emerged explicitly as a separate splinter group, lead by Dadullah’s younger brother, Mansour Dadullah, who had adopted his name, and who was demoted and published by the Taliban for disobedience. After this, the group conducted high-profile attacks, and maintained an opposition to the reconciliationary thinking propagated by the Taliban’s leadership during negotiations at the time. Ideology & Goals The ideology of the Mullah Dadullah Front is largely consistent with that of the wider Taliban movement: this is described by the United States Institute for Peace as ‘armed mullahs – fighting priests’; ‘as an organization of clerics, it claims a certain morality that lay people do not have; it also has a sense of exclusivity, restricted to a priestly order.’ The Taliban have, in their years of fighting in Afghanistan, sought to differentiate the violence that they enact from the violence of other groups, by giving it the legitimacy of a quasi-state power – now a state power, after their takeover following the US and UK withdrawal from the country in 2021. The Taliban emerged in 1994 and has been engaged in violent conflict since its founding; it has propagated and legitimized armed struggle as a core part of its ideology. Since their founding, the movement has fought the Islamic State of Afghanistan, and individual mujahideen commanders, before establishing themselves gradually as the de facto Islamic administration throughout Afghanistan. They argued for the establishment of the authority of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA), an Islamic state in Afghanistan. With their founder, Mullah Omar as their amir, or leader, the Taliban demanded that all other forces in the country submit to their authority, arguing that to disrupt this was to defy Islam itself. The ultimate goal, then, was to establish the rule of an Islamic state system in Afghanistan, if necessary through the use of violence. The Taliban also established themselves as the only true protectors of Afghan sovereignty, against the intervention of Western forces, often referring to themselves as continuing the long tradition of Afghanistan withholding invasion and conquest from opposing nations and insisting that those who participate in Western-style systems have shed their Afghan identity.  The Taliban utilizes the Koran and the traditions of the Prophet to guide the leadership and ideology of the movement, however, it is worth noting that the organization’s hierarchy has, at plenty of points in its history, been more decentralized and looser than one might expect given its current iteration as the de facto government of Afghanistan. This more decentralized nature is crucial when considering the development of individual factions and branches within the Taliban; many of these factions did not evolve out of large ideological disagreements, but instead from pragmatic disagreements about how to achieve the ultimate Taliban goals, and dissatisfaction with the immediate resourcing of their segments of the organization. As the Taliban experienced growing pains during its expansion across the country, some branches became more focused on their own missions, such as the Mullah Dadullah Front and their high-profile killings, which they saw as the most effective way forward. It is also worth noting that there were various viewpoints within the Taliban about the relationship they should have to the US-supported Afghan government, as well as the wider international community, and the Mullah Dadullah Front differed with the centralized Taliban leadership on this, believing that reconciliation and negotiation was not a productive path, instead favoring violence. (4) Approach to Resistance  The key methods of resistance for the Mullah Dadullah Front, were high-profile assassinations and suicide bombings. The namesake of the group, Dadullah, is responsible for introducing suicide tactics into the Afghan conflict, and this tactic persisted among the group. The group sent text messages and made phone calls to various members of the Afghan parliament in 2012, threatening suicide attacks if they voted to ratify the strategic partnership agreement between Afghanistan and the US. For the same objective, they also conducted their most famous killing, that of Rahmani. Rahmani was the second Peace minister to be killed within the year: before him, Burhanuddin Rabbani was also assassinated, a killing that was again claimed by the Mullah Dadullah Front. This approach was used by the Mullah Dadullah Front to disrupt the ratification of the strategic partnership, and curtail any new efforts to restart the much-disrupted peace process in Afghanistan. While the Taliban insisted at the time that the Front had no connection with them, and were instead a construction of the Afghanistan intelligence forces, the Front were widely known to be a branch of the Taliban and were successful at delaying the peace process by not only the threats of violence, but also by their ability to demonstrate that the wider Taliban movement was not united in its resolutions of openness to negotiation. Prior to the moves towards (and disruption of)  ratification, the strategic partnership was signed by President Barack Obama and the Afghan President, Hamid Karzai, during Obama’s visit to Kabul on 1 May 2012. Despite the intimidation by the Mullah Dadullah Front, the partnership was indeed ratified, agreeing that the US would be allowed to maintain a reduced number of troops in Afghanistan and continue training Afghan forces, as well as conducting targeted operations in the country against Al Qaeda.  Relations & Alliances  The Mullah Dadullah Front is largely thought to have remained affiliated with the Taliban, though Taliban spokespeople denied any relationship with the Front, claiming that the group was instead a creation of the Afghan government intelligence service. In August 2015, there was an announcement that Akhtar Mansour had succeeded the deceased Mullah Omar as the overall leader of the Taliban. Mansoor Dadullah refused to support the new leader, and this lead to several months of clashes between the Mullah Dadullah Front and the Taliban in Zabul Province, ultimately culminating in the killing of Mansoor Dadullah and many of his fighters in November 2015. In August 2016, the Mullah Dadullah Front then announced Dadullah’s nephew Mullah Emdadullah Mansoor as its new leader, threatening to take revenge on the Taliban. The Mullah Dadullah Front is also linked to a group known as the “Sacrifice Front” or Fidai Mahaz; this group was another splinter faction from the Taliban, and led by Mullah Najibullah, who was another former Taliban commander. This group was formed by many people who were ex-Taliban fighters and former members of the Mullah Dadullah Front, all of whom had become disillusioned with the Taliban itself. Overall, the Mullah Dadullah Front were part of a wider context of developing factionalism within the Taliban, and were vying for power and political purity alongside the backdrop of the Taliban’s participation with the current peace process in Afghanistan.  Works Cited Watkins, Andrew. ‘Taliban Fragmentation: Fact, Fiction, and Future’. United States Institute of Peace. March 2020. Accessed 21 July 2024. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/2020-03/pw_160-taliban_fragmentation_fact_fiction_and_future-pw.pdf   Roggio, Bill. ‘Mullah Dadullah Front Claims Assassination of Afghan High Peace Council Member’. Foundation for Defense of Democracies. FDD Long War Journal. 14 May 2012. Accessed 21 July 2024. https://www.fdd.org/analysis/op-eds/2012/05/14/mullah-dadullah-front-claims-assassination-of-afghan-high-peace-council-member   ‘The Dadullah Front and the Assassination of Arsala Rahmani’. Institute for the Study of War. 14 May 2012. Accessed 21 July 2024. https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/dadullah-front-and-assassination-arsala-rahmani   Semple, Michael. ‘Rhetoric, Ideology, and Organizational Structure of the Taliban Movement’. United States Institute for Peace. December 2014. Accessed 21 July 2024. https://www.usip.org/sites/default/files/PW102-Rhetoric-Ideology-and-Organizational-Structure-of-the-Taliban-Movement.pdf   Simpson, Connor. ‘Meet the New “More Radical” Insurgent Group in Afghanistan”. The Atlantic, 19 May 2012. Accessed 22 July 2024. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/05/meet-new-more-radical-insurgent-group-afghanistan/327901/   Special Operations Interrogator's Report, “State of the Taliban Archived 16 November 2021 at the Wayback Machine,”. The New York Times , 6 January 2012. Accessed 22 July 2024. https://www.documentcloud.org/documents/296489-taliban-report.html#document/p1   Additional Resources

Insurgency Overview Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), or “Basque Homeland and Liberty” was a Basque nationalist and separatist organization founded in 1959 with the primary goal of establishing an independent Basque state through armed revolutionary struggle.  The Basque country consists of 7 provinces in north-eastern Spain and south-western France.  The Basque people share a common language, ethnicity, and socio-cultural history.  Basque nationalism emerged in the 19th century with the rise of liberal centralism and modern industrialization. The Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) was founded to protect and give power to the ethnic Basque and their way of life.  General Francisco Franco’s brutal repression of the Basque during the Spanish Civil War and the decades of repression that followed only strengthened the Basque identity and nationalist sentiment. The ETA emerged out of frustration with the PNV’s passive resistance.  Through confrontation, the ETA vowed to gain Basque independence by any means necessary, including violence. The group was classified as a terrorist organization by France, Spain, the EU, the UK, the US, and Canada.  This classification is due to ETA’s paramilitary tactics which include bombings, kidnappings, and assassinations.  Between 1968 and 2010, the ETA killed 829 people—including 340 civilians. (1)  Following five decades of armed insurgency, a permanent ceasefire was declared in 2011. In 2017 the group disarmed and one year later announced their complete dissolution as an organization. History & Origins The Basque country, Euskal Herria , is a region of 7 provinces located across Northern Spain and Southern France.  Most of the region resides in four Spanish provinces (Navarra, Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya, and Alava). The Basques are the region's indigenous population. They are ethnically, culturally, and linguistically distinct from the Spanish and French. Historians believe they have occupied the territory for at least 7,000 years (potentially 40,000). They have remained fiercely independent despite millennia of threats from outside invaders.  In the Middle Ages, they joined the French and Spanish Kingdoms.  The Spanish Basque provinces were granted charters, or fueros , that granted each province a right to self-government. (1)(2) The discovery of the Americas led to an increased demand for commerce, trade, and industry in the Basque country.  At this time, a class of bourgeoisie ( jauntxos ) began to develop and reshape Basque society. During the French Revolution, liberal ideas of a centralized government in Spain gained popularity, especially amongst the bourgeoisie.  Following a series of civil wars in the 19th century known as the Carlist campaigns, the Spanish government eliminated regional privileges and thus the Basque provinces lost their autonomy. (1)(3) In the late 19th century, the Basque provinces became one of the most heavily industrialized areas in Iberia. Massive migrations of non-Basque migrants entered the region looking for work. The Basque working class found themselves working in sweatshop conditions and slum housing while competing with non-Basque for jobs.  The Basque country was Spain’s economic powerhouse, but many felt their taxes weren’t being allocated fairly by Madrid. Many Basques felt their culture and way of life were under threat.  In response, Sabino de Arana founded the Basque Nationalist Party (PNV) for Basque independence in defence of Basque culture, language, and race. (4) In the early 20th century, the PNV became a dominant political force in local elections and a vocal minority in the Spanish parliament. In 1923, Captain General Miguel Primo de Rivera became dictator of Spain and outlawed the PNV.  The party was forced to go underground. At the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War, a coalition of Basque nationalist and republican forces enacted the Government of Euskadi but were defeated by General Francisco Franco’s forces in 1937. The exiled Basque government, synonymous with the PNV, fled to Paris. For decades, Franco continued to rule Spain with an iron fist; he outlawed all Basque culture including Euskadi, the Basque language.  The PNV believed the Allies, whom they collaborated with closely during World War 2, would rid Spain of Franco. Instead, the US made a deal with Franco in return for establishing military bases across Spain. In 1959, a group of Basque youths formed the ETA, which broke with the passivity of the PNV and called for a campaign of national liberation by any means necessary. (4) ETA, Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Liberty), emerged out of a student group, Ekin , in the early 50s. (4) Their first major action occurred in 1961 when the group’s failed attempt to derail a train of Francoist supporters was met with immediate retaliation from Franco.  More than a hundred eterras  (ETA members) were arrested, tortured, and given lengthy prison sentences. Several key leaders fled into exile in France. (3) In 1962, the group held their first assembly and developed a structure of activist cells. The exiled leaders formed the Executive Committee which continued to give top-down orders to ETA cells in Spanish Basque from France. They also sent out a communique publicly declaring their intent to gain Basque independence by “whatever means necessary.”   In 64’ and 65’, the ETA held their third and fourth assemblies, adopting an anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist position combining Basque nationalism with Marxist ideas of class struggle and Franz Fanon’s ‘Third-Worldist’ perspective on decolonization. In 67’, they reached a consensus on pursuing a strategy of armed struggle known as the ‘action-repression-action spiral theory’. The strategy would attempt to antagonize Franco into unbearable escalations of relation and repression that the Basque population would become compelled to join them in their revolutionary struggle for independence. (1)(2) In 1968, the ETA assassinated Meliton Manzanas, a police commissioner known for torturing Basque nationalists. In response, Franco declared a “State of Exception”, suspending constitutional rights and arresting, torturing, and imprisoning Basques perceived to be affiliated with ETA. The spiral theory did not account for the intensity and rapid development of Franco’s retaliation. (1)(2) In 1970, in the Burgos Trials, several ETA members were condemned to death.  Coverage of the trials received international attention and was condemned by figures like the Pope and philosopher Jean-Paul Sartre. In response, those condemned to die received long prison sentences instead. (5) ETA’s most infamous action, dubbed ‘Operation Ogre’, occurred in 1972 when an ETA cell assassinated Admiral Luis Carrero Blanco, Franco’s second in command and Spain’s newly inaugurated Prime Minister. Blanco was notorious for his brutal counterinsurgent campaigns and a crackdown on illegal labour unions.  Following Franco’s death, Blanco was to continue to lead the regime. When ETA was informed of Blanco’s routine trips to and from mass, they seized on the opportunity to act.  Originally, they planned to kidnap Blanco to leverage a deal to have ETA prisoners released, but they decided it would be easier to have him killed.  On December 20th, an 80kg Goma-2 explosive planted in a tunnel beneath the road blew Blanco’s car several stories high, killing him instantly. His death is widely seen as the end of Francoism. (2) On November 22, 1975, General Franco took his last breath.  King Juan Carlos I declared an amnesty for all of Spain’s political prisoners and allowed a democratically elected parliament and Prime Minister. A new constitution was enacted in 1978 by popular vote. The constitution recognized autonomous communities and their ethnic nationalities. Basque culture and language were allowed to be practised openly once again. For Basque nationalists, the constitutional changes weren’t seen as ‘true independence’. Many Francoist officials guilty of crimes against humanity continued to retain their posts in judicial, military, and political administrations. During this time, the ETA increased their armed activity. Between 1978 and 1980, ETA claimed 227 lives, 213 casualties and 19 kidnappings. (2) During the transition to democracy, the ETA split into factions. A faction known as ETApm (ETA politico-militar) wanted to broaden its strategy to include both political engagement and militant activities, but ETAm (ETA-militar) were committed to the armed struggle. ETApm began to regard violent actions as counter-productive and saw working within the new democratic system as more beneficial to the Basque cause.  In 1977 they formed a political group known as Euskadiko Ezkerra (EE), or ‘Basque Left’, and won several seats in both the Spanish and Basque parliaments.  The success of EE convinced ETAm to form their political group known as Herri Batasuna (HB), or ‘People’s Unity’. Both factions joined the Koordinadora Abertzale Sozialista (KAS), or ‘Socialist Patriotic Coordinator’, a unified coalition of political parties and labour unions representing the interest of the Basque working class. (2) In 1982, ETApm disbanded completely.  Following their dissolution, the ETAm was simply known as ETA. By the late 80s and 90s, the movement began to grow weak.  In 83’, the French government began to cooperate with the Spanish government in denying ETA members refuge and deporting them back to Spain. The Spanish government were also found to have ties to Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (Anti-Terrorist Liberation Groups), or GAL. GAL were a paramilitary coalition that illegally tortured and killed anyone they believed was connected to the ETA in what is as a “dirty war”. (6) Political parties that supported Basque nationalism, such as HB, were outlawed. Most notably, public support began to decline following bombing campaigns across Spain that resulted in civilian casualties and the assassination of former ETA leader María Dolores González Yoyes. (2) In 1988, many ETA members began to sign a cease-fire agreement with the Spanish government. Four years later, three of ETA’s leading figures were captured.  By this time, the movement had dwindled into bouts of youth-led street violence.  Many saw this as a clear sign of their weakness. In 1995, an ETA cell commuted a failed attempt to attack the Spanish royal family. That same year, they kidnapped and assassinated a Spanish political leader, Miguel Angel Blanco, beloved by both Spanish and Basque citizens. They were met with a further decline in public support. (2) Post 9/11, the United States’ “War on Terror” made it harder for ETA to continue to operate. In 2004, ETA was blamed for the Madrid Train Bombings that killed 191 and injured 1,800. Although the bombing was later revealed to have been orchestrated by an Islamic extremist group, damage to the group’s public image had already been done.  ETA reached out for cease-fire talks in 2006, but the treaty broke down following ETA’s bombing of a parking garage at Madrid’s airport that killed two Ecuadorian immigrants. In 2010, the group decided to announce a ‘permanent ceasefire’, and the following year they announced an end to their armed campaign. In 2017, they destroyed their arsenal of weapons and two years later announced their complete dissolution. (5) Despite no formal peace process, the ETA and Spanish government have remained dedicated to peace, but tension runs deep.  Recently, an ETA-affiliated political group known as EH Bildu ran forty-four ex-convicted ETA members for the Spanish general election. A conservative Christian party known as PP, or ‘People’s Party’, have responded with accusations that the “ETA is still alive” in the form of EH Bildu. Regardless of these accusations, Spanish Prime Minister, Pedro Sanchez, determined there is no legal basis for Spain to ban EH Bildu. EH Bildu insists that the days of armed revolution are over. Former ETA member and general coordinator of EH Bildu, Arnaldo Otegi, stated that ETA’s use of violence in the quest for independence  “should never have happened.” (7) Objectives & Ideology The ETA is strongly rooted within the Basque nationalist movement. They emerged out of frustration at the PNV’s passive resistance towards the Franco regime. The PNV saw cooperation with the Spanish government and coalition building as a pragmatic way to gain more autonomy for the Basque region. The younger and more radical ETA argued that only through direct action could independence be gained. (1)(3) The early ideological struggle within the ETA was concerned with the following: Ethnicity vs class as an organizing principle for revolution. Nationalism vs socialism as a guiding ideology   Conducting struggle based solely on ethnic Basques vs integrating non-Basque immigrants into the conflict. Use of ‘direct action’ or ‘activism’ vs nonviolent organizing among masses of industrial workers .   (3) Periodically, the ETA held debates at collective assemblies and made decisions on organisation structure, political ideology, philosophy of the movement, operations, strategy, tactics, etc. At their first assembly (1962), the ETA asserted its identity as a “revolutionary Basque movement” for national liberation. The Executive Committee issued their declaration of purpose: “ETA is a clandestine organization whose only objective is to obtain as rapidly as possible and using all the means possible—including violence—the independence of Euzkadi.” They advocated for the creation of a federated Europe based on ethnonationalities, separation of church and state, and opposition to racism and dictatorial regimes, whether fascist or communist. They supported a Basque national front composed of all ethnic Basque political groups regardless of social class and emphasized the Basque ethnic and cultural struggle. (3) By the third assembly (1964-1965), things began to radically change. Multiple factions who were focused solely on purely ethnic or class struggle left the group. The remaining members were more ideologically homogenous. They defined themselves as anti-capitalist and anti-imperialists committed to the armed struggle for Basque independence.  Inspired by Franz Fanon’s writings on the struggles of the Third World against Western European and American colonialism, the group saw the Basque ethnic struggle and working-class struggle as two parts of a large struggle against Spanish colonization. Therefore, the ETA would wage an armed struggle against both the Spanish apparatus of domination (government, bureaucracy, economy, mass media, etc.) and the Basque bourgeoisie who refused to cooperate with the struggle. (3) Between 1967 and 1968, the ETA split due to ideological and strategic differences between factions. The ETApm were closer to traditional Marxist-Leninism and chose to combine an armed mobile proletariat and joint political-military strategy like the Tupamaros in Uruguay. In contrast, the ETAm maintained the use of small clandestine cells and was influenced by the Palestinian militant group Black September. By the 80s, ETApm dissolved but remained active politically as the EE. The ETAm continued the armed struggle as the sole ETA. (3) In 1978, ETA’s five conditions for a total cessation of hostilities were the following: Amnesty for all Basque political prisoners. Legalization of all political parties including those espousing separatism. Expulsion of the Spanish Guardia Civil and other police agencies from the Basque country.   Adoption of measures to improve conditions of the working class. Recognition of the national sovereignty of Euskadi and the right of the Basque people to self-determination.   (3) The Spanish government refused to negotiate. In 2011, the ETA were unpopular, isolated, and weakened beyond repair. They decided the armed struggle was no longer a viable option and called for an end to hostilities in 2011. In 2018, the last remnant of ETA announced its dissolution. (3) Today, many ex-ETA members continue to fight for the creation of a “Basque State”, but through democratic politics rather than armed actions. (ex. EH Bildu). (7) Political & Military Capabilities ETA militants, eterras , are estimated to have ranged somewhere between 300 to 2,000 active members at their peak.  After five decades of operations, they have killed 829, kidnapped 77, and wounded more than 22,000. (4) Their operations consisted of armed robberies, raids on weapons factories and depots, bombings, and sabotage.  Most operations were carried out in Spanish Basque but included cities in Spain, France, and Catalonia. (2) The ETA was organized along a three-tired, top-down pyramid-like structure. The Executive Committee, based in France, consisted of about 10 individuals. Their function was to recruit, gather and analyze intel, procure weapons, maintain finances, and handle publicity. The middle branch was a loosely operational committee that oversaw ETA activities in each of the Spanish Basque provinces. At the base of the organization are the commandos, cells of 3-5 members operating near the town or neighbourhood they live. They work in secrecy and stay isolated from the rest of the organization to prevent members from giving up any information under interrogation or torture. (2) There are several classes of etteras within the organization . Liberados , aka ilegales , or fichidos , have a police record, or ficha , on file. They work full-time for the ETA and earn a modest salary. Liberados  carry out most of the armed actions such as bombings, bank robberies, and kidnappings. Legales are unknown to police and live conventional lives.  Most ETA activists are young, single male legales  from Vizcaya or Guipúzcoa. They are full-time students, workers, and agriculturalists who could be sporadically activated for an ekintza  (action) at any moment. They serve as enlances  (links) and act as couriers of information, or buzons (mailboxes) which serve as drop-off points for messages, weapons, or other items passing through ETA’s network. Information would be shared in secure locations such as local bars, movie theatres, restaurants, etc. Contraband was hidden in secret compartments with false bottoms to avoid detection. (2) A recruiter scouts out new members at social clubs and hangouts and vets them for over a year. During the onboarding process, potential recruits play minor roles in operations and progressively take on more responsibility. Once admitted into the organization, they spend two weeks of basic training at a camp in southern France where they receive training on weapons, combat, explosives, communication devices and channels, intel gathering, etc. (2) ETA’s weapons and ammo cache were supplied via the international illegal arms market or stolen from arms depots in Spain, France, and elsewhere. Weapons were often smuggled across the Pyrenees or Bay of Biscay concealed within food crates or in vehicles/boats with false bottoms. ETA cells were as well equipped as a conventional infantry attachment in the Spanish Army. The preferred pistols include the Belgian-manufactured Browning 9mm HP35 and the Basque-manufactured Star, Astra, and Firebird. The preferred submachine guns included the Belgian-manufactured 9mm Vigneron, Israeli/Belgian-manufactured 9mm Uzi, and the United Kingdom-manufactured 9mm Sten Mark II. Most ETA were given pistols rather than submachine guns. Pistols were the least likely to result in accidental deaths or wasted ammunition. Specially trained commandos received automatic/semi-automatic rifles such as the American M-16 and Belgian FAL. Rocket launchers were rarely used because they tended to be old and unreliable. The go-to explosive was Goma-2.  It is manufactured across Spain and Portugal and used for construction and quarrying.  There were plenty of major deposits in Basque country from which to steal. (2) ETA was financed by donations, army robberies, kidnapping, ransoms, and so-called “revolutionary taxes” aka (extortion) they learned from the Irish Republican Army. Basque industrialists and bourgeoisie essentially “made an offer they couldn’t refuse” under threats of violence. For perspective, in 1978 ETA robbed 50 banks for over 4 million dollars. That same year over 800 wealthy Basques were paying revolutionary taxes. Kidnapping victims were kept behind false walls or windowless rooms known as “people’s prisons” until a ransom was paid or a political concession was granted. These same hiding spots could be used to hide eterras  from capture. (2) The ETA’s main targets were members of the Spanish security state. Civilian casualties were mostly politicians and police informants although 9% were estimated to be innocent bystanders. Bombs and crossfire were responsible for most of their accidental victims. Operations tended to avoid direct assault. Eterras used hit-and-run tactics catching their victims off guard when they were most vulnerable. Most victims were assassinated while driving, sitting at a bar/restaurant, taking a walk, etc. (2) Approach To Resistance The ETA’s primary approach to resistance was through armed insurgence. In 1967, there was a group consensus on applying the ‘Action-Repression-Action-Spiral Theory’ against Franco’s regime. In theory, cycles of escalating armed actions and retaliation would have led to such atrocious forms of repression that a civil war would break out and the general Basque population would join the ETA in its armed struggle for independence. In practice, the Franco regime cracked down swiftly and arrested, tortured, and imprisoned lETA leaders and hundreds of etteras. A ‘State of Exception’ (martial law) was implemented suspending constitutional rights for Spanish Basque and eventually the rest of Spain. There would be no civil war. Despite living under the conditions of a constant police state, ETA continued armed operations against Franco’s regime until his death. Their assassination of Admiral Blanco arguably put the nail in the coffin of Franco’s regime and facilitated the emergence of a Spanish democracy. (2) During Spain’s transition to democracy, ETA’s ideological split would precede both factions joining a workers’ coalition (KAS) and forming their political parties (EE and HB). Both parties responded “no” to the Constitutional referendum. Regardless, the referendum was passed. During these turbulent years, ETApm and ETAm increased armed insurgency for “true” liberation. Later, ETApm ultimately decided to forgo the militant path. Their reasoning behind that decision was twofold. First, they believed through politics they could gain more autonomy and worker’s rights for the Basque people. Secondly, they believed armed insurgence might trigger a right-wing coup and a loss of their recently gained autonomy. ETAm continued its armed insurgency but ultimately dissolved due to Spanish counterinsurgency, French cooperation with the Spanish government, and a loss of public support. (2) ETA was able to create a “spiral of silence” using street violence, intimidation, extortion, and a network of organizations within the Basque National Liberation Movement. The goal was to make their presence felt everywhere. Intimidation and extortion were leveraged to entice others to support the cause. There was a  “fear of physical and (sometimes irreversible) damage or destruction of property, but also social marginalization or emptiness, including stigmatization as Spanish.”   ETA encouraged supporters to occupy public spaces and show their support. It held symbolic power and attracted media attention which held the perception of legitimacy to ETA’s cause. (8) Relations & Alliances It has been alleged that the ETA had links to an international terrorist network.  In 1981, Spanish magazine Policia Espanola published an alleged foreign contact that claimed ETA was receiving weapons, explosives, and/or tactical training in South Yemen, Lebanon, Czechoslovakia, Ireland, Uruguay, Cuba, and Algeria. Spanish intelligence claims a small group of eterras were trained in kidnapping and sabotage in Cuba in 1964. They are also alleged to have had ties to the IRA, Red Brigades, and the Baader-Meinhof Gang.  Exiles were given refuge in France (until 1983), Belgium and Algeria. (4) Political parties associated with ETA were Herri Batasuna and Euzkadiko Ezkerra.  EH Bildu, a Basque separatist party, is made up of many ex-ETA members, forty-four of which recently ran in Spain’s general elections. (4)(7) ETA had a strong presence in the Basque Liberation Movement. Organizations within the public sphere apart of this movement including workers’ unions (LAB), youth groups (Jarrai), feminist groups (Egizan), ecologist groups (Eguzki), student groups (Ikasle Abertzaleak), internationalist groups (Askapena), media and cultural groups (Egin & Egin Irratia), human rights groups (Herriko Tabernas) and other groups which serve as political and social apparatuses to create a counter society who ran against the prevailing narrative of the state. (8) Works Cited (1) - Watson, Cameron, Basque Nationalism and Political Violence: The Ideological and Intellectual origins of ETA, Center for Basque Studies, University of Nevada, Reno, Nevada, 2007. (2) - Anderson, Wayne, The ETA: Spain’s Basque Terrorists , Rosen Publication, New York, 2003. (3) - Clark, Robert P., The Basque Insurgents: ETA, 1952-1980 , University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, Wisconsin, 1984. (4) - Douglas William A., and Joseba Zulaika, “On the Interpretation of Terrorist Violence: ETA and the Basque Political Process”, Comparative Studies in Society and History ,   Volume 32, No. 2, pp. 238-257, Cambridge University Press, Published: April, 1990.  Accessed: 6/23/2014 https://www-jstor-org.proxy.multcolib.org/stable/pdf/178914.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ac11b4769c0a0c32504f2dead698577a3&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1 (5) - Who Were the ETA (Euskadia Ta Askatasuna)?, History With Hilbert, Educational Video, Published May 21, 2021. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8iRB7SJ3S-4&t=28s (6) - Encarnación, Omar G., “Democracy and Dirty Wars in Spain”, Human Rights Quarterly , Vol. 29, No. 4, pp. 950-972, The John Hopkins University Press, Published November 2007 https://www-jstor-org.proxy.multcolib.org/stable/pdf/20072832.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3Ac11b4769c0a0c32504f2dead698577a3&ab_segments=0%2Fbasic_search_gsv2%2Fcontrol&origin=&initiator=search-results&acceptTC=1 (7) - Llach, Laura, Spanish Elections Re-Open Deep Wounds, as ETA Terrorists Run for Political Office, Euro News, Published: 5/19/2023 https://www.euronews.com/2023/05/19/spanish-elections-re-open-deep-wounds-as-eta-terrorists-run-for-political-office (8) - García, César, “The Strategic Communication Power of Terrorism: The Case of ETA, Perspectives on Terrorism , Vol. 12, No. 5 pp. 27-35, Terrorism Research Initiative, October 2018. https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/26515429.pdf?refreqid=fastly-default%3A809e306b3115dbd7d1be0a50be7330c6&ab_segments=&origin=&initiator=&acceptTC=1

Introduction & Overview Colectivos are armed, far-left paramilitary groups that reside in Venezuela’s poorest neighbourhoods and slums. Loyal to the Venezuelan government and the Bolivarian Revolution, they act mainly as government enforcers to maintain order and suppress dissent. Numbered in the hundreds, members of Colectivos are armed, funded directly by the government, and are usually seen travelling on motorcycles in large groups. History & Foundations The Colectivos emerged during a period of armed leftist rebellions against the presidency of Rómulo Betancourt in the 1960s. Some of these groups, like the Tupamaros (named after the former Uruguayan group with the same name), conducted bank robberies and engaged in car theft to fund their activities. Decades later, in 1998, they publicly endorsed Hugo Chavez’s candidacy for presidency (Infobae, 2017a) . Following his election a year later, most of these groups gave up their armed struggle and decided to support the new socialist government (Newman, 2019) . Chavez took advantage of this trend and decided to fund, organize, and arm these groups to protect his revolution and broader political ambitions. Later, these groups came to be referred to as the Bolivarian Circles, which were part of political groups set up by Chavez to garner grassroots support. During the events preceding the April 2002 coup that saw Chavez temporarily removed from power, the groups proved their loyalty to him and his government by engaging in violent acts against anti-government protestors participating in mass worker strikes. During the protests, members of the Bolivarian Circles shot at protestors that were marching towards the presidential palace and later exchanged fire with police officers. The incident resulted in 19 deaths and over a hundred injuries. After the incident, Chavez’s government began to refer to the groups as “Colectivos'' ('collectives' in English) and began the process of legitimisation by including these groups in the political process on a local level (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . This process included the covert arming of the groups with decommissioned and confiscated handguns from military bases by the director of Venezuela’s national intelligence agency (Briceño, 2019) . Following this explicit support and 'normalisation', political attacks grew rampant and violence grew steadily. In 2003, a Colectivo by the name of Coordinadora Simón Bolívar aided the Bolivarian Forces of Liberation (a communist guerrilla group) in a series of coordinated bombing attacks targeting the Spanish and Colombian embassies in Caracas (Medina, 2003) . Years later, in 2008, Colectivos once again participated in a series of coordinated bombings, this time targeting the headquarters of Venezuela’s largest business union, Fedecámaras. The perpetrator, an active member of the Metropolitan Police Department, was the sole victim of the bombing after one of his explosives detonated prematurely. Further blame was placed on a Colectivo called Frente Guerrillero Venceremos, following the discovery of pamphlets belonging to the group at the scene (El Universo, 2008) . A few weeks before this attack, another Colectivo attempted to blow up the George Washington statue in Caracas. The bomb detonated, but only caused minor damage (Infobae, 2017b) . In 2009, several canisters of tear gas were fired at the Vatican’s diplomatic headquarters by a Colectivo in response to them offering asylum to Nixon Moreno, an anti-government protestor accused of attempting to rape a police officer. Colectivo La Piedrita claimed responsibility, leaving pamphlets outside the building accusing the Catholic Church of treason against the Venezuelan people (CNN, 2009) . That same year, the group raided and tear gassed the headquarters of Globovision, a prominent television news network accused by Chavez of inciting violence and conspiring against his government (Reuters, 2009) . Despite the government's support for the Colectivos, this attack drew strong condemnation, leading them to imprison the leader of the group, Lina Ron, for three months. Following the incident, the U.S. embassy in Venezuela suggested to the American government that Lina Ron be added to a list of suspected terrorists for her involvement in the attack (Semana, 2011) . More recently, in 2017, colectivos stormed the National Assembly building armed with firearms and attacked opposition legislators with teargas and pipes, injuring 7 (Ramírez & Rawlins, 2017) . Today, there are hundreds of different Colectivos around the country, with some of the largest and most prominent ones being based in the capital city of Caracas (Infobae, 2017a) . In fact, in the 23 de Enero neighbourhood alone, there are reportedly over 46 different Colectivos (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . Some of the most prominent groups include La Piedrita, Alexis Vive, Los Tupamaros, and la Coordinadora Simón Bolívar. Objectives & Ideology Colectivos are known to be relatively homogeneous ideologically, with all of them uniformly endorsing the current government of Venezuela and the Bolivarian Revolution. Ideologies may vary on a smaller scale, with different forms or approaches to leftism, but the two major tenets of their beliefs are Bolivarianism (a mix of nationalistic and socialist ideals named after Simon Bolivar) and Chavismo (the socialist ideology of Hugo Chavez). Despite their strong support for the Venezuelan government, some Colectivos reportedly have ill-feelings towards Nicolas Maduro, Chavez’s hand-picked predecessor following his death in 2013. This stems from a variety of issues that include reduced funding, perceived government hostility towards the groups, and the belief that Maduro has corrupted Chavez’s revolution and led the country to deteriorate. Nonetheless, the groups remain loyal to the revolution and government because they prefer it over the pro-capitalist opposition government. However, it is reported that the government has lost control of many of these groups as they refuse to answer to them, instead opting to defend the revolution and government independently and on their own terms. Overall, the group's main objectives are to 'protect' (as they view it) Venezuela from foreign intervention and to uphold Chavez’s legacy and revolution. On the local level, the groups serve as security in certain neighbourhoods and are known to conduct a wide array of community service. Among these are after-school programs, sports events, and drug rehabilitation programs (Markovits & Bevins, 2008) . This is notably the case following Chavez’s dissolution of the Metropolitan Police in 2011, as security in certain neighborhoods was turned over to the Colectivos (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . To this day, police rarely enter or patrol these areas, often allowing the groups to govern themselves. One of these neighbourhoods is the 23 de Enero neighbourhood in Caracas, which is regarded as a hotbed for the armed groups. Here, Colectivos impose roadblocks to tax vehicles, controlling movement into the neighbourhood while also reportedly imposing protection taxes on residents. The groups also claim to combat crime, regularly executing drug dealers and thieves (Markovits & Bevins, 2008) . However, despite the groups' alleged involvement in fighting crime and curbing the local drug trade, Colectivos have long been accused of trafficking both drugs and weapons, as well as participating in organized crime, a claim that has been reinforced by locals and investigative journalists alike (Briceño, 2019) (Infobae, 2020) (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . The Colectivos are also used by the government to help administer social programs, ultimately deciding who gets government assistance in certain neighbourhoods. However, the groups have often been accused of stealing medicine and food rations from these programs to sell on the black market. They have also been accused of using aid programs to discriminate politically, with residents of one neighborhood complaining that Colectivos would threaten to shoot and refuse to give food to those who spoke negatively about the government (Transparencia Venezuela, 2019) (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . The groups also reportedly provide intelligence and surveillance for the government (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017) and patrol polling stations during election seasons, often engaging in threats and violence against voters. These incidents of voter intimidation are not uncommon. In 2021, Colectivos conducted a drive-by shooting on a voting center, killing a young man and injuring two others (Infobae, 2021) . That same day, Colectivos threatened voters and fired their weapons in the air at another voting center close to the site of the first shooting (Monitoreamos, 2021b) . On the national level, the groups are used by the government to stifle dissent, often targeting anti-government protests and members of the opposition. Maduro has publicly called on the groups to maintain order before, most notably during the 2019 electricity blackouts where he asked them to participate in “active resistance”, presumably against saboteurs and rioters (Diario las Américas , 2019) . Colectivos often work as security for public officials, serving as bodyguards for local politicians pertaining to the ruling PSUV party (United Socialist Party of Venezuela) (Gurney, 2014) (Kobelinsky, 2017) . It is also not uncommon for Colectivo members to hold positions in government, especially on the local level. One colectivo group, the ‘Tupamaros’, allegedly had close ties with the former mayor of Caracas, Juan Barreto, who ended up appointing a leader of the group as the city's deputy director of public safety (Gurney, 2014) . Approach to Resistance As previously stated, Colectivos regularly engage in political intimidation, often threatening opposition politicians and their supporters. This is regularly done by sending death threats to protestors to prevent them from taking the streets (Barráez, 2019) . Colectivos are also widely known for disrupting and sabotaging anti-government protests, something which they have admitted they are paid by the government to do (Voz de América, 2018) . The violence caused at these protests is large and indiscriminate, often coming through the form of shooting at protestors. During anti-government protests in 2014, for example, the Venezuelan Observatory of Social Conflict (OVCS) reported that Colectivos were responsible for at least 437 violent attacks on protestors in the first quarter of the year, with most cases resulting in gunshot wounds. One of these attacks resulted in the murder of Genesis Carmona, a young college student and beauty pageant queen. The shooting led to widespread controversy around the country and - despite the government blaming it on the protestors - footage showed government supporters firing a barrage of shots at marchers seconds before Carmona was hit (La Vanguardia, 2014) . Three years later, during widespread anti-government protests that gripped the country, Colectivos killed 27 protestors and engaged in kidnapping and arbitrary arrests, according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights. Following these incidents, the European Parliament asked the Venezuelan government to “immediately disarm and dissolve all uncontrolled armed pro-government groups and end their impunity" (European Parliament, 2014) . Venezuela's National Assembly followed suit a few years later, declaring their actions as “state terrorism” (Europa Press, 2019) . In 2018, the groups once again made national headlines after they shot at interim President Juan Guiado and his supporters at an opposition rally. The armed men later attacked journalists and stole one of the cars used to transport Guiado and his aides (Meléndez, 2020) (Reuters, 2020) . Two years later, in 2021, the Colectivos were believed to be behind an assault on the campaign center of the Mesa de la Unidad Democrática (MUD), a coalition of opposition parties, that left a legislator badly beaten (Monitoreamos, 2021a) . In 2022, several female students reported that Colectivos had grabbed them and ripped their fingernails out during protests at the University of the Andes in Merida state. The protests had been surrounding Diosdado Cabello’s visit to the university, a high ranking Venezuelan politician and one of Maduro’s closest associates (NTN24, 2022) . This attack was not an isolated incident, however, as Colectivos have repeatedly targeted university students in the past. Seven years prior, colectivos stormed the same university, firing shots at students and assaulting them (Diario las Américas, 2015) . While the Colectivos' attacks on anti-government protests are fairly common, their repression of workers on strike such as teachers and doctors has also been well documented. In 2016, Colectivos assaulted and kidnapped doctors who were protesting the dismissal of three of their colleagues for accepting medicinal donations from opposition politicians (Lozada, 2016) . Additionally, in 2023, Colectivos threatened and shot at teachers who were protesting for better salaries around the country (NTN24, 2023) (Barráez, 2019) . Their attacks on journalists have also been widely reported, notably in 2020 when Colectivos assaulted and robbed journalists covering the arrival of opposition leader Juan Guaido outside of the Simon Bolivar International Airport, near Caracas. Journalists present at the airport reported that police watched the incident take place, but did not intervene (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2020) . Prior to that, in 2012, Colectivos shot up an opposition rally being attended by presidential candidate Henrique Caprilles and then proceeded to attack and rob several journalists at gunpoint (Committee to Protect Journalists, 2012) . In 2021, men and women allegedly pertaining to local Colectivos were caught on video touring an occupied apartment building accompanied by officials from the Ministry of Housing. According to building residents, they were attempting to break into empty apartments with the intention of occupying them (800Noticias, 2021) . InSight Crime reports that these instances of illegal seizures of property are not uncommon, as many buildings and businesses that were temporarily shut down due to COVID around Venezuela were later occupied by Colectivos (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2021) . UPDATES: During Venezuela's October 2023 opposition primaries, a voting center was teargassed (Meza, 2023) , and another was threatened, prompting officials to change locations (Alcalde, 2023) . The armed theft of electoral material was also reported at another voting center (Maduradas, 2023) . Colectivos were suspected to be responsible. Numerous unconfirmed videos of colectivos harassing voters around the country, some with firearms, have spread throughout social media. In February 2024, Colectivos blocked roads in the Petare neighbourhood of Caracas to demand that Police release detained members of the group that had been arrested on a variety of criminal charges. Armed with firearms, Colectivo members forced bus drivers to park their buses diagonally on the road, blocking the flow of traffic. They also threatened a garbage truck into emptying its contents, which they lit on fire, in front of the police station (Hernández, 2024). In July 2024, during Venezuela's presidential election day, several reports of Colectivos around the country attacking voting centers arose. In Táchira, a man was pronounced dead after a shooting outside of a voting center reportedly carried out by Colectivos (El Nuevo Siglo, 2024) . It was also reported that Colectivos assaulted several people and stole a media outlet's camera at a voting center in a school in Caracas (Hernández, 2024) . Dozens of other unconfirmed reports have since spread through social media platforms such as Telegram and X, showing masked men on motorcycles driving past voting centers and allegedly assaulting electoral witnesses. Following the release of election results declaring Maduro as the winner, mass protests erupted claiming electoral fraud. Reports of rampant violence by Colectivos in these currently ongoing protests are widespread and well documented. Videos of weapon-clad Colectivo members threatening protestors have gone viral, and reports of several beatings and shooting deaths have also been reported (Lozano, 2024) . Military Capabilities The colectivos are known to be extremely well armed and possess a variety of weapons, many of which they flaunt at protests and on social media. On top of their access to rifles such as FALs, AKs, and AR-15s, they are also known to be in possession of other firearms such as shotguns, submachine guns and handguns, as well as tear gas and grenades. The groups obtain these weapons through funds provided by the government, on the black market, or from working security for government officials (Gurney, 2014) . It is also not uncommon to see them openly brandish and carry firearms in day to day life, despite firearm ownership being illegal and punishable by up to 20 years in Venezuela (Infobae, 2017a) (BBC, 2014) . Moreover, it is important to note that, while not all Colectivos are armed equally or have access to the same firepower, most are at the minimum equipped with pistols (Unidad Investigativa de Venezuela, 2019) . Political Alliances & Opposition Venezuela’s Colectivos have been heavily influenced by Iran’s civilian Basij paramilitary force. In 2009, the then-commander of the Basij, Mohammad Reza Naqdi, and then-Iranian defence minister, Mostafa Mohammad-Najjar, visited president Hugo Chavez in Caracas. Allegedly, these visits served to aid in the training of Venezuela's own civilian militias, the Colectivos (Humire, 2015) . The groups have maintained somewhat close ties with Venezuelan security forces, with many members having received prior training from police (Torres & Casey, 2017) . Colectivos can often be seen working alongside law enforcement to conduct raids and provide security (United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2017) . The most notable occurrence of this was when colectivo members participated in the 2018 operation to kill rebel commander Oscar Perez alongside Venezuelan troops and state security forces (Fiorella & Leroy, 2018) . One Colectivo, called ‘Tres Raíces’, even has several of its members serving in the country’s National Intelligence Service and local police. This has often allowed them to evade justice and prosecution for murders and kidnappings that members of the group have been linked to (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . Due to these close ties with the government and national security forces, the groups are able to operate with impunity. According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, police once left a protest when Colectivos arrived and refused to help those that the group attacked. The British Embassy in Caracas also reported that the members of the group are rarely arrested for breaking the law, and if they are, they are almost immediately let go (Transparencia Venezuela, 2020) . In 2018, members of the Colectivo ‘La Piedrita’ participated in military exercises alongside Venezuelan troops. They openly brandished firearms and their leader, Valentin Santana, met with several government officials and high ranking members of the military, despite having two active arrest warrants for homicide (Meléndez, 2018) . Despite this, however, the relationship between Colectivos and police is not always positive, and clashes between them have occurred on more than one instance, often due to animosity between both groups over who holds rightful authority. This stems from the fact that security forces are barred from entering certain neighborhoods by Colectivos, instead being forced to cooperate with them in order to enter these areas. In 2014, a gunfight between Venezuelan police and members of the Colectivos ‘5 de Marzo’ and ‘Escudo de la Revolución’ resulted in five dead Colectivo members (Pachico, 2014) . That same year, security forces killed the leader of the ‘5 de Marzo’ Colectivo, who happened to be a former police officer (Rísquez, 2018) . The Colectivos are also known to sometimes clash with each other over territory and drug routes (Infobae, 2017a) . In 2008, it was revealed that several Colectivos from Caracas had been in contact with the FARC, a communist guerrilla group based in Colombia, and had received training from them (Stone, 2011) . In regards to the group's funding, the government's initial payments to the Colectivos came through the form of slush funds and direct payment from politicians to members of the group. Nowadays, Colectivos are often paid with food and supplies rather than money (Gurney, 2014) . While most Colectivos were originally reliant on this government funding, budget cuts have meant that many groups have had to rely on other means to obtain funds, both through legal and illegal means (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . One Colectivo, for instance, runs an official bodyguard service while others run casinos and various small businesses (Rísquez, 2018) . The groups are also known to control illegal gold mines around the country and allegedly tax miners and local communities (Rendon et al., 2020) . Drug and weapons trafficking is also common, from which a sizable portion of their income is believed to derive from (Venezuela Investigative Unit, 2018) . Works cited (APA-style) 800Noticias. (2021, January 9). +video: Colectivos Intentaron Invadir un edificio en el recreo . https://800noticias.com/video-colectivos-intentaron-invadir-un-edificio-en-el-recreo Alcalde, C. (2023, October 23). 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Colectivos confiesan que fueron contratados para disipar Marchas Opositoras . https://www.vozdeamerica.com/a/colectivos-marcas-opositoras/4228673.html Additional Resources